_________________ WTN-L World Tibet Network News _________________
Published by: The Canada Tibet Committee
Editorial Board: Brian Given, Conrad Richter, Nima Dorjee,
Tseten Samdup, Thubten (Sam) Samdup
WTN Editors: wtn-editors@tibet.ca
______________________________________________________________________
Issue ID: 00/04/22 Compiled by Thubten (Sam) Samdup
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Saturday, April 22, 2000 (2)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Contents:
----------------------------------------------------------------------
1. CHINA in TIBET: Forty Years of Liberation or Occupation?
----------------------------------------------------------------------
by Lobsang Sangay
Harvard Asia Quarterly
Lobsang Sangay, Tibetan scholar and attorney from India is pursuing an
S.J.D. on the Tibet/China conflict at Harvard Law School. He became
active in the Tibetan struggle at the age of fourteen and went on to
become one of the national leaders of Tibetan Youth Congress, the
largest and the most active NGO in the Tibetan community in exile. He
has traveled to various parts of the US giving lectures on the
Tibet/China conflict and is also consulted by news media on the issue.
Since arriving at Harvard, I have met many open-minded and rational
mainland Chinese scholars and students, as well as many Western experts
on China. As a result of these encouraging and at times
thought-provoking meetings, I have learned first-hand the Chinese view
on the situation in Tibet, as well as the impact these views have had on
China scholars in the West. In this issue of Harvard Asia Quarterly
dedicated to commemorating a number of key anniversaries across Asia, I
would like to present my reflections on the forty years of Chinese1 rule
in Tibet.2 I will focus on several basic issues, namely, the Communist
Chinese Government's justification of their occupation of Tibet, and
show how Tibetans view themselves as distinct from Chinese. I will also
show how Tibetans and Chinese hold widely divergent perspectives on the
Chinese government's claim that they have improved religious,
educational, and economic conditions in Tibet.
This year marks the fortieth anniversary of what the Chinese Government
calls its "peaceful liberation" of Tibet. However, the consequences of
that event the mass exodus of the Dalai Lama and 80,000 Tibetans from
their ancestral homeland are hardly what one would expect to result from
a "peaceful liberation." Moreover, after forty years of absolute rule by
China, the cross-border flow of Tibetans continues: last year alone more
than 3,000 Tibetans crossed the Himalayas to gain political and
religious freedom and to pursue a modern education in India, home of the
Tibetan government-in-exile.
In contrast to the tragic experience of this past forty years, a brief
step back to an earlier period might serve, without dwelling at length
on the historiography, as a model of mutual respect and recognition for
China and Tibet. In 641 AD the Chinese Princess Wangchen was married as
a junior queen to the Tibetan King Songtsen Gampo. As a gift to her new
country, the Princess brought with her the Buddhist statue of Jowo
Sakyamuni. Even today, this very statue of Jowo Sakyamuni is still
revered by Tibetans as one of the holiest Buddhist statues and is
visited by hundreds of thousands of Tibetan pilgrims at the Jokhang
temple in Lhasa. In 731 AD, nearly a century after Princess Wangchen's
marriage to Songtsen Gampo, another Chinese bride, Princess Chin-Cheng,
a devout Buddhist, was given to the Tibetan King Tri-de Tsug-tsan. She
is said to have contributed greatly to the propagation of Buddhism in
Tibet. Interestingly, this particular period, known as the Tang dynasty
in China and as the Yarlung dynasty in Tibet, is considered the Golden
Age in both countries. Both were Buddhist dynasties. Is there any way,
that the spirit, if not the total substance of that relationship, can be
revived again?
The rest of this article will discuss the contemporary relationship
between China and Tibet and show how far we have strayed from that
historical period of harmony.
Justifying the Chinese Occupation: "Peaceful Liberation"
The Chinese Government maintains that Tibet was "peacefully liberated"
in 1951 from both imperialism and a brutal feudal system that was "hell
on earth."3 According to this argument, Tibet has been transformed into
a "Socialist Heaven" through the introduction of revolutionary socialist
measures.
