By Henry Kissinger

Los Angeles Times Syndicate

July 26, 1995

The United States and China are on a collision course. Twenty-five years of U.S. bipartisan policy pursued by six administrations is coming unglued. Chinese leaders fear that America, afraid of growing Chinese economic power, is embracing a two-China policy as part of a strategy designed to contain China. Many American leaders believe that the Chinese are deliberately challenging American convictions on human rights and nonproliferation. Choices are narrowing, and Sino-American relations are becoming vulnerable to accidents beyond the control of either side.

It is dangerous to base policy on the frequently heard proposition that good relations with China were important during the Cold War but have lost their significance with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The opposite is true. Sino-American cooperation is essential at this moment when, among the key nations of Asia, economic dynamism exists side by side with political fragility. The majority of Asian countries are undergoing a transition that produces tension between the internationalism required by global economics and the nationalism many leaders believe helps internal political cohesion. Existing alliances are under stress, especially as the perception grows that America is abandoning its stabilizing role.

Japan is transforming its political institutions and probably the orientation of its postwar foreign policy. Cold War Japanese leaders, living with the trauma of defeat, sheltered Japan's foreign policy under the American security treaty and emphasized the economic rebuilding of the shattered country. The shock of defeat has worn off; the end of the Cold War has destroyed the conviction that American and Japanese perceptions of the national interest are inevitably parallel. The size of the Japanese defense budget -- already the third largest in the world -- reflects this shift toward a more national orientation. Though Japanese and American interests are far from irreconcilable, an explicit effort is needed to bring them into closer harmony -- a task submerged beneath seemingly endless confrontations on economic issues.

South Korea is challenged by its desire for unification and its fear of North Korea's nuclear aspirations. North Korea is seeking to undermine it by settling problems directly with the United States, as in the negotiations over the North Korean nuclear program. South Korea's uneasiness, though publicly understated, clashes with the administration's apparent conviction that the United States has a special responsibility to mitigate North Korea's sense of isolation. South Korea's frustration is magnified by the awareness that neither China nor Japan is eager for Korean unification. And if the Sino-American confrontation continues, the situation in Korea could turn ugly.

As India emerges into great power status, its foreign policy can be expected to become increasingly assertive. India will seek an influential, if not a dominant, role in the arc extending from Aden to Singapore. This attempt will produce potential conflicts with China in Tibet and Burma, and with Indonesia, Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, China in Southeast Asia.

In Southeast Asia, Indonesia has made extraordinary, if little-noticed, economic progress. Its population, approaching 200 million, and its vast resources, which have been skillfully managed, destine it to play an increasingly important international role. But its political leadership is approaching transition as President Suharto starts what many believe to be his last term.

The nations of Asia having never organized themselves into an Asian Economic Community or an Asian Defense Pact -- as have the nations of Europe -- perceive each other as strategic rivals and potential threats. Until now, the United States has played the principal stabilizing role through a series of bilateral security and political arrangements which, if abandoned, could erode all restraints.

In the post-Cold War world, the United States remains in a powerful position to sustain Asian peace. Because the conflicts of the Asian nations with each other are more deep-seated than any disagreements they have with the United States, our bargaining position in a well-conceived policy is excellent -- an advantage reinforced by the fact that America provides the principal market for all Asian nations.

Yet in recent years the United States has become embroiled in conflicts with too many key Asian countries. It ought to be a settled maxim of American foreign policy not to take on the principal Asian nations simultaneously. The opposite has been the case. During calendar year 1995, the United States has been in confrontation with both Japan and China, and has managed to throw in glancing blows at the nations of Southeast Asia as well.

By far the most worrisome of these disputes concerns our relationship with China. After 1949 China and the United States had no relations for more than 20 years. Between 1971 and 1989, they achieved something approaching a strategic partnership. Since then, relations have steadily deteriorated over Tiananmen Square, human rights and more recently over Taiwan.

Stability in Asia is most likely if China and the United States cooperate. Conflict with China would encourage virulent nationalism all over the region. While an overbearing Chinese foreign policy could drive American foreign policy to such an expedient, nothing in the contemporary world calls for a policy of isolating China; the weight of our interests is in precisely the opposite direction.

