Published by: China-Net, Chinese Community Forum, Wednesday, April 24, 1996 (Issue No. 9617) **

It was sixteen years ago that Wei Jingsheng was first convicted. At that time, Deng Xiaoping's reform program had just begun and people in China, who had just emerged from the nightmare of the Cultural Revolution and were beginning to enjoy the new prospects from the reform, were full of hope for the future. But now in 1995 when Wei was again convicted, the reforms have bogged down and the future of China is bleak and uncertain...

From what we have witnessed in 1995 it is clear that the Chinese regime is no longer capable of solving all the imminent problems it faces, both all of the problems of reform as well as those stemming from the reform process.

At the conference on the national economy which was convened at the end of 1995, the Central Committee of the party declared that economic retrenchment, the so-called "micro management" which began in 1993, should continue, despite repeated warnings from economists that it had already caused severe economic setbacks and needed to be discontinued by the end of 1994 at the latest. According to optimistic official estimations, the inflation rate has dropped from 21 percent at the end of 1994 to the current less than 15 percent. If this is so, then the leaders should be reassured and be willing to slacken the money market. But they still want to continue the retrenchment. Why? Because the heads of the Central Committee realize very clearly that the decrease in the inflation rate has only been achieved as a result of administrative measures. Subsidies for foodstuffs in Beijing have increased 174 percent from 1994 -- how can any government sustain such high subsidies? 1995 also proved to be a year of irony f

or the first and foremost achievement from Deng's reforms: the solving of the problem of shortages in grain production. In 1995, the grain shortages became more and more severe. China stopped all exports of grain and imports increased two-folds; yet the price of grain still doubled. According to a joint Sino-Japanese survey, there were 12 grain-deficient provinces in 1993 and this figure will increase to 22 provinces by the year 2010. All of the efforts that the Communist regime has taken in this area have been in vain: the area of arable land is still shrinking and the young and able-bodied farmers are still deserting agriculture and flocking to the cities...

The leaders of the party have repeatedly called for a reduction of the excessive burdens on the peasantry. But the irony is that the more they make statements and the more they issue documents, the heavier the farmers' burdens. When Vice Premier Zhu Rongji inspected Guangxi province at the beginning of 1993, he said: "The extortion in some localities is very severe, leaving peasants with no choice but to hang themselves. This time we discovered nine suicide cases. How many cases actually occurred, no one knows." But according to an official survey released at the beginning of 1995, the suicide rate in urban areas is 8.7 cases for every 100,000 residents and in rural areas the figure is 21.4 for every 100,000. The urban figure is similar to the average worldwide figure as released by WHO, but the suicide rate in Chinese rural areas is among the highest in the world. Of course this does not mean that the rural people are more pessimistic than their counterparts in the cities. After repeated calls from the ce

ntral government to reduce the peasants' burdens, the burden inflicted on peasants in Jilin province in the first three quarters of 1995 increased 87 percent as compared to 1994, in Heilongjiang province the figure was 120 percent, in Jiangsu, 87 percent.

Under the call for a "Great Leap Forward" issued by Deng Xiaoping in 1992, local officials went into a frenzy to set up necessary or unnecessary projects just to show off their accomplishments. Needless to say, the burden for the funding of these projects, for the expenses for the extravagant government operations, and for the luxuries enjoyed by the leaders all shifted to the peasants. The ratio of incomes between urban residents and peasants has increased from 1:156 in 1949 to 1:2.6 in 1994; it is even higher than the 1978 ratio (1:2.37), one year before the reforms. This figure does not include such factors as the higher commodity prices in the rural areas and the subsidies and welfare benefits for the urban people since 1949 which the peasants have never had the fortune to enjoy. As to the 80 million young peasants who have flocked into the cities to seek jobs, they have been treated much worse than illegal immigrant workers in western countries. In Shenzhen, the so-called "window of reform," peasant w

orkers usually have to toil over ten hours a day with no overtime compensation and they do not enjoy even minimum labor protection or compensation for industrial injuries; and they are paid much less than urban workers. Many lead lives of slaves or prisoners and some are even locked up. In the fires that broke out in the Shenzhen factories since 1994, several hundred female workers were burnt to death and many of those who lived were permanently handicapped. The authorities made special efforts for a news blockade in 1995 so that much of the true situation is unknown to the rest of the world. An uprising of over a hundred thousand peasants in Fuzhou district of Jiangxi province when the homes of corrupt officials were looted and peasant riots in a small town near Hangzhou, the capital of Zhejiang province, have all been hidden from the outside world, even from Chinese in other provinces. Before Wei Jingsheng was convicted, the clashes between Hunan peasants and the Shenzhen police where peasants were ruthles

sly massacred by machine guns only came to light because they occurred in Shenzhen, a place too close to Hong Kong that there could be no cover-up.

The frequent strikes and demonstrations by the 20 million unemployed workers or those who receive no pay from their factories is the most worrisome problem for the Communist authorities. The long talked about reform of state-owned enterprises was stopped precisely because the leaders feared possible disturbances among the workers. The incompetence of the regime to control the corruption of officials, to reduce the gap between the rich and poor, and to solve the social problems has made the people increasingly angry. The stagflation which began in 1995 and the decline in living standards have exacerbated their anger. All of these crises have deepened the discord within the ranks of the Communist party: the dissatisfaction and dissent among cadres at different levels has placed great pressures even on the top echelon. It is the opposition from within the "fortress" itself which alarms the Communist party the most.

Therefore, one important motivation for re-convicting Wei Jingsheng was to intimidate the opposition forces both within and without the Communist party. The prosecutors are perfectly clear that Wei Jingsheng's power to overthrow the government can never be compared with the forces created by the corruption and incompetence of the government which has ruled the country for nearly half a century.

** Chinese Community Forum (CCF) is an e-journal published on China-Net. CCF is dedicated to the discussion on the issues related to the Chinese community. The opinions expressed here do not necessarily represent the views of the Editorial Board of CCF. Contributions to the discussions and suggestions of new topics are very much appreciated.