ABSTRACT: The war in the Persian Gulf has put back into first place the urgent need to stop exporting conventional arms to the Third World. This article expresses hopes for the creation of an international convention modelled on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty created for a similar purpose.

("L'Unità" of February 17, 1991)

The war in the Persian Gulf has already demonstrated it beyond all reasonable doubt: the senselessness of the policy of indiscriminate exporting of arms to the Third World. About half of Iraq's arsenal, as we know, was provided by the Soviet Union and the rest of it by Western suppliers. Not less well known is the paradoxical fact that the French risk being struck by the Mirage F1 aircraft and the Exocet missiles they themselves furnished to Saddam Hussein.

Such paradoxes, however, also offer opportunities. I think one can finally count on the healthy scepticism of Western public opinion in regard to the economic arguments heretofore used to justify arms arms exports. First of all, because it is much more expensive, in human lives as well, to destroy a war machine than not to have created it in the first place. And also because the profits created by such exports is only an infinitesimal part of the wealth produced by the industrialised nations: one can estimate that arms sales sold abroad amounts to 0.1% or 0.2% of Italy's GNP, and about 1% of France's, and so on.

The situation is completely reversed if one looks at it from the standpoint of those who import the arms: the military expenditures of countries like Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lybia and Israel have never fallen below 10% of their respective GNP's during the last decade with high points of almost 30%. Therefore for us these sales are economically insignificant, whereas for those who buy they are a tragedy that cuts down the provision of primary needs and of economic development.

Ordinarily if one wants to depress the volume of a certain kind of commerce one can act on demand, on supply, or on both at once. To reduce the demand for arms in the Third World means first of all to resolve regional quarrels, and to do this it would be helpful to create conferences in the world's hot zones modelled on the European co-operation and security conference. Such conferences would be the sites for confronting and resolving the problems of democracy and political rights in the various countries; and their problems of disarmament, arms control and co-operation in relations between states.

But what can be done from the side of supply? Here it is necessary to break down the (apparent) logic of the old adage: "If I don't supply the arms, someone else will". How can this be done? Unfortunately the few specific precedents are not encouraging. In 1978-79 the Carter administration tried it, first by launching unilateral restrictive measures and then opening talks with the Soviets called Conventional Arms Talks (CAT). But after barely three meetings the CAT bogged down producing no results.

There are good reasons to think that the moment has come to take them up again. First of all there is the widespread disgust, to which I alluded earlier, at the waste and the sacrifices of the Persian Gulf war. And more important, there is the fact that the Soviet Union in 1991 is much more inclined than under Brezhnev in 78-79 to initiatives of this kind. And, finally, there are other historical precedents, completely contrary to the unfortunate results of the CAT.

For some time, in fact, the international community has considered it opportune to create norms that impede the proliferation of mass-extermination weapons. A typical case is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which went into effect in 1970. The NPT is based upon a specific bargain: the countries that reject arming themselves with nuclear weapons will receive assistance and technology whenever they decide they want to make use of peaceful atomic energy.

This could be a model to apply to the delivery of major arms systems (aircraft, helicopters, ships, armoured vehicles, missiles, electronic apparatuses and canons larger than 100mm) and the technology necessary for producing them. The producer countries could guarantee the delivery of civilian technology (at the same time as the creation of safeguards to impede their diversion to military uses) and economic aid to those countries which:

a) renounce arming themselves with sophisticated conventional weapons and their relative technology;

b) reduce their military spending;

c) conform in their domestic policies to the principles of democracy and of human rights.

Their is only one alternative to creating international norms with incentives for the potential arms importers: the formation of a cartel of arms producers. This road has been tried in the recent past, for example with the Norms For The Control Of Missile Technology. Seven Western countries signed it (including Italy) plus the Soviet Union, and it consists in practice of banning the export of ballistics missiles with a range greater than 300 kilometres. A cartel inevitably arouses the resentment of those who are excluded from it. And this, in fact, was the reaction of many Third World countries who accused the North of having cut them out of the peaceful exploitation of space (ballistics missiles, besides their military uses, serve to launch satellites into orbit).

My opinion is that however more strenuous it may be, it is better to work to work for setting up a system of norms rather than a cartel. However, better a cartel than the present competitive situation with all producers trying to sell as many arms as possible.

It wouldn't be a bad idea if Italy, which is supporting the idea of a Middle East regional conference, were to take on this task. For this purpose a motion was presented by in the Chamber by several European federation deputies who merit, in my opinion, the support of all the Parliamentary groups.