Both America and China have their own reasons for opposing the domination of Asia by a single hegemonic power. China wants the United States to help balance its relationships with powerful neighbors -- Japan, Russia and India -- at least until it is strong enough to do so on its own. America needs Chinese cooperation on these matters as well as on a peaceful evolution of the future of Taiwan and on the transfer of weapons technology. If these geopolitical issues move to the center of Sino-American relations, other issues such as human rights and nuclear proliferation will have a strategic context.

Even those of us who call for priorities based on the national interest recognize that human rights must always constitute a central American concern. What makes the issue insoluble with respect to China is presenting it as a unilateral demand to be imposed by pressure, evoking memories of a century of Western colonialism. China's leaders are able to show understanding for the special needs of their counterparts in a reciprocal relationship. What they will not accept is the implication that America bestows its cooperation as a special favor.

Similarly, America's basically sound nonproliferation policy has been marred by insensitive implementation. During the Bush administration, a missile control regimen was negotiated, which China was invited to join after the fact. When China reluctantly went along, the Bush administration toughened the agreement's requirements and, for a second time, urged China to comply with what it had not negotiated. It is my impression that most of the violations now being alleged fall into categories added to the agreement after America unilaterally toughened its provisions.

With a change of tone, I believe that progress on both proliferation and human rights -- especially the former -- is possible if the slide toward collision in the Taiwan Straits can be reversed.

The immediate cause of that slide was the granting of a U.S. visa to President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan. To many Americans, this appears as the sovereign American right to determine the entry of visitors. In Beijing, the visit is regarded as the culmination of a series of unilateral and high-handed U.S. actions abrogating existing agreements.

Beijing perceives such American decisions as the sale of F-16s to Taiwan, begun by President Bush and accelerated in the present administration, as amounting to a "two-China" policy, formally forsworn by six American presidents. And to Beijing, a two-China policy is a particularly sensitive issue because the alienation of Taiwan was the first stage in the process by which Imperial Japan sought to dominate China. China would almost certainly prefer to resist a two-China policy by force than to be seen as acquiescing. And in such a conflict, America would be alone.

A containment policy toward China under present circumstances is a pipe dream. Unlike the containment policy in Europe, it would have no Asian takers except perhaps Vietnam. America's ability to influence Japan would dramatically decline. Korea would turn into a tinderbox. Nations with hegemonical aspirations -- or even territorial claims -- would sense new opportunities. The European nations would eagerly step into the economic vacuum.

To be sure, China could suffer even greater damage, being much more vulnerable to economic warfare and unleashed nationalism. But this would prove little consolation in the face of the erosion of restraints that collapsing confidence in American leadership would produce around the world. Far from isolating China, America would be isolating itself.

Since 1971, American presidents have affirmed that they would neither encourage nor support a two-China policy or a one-Chi a, one-Taiwan policy. But they have also affirmed America's interest in a peaceful resolution of the issue and in the well-being of the people of Taiwan. Within that framework, Taiwan has made enormous progress. It participates in several international institutions, including the Asian Development Bank, the APEC meetings and the Olympic Games. Relations between Taipei and Beijing have been improving. China's President Jiang Zemin has proposed a unification in which Taiwan would be self-governing and retain its own armed forces. The basis for direct negotiations therefore exists. Why challenge a framework that has so far served all the parties involved?

Before there is a reversal of the policies that have benefited the United States, China and political stability, all sides should step back from the brink before irreparable damage is done. Specifically:

The administration should restart a political dialogue with China. As a first step, it should specifically reaffirm all the provisions of existing agreements. The next step should be an exploration of the practical application of these principles under changing conditions.

Beijing should end its hard line and take seriously issues about which Americans feel deeply -- such as nuclear proliferation and the fate of Harry Wu.

Congress should stop ad hoc measures and work for a joint course with the administration.

Taiwan should think again before pressing America on a course which, in the end, could isolate Taiwan and force it to take the blame for consequences some of its backers apparently do not foresee.

A school of thought holds that China is bluffing and will, in the end, recoil. But it is reckless to play chicken with the fate of nations.

The writer, a former secretary of state, is president of Kissinger Associates, an international consulting firm that has clients with business interests in many countries abroad.