By Jeane Kirkpatrick

Los Angeles Times Syndicate

May 31, 1995

"Our foreign policy should flow from our domestic society, from the needs and values of the American people," writes Ronald Steel in the current Atlantic Monthly. That being the case, Steel observes, it is to be expected that Americans who were willing to give foreign policy the top priority during the long Cold War are now treating it and policymakers with less deference, especially since the sensibilities and priorities of a majority of Americans often differ from those of foreign policy elites. I agree.

Now the Republican majorities in the House and Senate, frequently joined by congressional Democrats, are treating policies tolerated during the Cold War with no deference at all. We should not be surprised that this is happening.

But while the pressures and disciplines of the Cold War have been

removed, the agencies and the specialists who peopled them remain. These

agencies have expertise and a vested (but not sinister) interest in the U.S. government's broad involvement (or, to use the currently preferred word, "engagement") in the world. Inhabitants of these bureaucracies constitute an informal but active and influential lobby for the preservation of many agencies that are Cold War artifacts.

This lobby is now fully mobilized to defeat the Republican House and Senate efforts to reorganize foreign policy agencies, eliminate departments and overhaul many aspects of the conduct of foreign affairs. Both the House and Senate have adopted bills that eliminate the Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and the arms control agencies, and that make deep cuts in foreign aid. They also seek to give the administration some specific instructions about what to do and not to do in foreign affairs.

For instance, do let President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan visit the United States and his alma mater, Cornell University. Do recognize Tibet as an independent country and appoint an ambassador to deal with it. Do ban the importation of goods made by forced labor (a human rights violation of which China is frequently accused). Do provide political asylum to women subject to forced sterilization or abortion -- another practice charged to China's government.

Meanwhile, don't further or normalize U.S. relations with Vietnam unless that country accounts for all American POWs. Don't spend U.S. moneys on a policy of forced repatriation of Cubans. Don't give U.S. assistance to any country (such as Russia) that sells or provides weapons to any "terrorist" country (such as Iran), and so forth.

All these specific provisions are seen by the Clinton administration and much of the foreign policy elite as extremely objectionable efforts by Congress to micromanage foreign policy. Secretary of State Warren Christopher called it "an onslaught on the president's authority to manage foreign policy" and has said he would recommend that the bills be vetoed, which Bill Clinton has already threatened to do, declaring this "the most isolationist proposal in 50 years."

But these issues of "micromanagement" involve much more than

"isolationism" vs. "internationalism." They are matters on which there are large gaps between the views and values of the American public and those of the foreign policy elite, whose preferences are also those of the Clinton administration.

The issues involving China and Taiwan involve different evaluations of how important it is for the U.S. government to respect the sensibilities of the (Communist) Chinese People's Republic (PRC), and also how important it is for the United States to respect the successful development and democratization of Taiwan, which is also a major U.S. trading partner. Views on this matter do not split cleanly along party lines.

Historically, Republicans have been more favorably disposed than

Democrats to Taiwan. But organized labor raises the strongest objections to importation of the products of prison labor. And strong supporters of Tibet are found in both parties -- as likely to be liberals as conservatives.

It was argued, and believed by many, that Cold War considerations

required swallowing moral concerns about China's treatment of dissidents, use of forced labor, repression of Tibet and a "population policy" that features forced abortion and sterilization.

Most foreign policy professionals probably still believe that China's geopolitical importance should outweigh human rights and concerns. Most human rights advocates disagree.

There are also deep splits between those supporting one or more of the agencies slated for disappearance, and between those who believe initiatives in foreign policy should always be left to the president and executive departments.

I, personally, was deeply embarrassed when President Lee was not

permitted to set foot on the soil of Hawaii and when he was denied permission to visit Cornell to receive an honorary degree. I am offended as well by the PRC's practice of forced sterilization and abortion, its mistreatment of dissidents, its practices of forced labor and its brutalization of Tibet. My sensibilities have been offended by the State Department's habit of shrugging off such practices. So have many other Americans in Congress and out.

I think it is an important mistake to eliminate U.S. support for USIA and the freedom radios. They are the best purveyors of the message of freedom, the cheapest, safest and most effective instrument of foreign policy. So I hope Congress will change its mind on this.

I also believe it is clear that the Constitution gives Congress a

significant role in the conduct of foreign policy. All of us associated with the Reagan administration learned to defer to the often arbitrary

micromanagement of Democratic congresses. The Constitution and precedent

alike divide powers in this as most other policy domains between the

president and Congress, and constitute an "invitation to struggle."

(C) 1995, Los Angeles Times Syndicate