ABSTRACT: Angelo Panebianco points out, beginning with the example of the massacre of Tien An Men, the uselessness of non -violence against compact and ferociously determined ranks;

I will respond to the request for an evaluation of the role which those practicing non-violence can take in political campaigns with two observations. The first of these is of a general character (on non-violence itself), and the second more specific (on the effect of non-violent actions by the Radical Party on Italian politics).

In the first case, I shall say that laics must make a myth of nothing--even non-violence. Otherwise the result is a laicality--even by Gandhi, who was aware that non-violence could be useful to the Indian people against British democracy (the costs, political and cultural, of shooting into a defenseless crowd can be dangerously high for any British government). But it would have been useless against Hitler and his SS. What I mean to say is that the evaluation of using or not using the method of non-violent civil disobedience does not imply a question of principle but of convenience; and thus, from time to time, a profit/loss analysis and an examination of the existing situation is required.

I will give an example. Tien An Men Square can be interpreted as an exemplary case of the application of non-violent action which is successful as long as the configuration of the forces in the field is of a certain type, but which leads to catastrophe when the configuration of the forces changes. As long as the struggle within the Chinese Communist Party remains open, Tien An Men plays a very important role, contributing both to the weakening and the paralyzing of totalitarian power. However, when the political circumstances change, when the play of factions within the party are resolved at the expense of the Secretary disposed to aperture and to the advantage of the hardliners, then non-violent action loses all value. The result is then a foregone conclusion; the only uncertainty at that point being how many will die when the order is given to shoot on sight. The tragic example of Tien An Men, or even the relations between Gandhi and the British government, will help us to understand what the rules a

re which, even in much less dramatic situations, will decide the success or failure of non-violent actions. (It should be clear that the term "non-violence" applies to the systematic use of the methods of civil disobedience and not simply the use of the usual non-violent methods of democratic political struggle.)

The rule can be defined thus: the main condition for success is the capacity of the practitioner of non-violence to create or increase divisions within the ranks of the adversary. If those ranks are divided, the practitioner of non-violence can exploit that division, play--according to the old expression--on the others' "contradictions". If the adversary's ranks are closed, then non-violence (in the strictest sense of that term) is useless and will (in the cases of hunger strikes, for example) end in failure. However, if the ranks of the adversary are to be divided, it is necessary in the first place that non-violent action be utilized for campaigns which are clear and well defined, that a specific issue be chosen for which, at least theoretically, victory is possible. If non-violent action is to succeed, it is necessary that at least a part of the official ranks of the adversary be in sympathy with the cause (objective) motivating actions. In fact, the practitioner of non-violent action is not held in

sympathy (there is no reason why he should be), his cause-objective is.

It is a fact that the Radical Party achieved its greatest successes during those periods when its causes enjoyed wide-spread support in Italy, thus dividing the adversaries' "ranks". It is also a fact that the Radical Party saw the results of those methods deteriorate when it dedicated itself to other causes-objectives (starvation in the world, transnational politics), which by their very nature do not have wide support (real support and not mere facade) which would create those divisions. I am quite aware that many Radicals will not agree with this. They think that everything depends, not on the nature of the cause-objective chosen from time to time, but on the fact that the conditions of the support of an authentic democracy in Italy do not exist. It is not my intention here to enter into a discussion--which would by necessity be long--on this point (what is a "democracy"? Where on this planet is it possible, in strictest sense of the phrase, to "be informed to decide"?). I will simply say that the e

xistence of a different evaluation is, in its turn, the result of a different judgement on the state of democracy in Italy. And I will stop there, convinced however, that in this country--which I consider as being very "democratic" and not very liberal--if the Radicals do not assume the task of defending individual freedom and rights, no one will.