This justification of the invasion of Tibet is no different from the
age-old argument of Western colonialism: invasion is good for the social
and economic development of the occupied colony. If this charge is true,
then the Chinese seem to be not only supporting, but also practicing the
very imperialist policy they have long condemned, one of the
foundational anathemas of the communist revolution. Moreover, this sort
of justification echoes the claims Japan used when it invaded China and
other East Asian countries during World War II - that it was creating a
"Greater Asian Co-prosperity Sphere." If Chinese justifications for
invading Tibet are legitimate, then it is hard to see how the British
takeover of Hong Kong and the Japanese invasion of China were
unjustified.
More to the point, I believe, one should question the claim that the
level of oppressiveness of a government, in this case, Tibet's supposed
brutal feudal system, justifies invasion and occupation by another
nation. If that logic held true, one could in theory argue that the
Soviet Union or the United States would have had the right to occupy
China during the Cultural Revolution, a period most Chinese would agree
was a period of extreme oppression and bad governance.
Looking closer at this Chinese justification, an even more blatant
disconnect with reality is clear. By any objective standard the
"liberation" of Tibet could hardly be described as "peaceful." In the
immediate aftermath of widespread Tibetan national uprising against
Chinese in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), approximately 87,000
Tibetan "enemies" were "eliminated" from March to the beginning of
October 1959 alone.4 This figure does not include the number of people
who have lost their lives in eastern Tibet since the early 1950s. The
Tibetan Government-in-Exile estimates that a total of 1.2 million
Tibetans have died as a result of the Communist Chinese occupation as of
the 1980s.5 This is a remarkably high number considering the size of the
Tibetan population is currently only roughly six million, by Tibetan
estimates.6 It is also a fact that Tibetans went through a period of
famine as a result of the Great Leap Forward in 1958-61 and experienced
even worse suffering during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976.
Throughout this period of Chinese rule, Tibetans had no reason to feel
"liberated." As late as 1980, Communist Party Secretary General Hu
Yaobang acknowledged during his official visit to the TAR that "the
Communist Party had failed in Tibet. Far from eradicating poverty, in
many areas the people's living standards had declined" compared to
pre-1950s condition.7
Still, there remains the oft-repeated nationalist argument that Tibet
was never independent and has always been part of China. In 1951,
shortly after the People's Republic of China was formed, Tibet was
forced to sign "the Seventeen Point Agreement," the first and only legal
document in which Tibetan sovereignty was surrendered to China.8 On the
issue of independence, by now, however, this point has been more or less
settled in academic and legal studies on Tibet; with the exception of
mainland Chinese scholars, almost all Tibet experts agree that at least
during the period of 1913 to 1951, Tibet was either an independent, or
de facto independent, country.9
Views of Ethnicity and Nation: "Us vs. Them"10 or Peaceful Co-existence?
Not only do Tibetans feel part of an independent nation politically, but
they also have an ethnic consciousness that is distinct from the
Chinese. Most Chinese have a broad definition of what it means to be
"Chinese." In sharp contrast to this, Tibetans maintain a very specific
idea of what it means to be "Tibetan," and this concept reinforces a
strong underlying "us vs. them" feeling of a separate Tibetan identity.
These different views are best illustrated by the words Chinese and
Tibetans use to describe each other. In the Chinese language, China is
known as Zhongguo, or "the Middle Kingdom," and is conceived of as a
land mass incorporating the Han majority and 55 minorities.11 Similarly,
the Chinese word Zhongguoren, meaning "Chinese people," includes both
the Han Chinese ethnic majority and the fifty-five so-called ethnic
minorities living within the borders of China, including the Tibetans,
Mongolians and Muslim Uighurs. The word Hanren refers to the ninety-four
percent of the population of China that is ethnic Han Chinese.
In contrast, Tibetan language and literature have no equivalent words or
phrases that encompass both Chinese and Tibetans as one people. Instead,
the Tibetan language makes a clear-cut distinction: Chinese people are
called Gyami and Tibetans, Bhoepa. In Tibetan operas, for example,
characters are introduced by their distinct ethnicity with terms such as
Gyami (Chinese) or Gyakar (Indian).12 Furthermore, the Tibetan word for
China, Gyanak,13 is linguistically distinct from the word for Tibet
Bhoe, as are the words for the Tibetan and Chinese languages, Bhoekey
and Gyakey respectively.14 These linguistic expressions of a separate
Tibetan identity are but one indicator of the different views of Chinese
and Tibetan nationhood and of the historical relationship between the
two peoples. China, it seems, has considered Tibet as an integral part,
while Tibet has viewed itself as separate and independent of Chinese
political control.
