The New York Times

Monday, March 6, 2000

China Is All Bluster on Taiwan (for Now)

By DAVID SHAMBAUGH

The furor over China's threat to use force against Taiwan if negotiations toward reunification are indefinitely delayed has put the Clinton administration in a diplomatic jam. In response to the threat, Taiwan is requesting increased American military aid. But the debate has overlooked a fundamental question: Can China successfully attack and occupy Taiwan? China's bluster leaves the impression it can subdue the island if it decides to, but in reality, the situation is quite different.

For now, China has little ability to mount a successful conventional attack.

If China were to start hostilities, it would likely do so with ballistic missiles accompanied by a barrage of electronic interference and computer viruses intended to blind Taiwan's anti-missile and anti-air defenses, intelligence and command centers. After this blitz weakened Taiwan's ability to retaliate, China's air and naval forces would come into play.

But herein lies the problem. Despite superior numbers, China's air and naval capabilities are weak; it is incapable of a successful follow-up attack. The navy has only about 20 destroyers. These ships, combined with submarines, may be able to deter some commercial shipping, but they probably can't enforce a blockade of Taiwan's two main ports, much less sustain a successful quarantine.

Nor does China have anywhere near enough transport capability to launch a successful amphibious invasion across the Taiwan Strait. It would take approximately 600 modern landing craft nearly two weeks to transport 20 infantry divisions (750,000 men) to Taiwan. Currently, China has the ability of moving only one or two divisions.

Air dominance is also critical to any attack. China has more than 3,000 fighters, but they are no match against Taiwan's qualitatively superior air force -- which is stocked with F-16's, French Mirage 2000's and Taiwan's own new fighters. Taiwan's pilots are also much better trained than their mainland counterparts.

Taiwan's best defense, however, may be geography. The island has a rocky coastline, frequent storms, fluctuating tides and mud flats, making an invasion a logistical nightmare. In 1996, when China test-fired missiles and staged naval war games near Taiwan, a typhoon grounded all its aircraft, and its ships promptly retreated to the mainland coastline.

The ability of Taiwan's forces to mount substantial resistance to a Chinese attack would permit the United States enough time to respond, if it chose to do so.

Thus China's military threat is nothing to worry about in the short term. Taiwan surely knows that, which in part explains why its leaders have refused to negotiate seriously about reunification, and why they have challenged the one-China principle, which states that the island is part of the Chinese nation.

However, China's military is well aware of its disadvantages, and has been steadily closing the gap. It is building new fighters and ships and has bought various modern weapons from Russia, including submarines, transport ships and destroyers with sophisticated antiship missiles.

At this rate, it is likely that within seven years the balance in conventional forces may tip in China's favor.

So, does this mean the United States should agree to Taiwan's requests for more arms? Washington has an obligation to maintain Taiwan's defenses, but providing more and more weapons is not the answer.

First, selling offensive systems like destroyers with Aegis radar systems (as some in Congress are now pushing) would accelerate the growing cross-strait arms race, causing China to buy and build equipment more urgently.

Also, Taiwan has had a lot of trouble absorbing the weaponry we have sold it recently: it lacks the spare parts, and its forces are often inadequately trained (several F-16 fighters have crashed there in the last year).

Rather, Taiwan's current military edge should be seen as a safe window of opportunity to calmly come to a long-term settlement with the mainland.

American interests are best served by maintaining Taiwan's reasonable defenses, urging its leaders to negotiate seriously and encouraging Beijing to create political incentives to attract Taiwan.

David Shambaugh is a professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University.