This dichotomy challenges the fundamental definition of nationality
itself. What constitutes nationality and who defines a nation? Is the
decision in the hands of an ethnic majority of a particular area, like
the Tibetans, or is it made by a dominant, more powerful ethnic group
like the Chinese? Ernest Gellner writes that one of the key elements in
defining nationality and nation is the common culture,15 whereas Walker
Connor recognizes Tibetans as a distinct nationality and defines
"nations" as human groupings "who share an intuitive sense of . . .
sameness, predicated upon a myth of common descent."16 As Tibetans have
a common culture and share an intuitive sense of sameness and common
descent, Tibet is a nation in its own right.
Buttressing this separate Tibetan identity is the Tibetans' shared
historical memory of Tibet as an independent and powerful nation. When
Tibetans are asked why they are ethnically and nationally different from
Chinese, Tibetans will claim that the Tibetan empire was once so
powerful that its army marched to the Chinese capital of Chang-an (now
Xian) and captured it for nearly a month, forcing Emperor Tai Tsung
(763-804 AD) to flee, imposing its own puppet emperor, and exacting an
annual tribute from Tibet. Many Tibetans also point to the Sino-Tibetan
peace treaty of 821 AD. This treaty proclaims that the "Tibetans shall
be happy in Tibet and the Chinese in China," clearly establishing that
Tibet and China had equal status at that time and that each treated the
other as an independent entity. This treaty still exists today in the
form of an inscription on the stone pillar in front of Jokhang Temple in
Tibet's capital of Lhasa.
This shared historical narrative strongly undergirds the perception of
Tibetan identity as separate from that of the Chinese. Thus, the Tibetan
resistance to ethnic assimilation and Chinese policies is deeply rooted
in historical, linguistic, and cultural reality, a reality now
heightened by modern nationalistic sentiment.
Tibetan Cultural Revival and the Cultural Revolution
Religion has also given Tibetans a spiritually charged national
identity. In contrast to the Tibetans' deeply held belief in Buddhism,
Communist China views Buddhism - like all religions - as the opiate of
the masses. This major clash of ideology was clearly demonstrated when
the Chinese government destroyed every remnant of the religious
institutions in Tibet. Recently, however, the Chinese government has
blamed this destruction on the nationwide excesses of the Cultural
Revolution (1966-1976) and its attack on "the four olds": old ideas, old
culture, old customs, and old habits.
Most Tibetans find this explanation a factually incorrect account that
downplays Chinese efforts to eradicate religion and to institute a
deliberate policy to destroy the spiritual foundation of Tibetan
identity and culture. The destruction and closing of monasteries in
Tibet were in fact carefully orchestrated well before the Cultural
Revolution.17 In my father's hometown Lithang (now located in Sichuan),
the local monastery where he was a monk was destroyed in 1956, ten years
before the Cultural Revolution even started.
The previous Panchen Lama, in his famous "70,000 Character Petition" to
Chairman Mao Zedong, wrote that out of 2,500 monasteries in the Tibet
Autonomous Region, only 70 (3%) were left in 1962, three years before
the Cultural Revolution began.18 According to the Panchen Lama's survey,
ninety-three percent of the 100,000 clerics had been forced out of the
monasteries.19 The situation was reportedly even worse in Eastern Tibet,
with 98-99% of the Tibetan Buddhist monasteries shut down.20 This
account is consistent with two other Chinese sources.21
Despite such destruction, Tibetans have held firmly to their spiritual
beliefs. When a small period of political openess appeared during the
initial phases of China's new liberalization policies in the early
1980s, Tibetans began to voluntarily finance the rebuilding of their
destroyed monasteries. Today they have revived many, but the quality of
religious practice is limited to rituals and is often quite minimal, due
to arbitrary and restrictive measures still imposed on religious
practices. This brief discussion cannot address in any depth related
issues, such as the imprisonment and torture of 121622 lay people, monks
and nuns for taking part in political activities, including for refusal
to denounce the Dalai Lama23 and recognize the Chinese-appointed Panchen
Lama.24 However, April 25, 1999, marks the tenth anniversary of the
birth of the Tibetan Panchen Lama, which will be observed worldwide by
Tibetans and Tibet support groups, including those in Boston, as marking
the disappearance of possibly the youngest political prisoner in the
world.
As many tourists who have been to Tibet since liberalization know, it is
a common experience to be followed by Tibetan children asking for the
"Dalai Lama's photo" even though the photograph is officially banned.
If, as the Chinese have argued, the monastic system had been so
oppressive and the Dalai Lama the head slave owner, this popular revival
of Buddhist institutions and desire for the return of the Dalai Lama
would be hard to understand. If the pre-1951 order had been so horrible
in the eyes of the Tibetans, the Cultural Revolution ought to have been
an opportune moment for them to "liberate" themselves from religion and
the Dalai Lama. But as both these examples prove, Tibetans take great
pride in their religion, which dates back 2500 years. In contrast,
Communism is a modern foreign ideology brought in from China, with
little hold on Tibetans' hearts and minds.
Communism failed in Tibet and has never been able to compete with
Buddhism's rich spiritual message. However, this is not to say that
religion is the right basis for political rule; all religions have both
good and bad effects on society and the concept of a religious political
order is a very complex one. Rather, it suggests that the Tibetan way of
life and values are quite distinct from and in many ways foreign to that
of the contemporary Chinese. Religion matters to Tibetans in a way most
Chinese find hard to understand.
Education for Tibetans - Modernizing "Feudal" Tibet?
To lessen the strong influence of religion in Tibet, the Chinese
government attempted to replace traditional monastery schooling with
modern, secular schools. Currently, the Chinese government claims that
it has established more than 3,000 schools in the TAR, special Tibetan
schools in inner China, and institutions of higher education, like the
School of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, and Tibet University. Some
Chinese officials argue that these progressive measures have helped
Tibetans both improve their lives and move toward the modern world.
Yet, when closely analyzed, the results show a peculiar pattern of
discrimination and a far less progressive policy.
Contrary to official statements, the majority of schools in Tibet are
constructed and funded by local Tibetans. In addition, as of 1995, Tibet
continues to be the least literate region in China, with a higher than
sixty percent illiteracy and semi-literacy rate25 - whereas China's
illiteracy rate has fallen to under seven percent.26
One of the most contentious issues between Chinese and Tibetans is the
medium of instruction used in schools. Article 4 of the Chinese
Constitution and Article 37 of the Minority Nationality Act of 1984
clearly indicate that the language of each nationality should be adopted
both as a medium of instruction in schools and for official use in the
government wherever minorities are dominant. In Inner Mongolia, another
Autonomous Region like Tibet, there are schools and colleges where the
medium of instruction is Mongolian. However, in the TAR, Chinese is the
language of instruction in schools above the secondary level, despite
the fact that "ninety-five percent of the Tibetan population do not
speak or understand the Chinese language."27 From the Tibetan
perspective, Chinese education policy, rather then modernizing,
represents one more tool to eradicate Tibetan civilization and identity.
As one might imagine, the use of Chinese as the language of instruction
in schools has had highly discriminatory effects on Tibetan students.
Higher levels of education in the TAR are in fact dominated by ethnic
Chinese.28 In the School of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, supposedly
established for Tibetans and located in the TAR, 446 (71%) of the total
630 students are Chinese and only 184 (29%) are Tibetan.29 In the Tibet
Nationalities Institute in Xianyang, 938 students out of the total 1,165
students are Chinese and only 227 are Tibetan.30 The Chinese government
maintains that only 4% of the population in the TAR is Chinese. If 4% of
the population takes more than 70% seats in the educational
institutions, then these figures beg the question of who is really being
educated in Tibet.
The major exception to this pattern is Tibet University in Lhasa where
the majority of students are Tibetan (1,018) and Han Chinese are in the
minority (208).31 Still, on closer examination of the data, even at
Tibet University one finds that Han Chinese are the majority in science
and technical courses, with Tibetans constituting only 26% of the
students in these areas. In contrast, Tibetans are heavily concentrated
in the humanities, representing 70% of the students enrolled in those
courses. Sadly, one of the core parts of the humanities program, the
Tibetan language department, has been closed for the past three years,
and the local government is pressuring teachers to teach Tibetan history
using the Chinese language.
The situation worsens at the highest level of education. For the last
forty years fewer than ten Tibetans have graduated or are graduating
from Beijing University.32 When questioned about this statistic, the
Chinese respond that Tibetans are unable to compete intellectually with
the Chinese. But, if that were the case, why, in just the last ten
years, have there been at least ten exiled Tibetans who have graduated
or are about to graduate from Harvard University?33 Exiled Tibetans
constitute only 5% of the Tibetan population or 130,000 in total (far
less than the 150,000 Chinese students in the US in any given year).
Each year hundreds of Tibetan children ranging in age from six to
eighteen years cross the Himalayas seeking secular or monastic education
in India. The real land of opportunity for Tibetan education is now
outside of Tibet.
Chinese "Investment" in Tibet
Many claim that if nothing else, Chinese involvement in Tibet has
brought with it greater economic development and modernization. Chinese
spokespeople always note that the government is pouring money into
Tibet. It is true that roads and factories are constructed and that
almost ninety percent of the TAR Government budget is subsidized by the
central government in Beijing. However, the bulk of the subsidies are
spent on two fronts: 1) Urbanization - developing cities to encourage
Chinese migrants from inner China to settle in Tibet, a phenomenon
discussed later, and 2) Bureaucracy - funding the burgeoning
administrative and institutional structure to control the volatile
situation in Tibet. "From 1952 to 1984, the cost of direct
administration was more than 15 percent of the total subsidies expended"
and is still increasing.34 The agriculture and animal husbandry sector,
which constitutes 90% of the Tibetan population, receives a meager 15%
of the total subsidies.35 Therefore most Tibetans living in rural and
nomadic areas have not progressed much for the last forty years.
In 1994 at its "Third Work Forum" on Tibet, Chinese leaders announced 62
development projects targeting industrial growth in the TAR.36 Certainly
this level of investment seems impressive, and in fact, the accounting
can be confusing. The government usually fails to make clear how Tibetan
natural resources are exploited as part of this infusion of money. 126
different minerals, such as chromium, lead, sulfur, copper, borax, iron,
petrol, gold and uranium to name a few, are found in Tibet. These are
not included in the gross product and, consequently, are also not listed
as a source of income.37 Also "because of high altitude and location,
Tibet acts as a principal watershed for Asia." Major rivers like the
Yangtse, Brahmaputra, and others originate in Tibet.38 Net hydrological
flows in Tibet comprise roughly 6% of Asia's runoff and about 28% of
China's (excluding Tibet), and 34% of India's total river water
resources.39 Tibet's rivers have enormous potential for hydroelectric
generation. As a result, despite the huge reserves of natural resources
it contributes, Tibet remains on the accounting ledgers as the poorest
region in China,40 a paradox best described by two Chinese economists in
the aptly titled book,The Poverty of Plenty. 41
Economic Advances?
A Lhasa woman recently told me that although ten years ago Katmandu in
Nepal felt like a big city, it now looks like a small village compared
to modern Lhasa. In this sense, Tibet has developed economically, and
urbanization has taken off in several parts of the Tibet. Although some
Tibetans seem to have benefited from the growth (a few Tibetans own
fleets of Land Cruisers and luxurious houses), in fact the major
benefits of these alleged improved economic conditions in the cities
seem not be reaching most Tibetans.
Economic development in urban Tibet is real, but again I have to pose
the question: for whose sake has this development taken place and under
whose terms? According to a census, outside of the traditional Tibetan
"Bharkor" market, there are more than 3,500 to 4,000 shops and
restaurants in Lhasa, but Tibetans own only 400-450 of them, leaving the
remaining 85% under non-Tibetan (usually Han Chinese) ownership. One
reason for the Chinese-dominated commerce is that Chinese migrants
entering Tibet use their clan and local village networks to support
their own ethnic group; another factor is the use of guanxi
(connections) among Chinese officials to exploit economic opportunities.
In the process, Tibetans have been economically marginalized and
deprived of their own fair share. When asked why this has happened,
Chinese react that they are more skilled and hence they dominate the
market. However, even age-old businesses, which require traditional
Tibetan skills like wood-carving, sewing aprons and traditional dress,
and selling Khatas (silk scarves) in front of Jokhang temple have been
taken over by Chinese migrants. This takeover is justified by saying
that the Chinese are more hard-working than Tibetans.
Another area where hard-work is not necessarily the baseline criteria,
but where economic and cultural encroachment has offended Tibetans, is
the growth of prostitution in Lhasa. Recent figures indicate that there
are approximately 8,890 prostitutes in Lhasa - 9% of the female
population - double the number in London, where the population nears
eight million.42 Although prostitution is outlawed in China, it is quite
common to find brothels in front of army barracks and government offices
in Lhasa, where officials look the other way. Since Lhasa is a holy city
for Tibetans, this type of immoral encroachment by the Chinese is
particularly resented.43
Urbanization
As stated earlier, one of the primary targets of subsidies is
urbanization. Like other towns, the city of Lhasa has expanded, and the
population has increased from 30,000 in 1950s to 200,000 in 1998.44
Though these figures seem impressive, it is again necessary to look at
the finer details of the statistics to see both who these new people are
and who is benefiting from the urbanization. It is estimated that as
much as 60-70% of the population in Lhasa now is Chinese. Not only do
they dominate private businesses as shown earlier, but they also occupy
most government-related employment. "Approximately 95 percent of
official Chinese immigrants are employed" in the state- owned
enterprises.45 Most Tibetans feel marginalized by such an encroaching
demographic reversal that limits their educational, cultural, and
economic opportunities. Even Tibetans who might support or sympathize
with the Communist ideology resent this process of marginalization.
The continued migration of Han Chinese into Tibet has intensified the
sense of separate identity among Tibetans, creating an increasingly
overt feeling of "us vs. them." In almost all the Tibetan areas,
conceptual and physical separation of the two groups has created two
separate worlds. In their everyday lives in most of the inner towns and
cities of Tibet, Tibetans work and live in physically segregated areas.
Consequently, while the number of Chinese moving to inner urban Tibet
has dramatically increased, the conceptual and physical separations
between the two populations foster a strong desire in Tibetans to resist
ethnic assimilation.
Despite economic development and urbanization in Tibet, most Tibetans
have not felt themselves to be the beneficiaries of this modernization.
Rather, Tibetans have felt increasingly marginalized in their own
territory and see themselves as mere observers of an economic
development benefiting others. This has made the ethnic "us vs. them"
sentiment all the more concrete, since it is usually the Han Chinese who
reap the profits of change.
This is not to reduce the issue of Tibet to a mere theory of economic
deprivation as the Chinese government seems to believe, i.e. if economic
discrepancies in Tibet are taken care of, the issue of Tibet will wither
away. On the contrary, it can be convincingly argued that economic
discrepancies can be a catalyst to exacerbate ethno-national tensions,
but they are not its primary cause.46 Catalans in Spain are economically
better off than the Spanish, but their sense of nationalism and call for
separate identity is strong. Similarly, Slovenia separated from
Yugoslavia even though Slovenes were economically more advanced, and the
most radical group calling for secession in Quebec is the successful
young urban professional, bilingual Quebecois. It is a common sight that
every day tens and hundreds of Kosovars are volunteering to join the
Kosovo Liberation Army. Many of them are leaving the relatively
comfortable life of Western countries to sacrifice their lives to fight
against the Serbs in the Balkans. Therefore, it is an established fact
that an "X" factor beyond comfort and economy, such as a respect for a
distinct identity and nationality, binds people together and calls for
recognition. In the case of Tibet, Tibetans are distinct from Chinese in
terms of language, religion, culture, history, ethnicity, civilization,
and geography. Respect and recognition of these distinctions will
therefore remain at the core of the resolution of the Sino-Tibetan
conflict. The "Tibetan issue" will not disappear for a long time to
come; therefore, open-minded Tibetans and Chinese must sit down together
and find a peaceful solution. The alternative is inevitable violence, a
tragic disaster for both Tibetans and Chinese.
The Future
As this article shows, Given the deep bitterness of many Tibetans, the
potential for violence and outbreaks of ethnic clashes throughout Tibet
should be taken seriously. The frustration level both in exile and
inside Tibet is real. Last year, the Tibetan Youth Congress held hunger
strikes even to the point of death for sixty-seven days in Delhi (one of
the longest hunger strikes held in the world). Out of frustration and as
a sacrifice, an exiled Tibetan named Thupten Ngodup immolated himself.
Inside Tibet, in 1997, there were seven bomb blasts in the TAR region
alone.Similarly, in May 1998, an attempted prison escape by Tibetans in
a prison near Lhasa escalated into a riot that left eleven people dead.
The crime rate in Lhasa is high and might also take on an ethnic
dimension. Crime mixed with nationalism might lead to an all out ethnic
war like the ones in East Turkestan in China or Kosovo in the Balkans.
Time is running out!
Let me end with the same question that I began with: is there any way
that the spirit, if not the total substance, of the mutual respect and
recognition during the Golden Age of the Tang dynasty in China and the
Yarlung dynasty in Tibet can be revived again? I believe so.
The answer to this question might be found in the very story of the
Chinese Princess Wang Chen and the Tibetan King Songtsen Gampo in 641
AD. The Chinese princess brought to Tibet the Jowo Sakyamuni statue,
which is now enshrined in Lhasa's Jokhang temple. Ironically, the
Jokhang temple has become the Tiananmen Square of Tibet, one of Tibet's
most sensitive and volatile landmarks. Since the Chinese occupation of
Tibet, Jokhang has served as the center of political activities for
ordinary Tibetans and for monks and nuns demonstrating against Chinese
rule. Chinese policemen and plainclothes intelligence personnel roam
around the temple and surveillance cameras monitor the movements of
people in the nearby market. Nomad, peasant, and exile Tibetan pilgrims
flocking to the temple to pay their respects to Jowo Sakyamuni must pass
through these security devices - caught in an ironic web of politics
that has transformed this holiest of holy sites into a symbol of the
police state.
Have these cameras and policemen deterred Tibetans from adhering to
their religious practices and beliefs? It seems not. Pilgrims continue
to come to the temple by the thousands and visit the top floor where a
statue of the Tibetan King Songtsen Gampo stands. To Tibetans, the King
represents the manifestation of the Buddha of Compassion. To the left of
him stand the statues of the senior Nepali Princess Bikrikuti and the
junior Chinese Princess Wang Chen, believed to be the emanation of the
Goddess Tara. Showing the highest form of reverence, pilgrims from Tibet
and exiled pilgrims from abroad fall to the ground, prostate themselves
in front of these statues, and offer them Khatas (white scarves).
Prostration is the highest form of respect for Tibetans, and,
physically, it is more difficult to perform than the traditional Chinese
kowtow. The prostration by Tibetans to the Chinese princess, reflects
how sincere Tibetans have been in paying respect where it is due.
Therefore, if Tibetans inside and outside are complaining about the
situation in Tibet, their judgment should be trusted.
The great respect and love pilgrims in Tibet and in exile have shown
toward the statue of Princess Wang Chen for more than a millennium is
proof that there is no inherent hatred among Tibetans towards the
Chinese per se. The intense resentment felt by Tibetans results from
policies issued and enforced by the Chinese Communist government. If
left to rule and live in their own way, Tibetans can live peacefully
with the Chinese and show them respect. The barrier to peace in Tibet is
not the pilgrims flocking to Jokhang temple to pay their respects, but
the lack of reciprocity by the Chinese - made worse by the presence of
the surveillance cameras and policemen monitoring this holy site.
___________________________________________________________________________
Send articles to: wtn-editors@tibet.ca
Subscriptions to: listserv@lists.mcgill.ca (SUB WTN-L [your name])
Cancellations to: listserv@lists.mcgill.ca (SIGNOFF WTN-L)
WTN Archived at: http://www.tibet.ca
___________________________________________________________________________
