Subject: (4) POLITICAL INITIATIVES OF THE TRANSNATION RADICAL PARTY
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(4) POLITICAL INITIATIVES OF THE TRANSNATION RADICAL PARTY
by Emma Bonino, Secretary of the Radical Party
Sofia, 15-18 July 1993, Radical Party General Council
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(4) Initiative for the creation of a parliamentary body at the U.N.
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SUMMARY: Recent international events continue to involve the UN more and
more dramatically, and this has speeded up the debate concerning not only
its roles and functions but also the very structure of this world
Organization, in the light of the renewed and increasingly urgent need of
peoples and individuals for democratic representation, within a federalist
perspective. Amongst the proposals capable of cancelling or, at least,
reducing the UN's "democracy deficit", one in particlar deserves attention:
the creation of a parliamentary body (General Assembly of Parliamentarians
from Member States).The constitution of such a body would obviously require
a formal modification of the UN Statute. Rather than adopt the complicated
procedure of summoning a general meeting for the revision of the Statute,
it would perhaps be more practical to prepare a draft resolution with the
aim of obtaining 2/3 of the votes of the Member States, necessary for its
approval. In the short term, however, an idea has been put forward for an
initiative that would function as an intermediate step, i.e., the setting
up of a "subsidiary" body of parliamentary representatives. This choice
would not require any modification of the Statute. A "subsidiary" organ
would certainly have limited, and mostly consultive powers; however, it is
not to be undervalued, primarily because it could awaken parliaments and
national parliamentary representatives.
This second possibility could be implemented, from a procedural point of
view, by its being proposed by a Member State for inclusion on the agenda
of the next General Assembly. We still have enough time to do this. As
far as content is concerned, the draft resolution for the constitution of
the new body would already contain precise indications; therefore, it is
neither a complex project nor one that is easily blocked. The most
important element, and the one that could pose the most delicate political
problems, is, obviously, the structure of the body, which must respect in
every way - whatever path we choose to take - the principle of "absolute
equality" that is extremely important to many countries, especially those
which are still developing.
We have examined these options in more detail in the document that forms
the basis for this report, and we naturally refer you to this. However,
given that similar parliamentary assemblies - those of the European
Counc8l, NATO and the CSCE - only play a marginal role, or are actually
used as an excuse not to rigorously control those same institutions, we
must decide whether it might not be preferable to request a radical reform
of the UN for 1995, to the point of creating a Parliamentary Assembly with
real powers.
General Assembly of Parliamentarians from UN Member States
In the light of difficult international relations, the reform of the UN
system would require a specific commitment by the Transnational Radical
Party to become a reality. A commitment which would give a real democratic
thrust to the debate - in the sense of speeding up the demcratization
process - which is taking place within this Organization and in the outside
world. In a recent reference to the institutional structure of the UN, the
Secretary General solicited "that transfiguration of this house which the
world hopes to be completed before its fiftieth anniversary, 1995" (S/PV.
3046).
In effect, the recent events in which the UN has been dramatically
involved, are extremely relative to the debate concerning the structure and
functions of the world Organization, particularly with respect to a renewed
need for democratic representation of peoples and individuals, within a
federalist perspective.
Amongst the various proposals to "update" the UN and reduce its "democracy
deficit", one in particular deserves attention: the creation of a body of
parliamentary representatives (General Assembly of Parliamentarians from UN
Member States).
1) It is an initiative which if realized in full would result in a formal
modification of the UN Statute, in accordance with Art. 108, consisting in:
A) an amendment to Art. 7, in the sense of adding a "Parliamentary
Assembly" to the principal organs; B) the insertion of a new clause
(probably XIII b) determining the structure, functions, powers and
procedures adopted by the new organ.
In order not to encounter unsurmountable difficulties, it would be
advisable to avoid having to summon a Gneral Meeting for the revision of
the Statute, according to the procedure laid down in Art. 109.
It would in fact be better to draw up a draft resolution for discussion at
the General Assembly, with the aim of obtaining 2/3 of the votes in order
for it to be approved. A modification to the Statute obtained in this way
would come into force only after it had been ratified by the parliaments of
2/3 of the Member States, including the five permanent members of the
Security Council.
2) We must nevertheless consider, as soon as possible, the possibility of
developing an initiative that would constitute an intermediate step, as
regards structure and content. It consists in attempting to set up a body
of parliamentary representatives, which would act as a "subsidiary" organ
to the UN General Assembly, according to Art. 22 of the Statute.
Unlike the setting up of a principal organ, the creation of a subsidiary
organ to the General Assemby does not require any formal modification of
the UN Statute and, therefore, is not subject to the "power of veto" that
Art. 108 and Art. 109 of the Statute confer on the permanent members of the
Security Council.
Naturally, a subsidiary organ has limited powers, which are mostly
consultative, and cannot, therefore, take the initiative in the same way
that a principal organ can. However, apart from supporting the present
General Assembly (which given its actual composition we are tempted to call
a "General Assembly of Governments"), a body of parliamentary
representatives could also have the important function of awakening and
coordinating national parliaments, with regard to the needs of the world
Organization.
Regarding the authority of this new subsidiary organ (General Assembly of
Parliamentarians), the General Assembly could entrust the new body with a
number of very significant tasks. According to Art. 10, the GA "can
discuss any issue or subject which falls within the aims of the (...)
Statute." This wide-ranging authority needs to be modified as regards the
General Assembly of Parliamentarians (as it is by law for subsidiary
organs), above all, according to Art. 13, which entrusts the following
tasks to the GA: a) "to promote political cooperation (...)"; b) to
further international cooperation at an economic, social, cultural level,
and in the fields of education and public health; and to increase respect
for human rights (...)."
Although the GA initially used this power (Art. 22) to create subsidiary
organs of a technical nature for study purposes, which were often composed
of members who each had a specific function, it must also be acknowledged
that it has also created bodies composed of delegates from Member States
which perform important political and operational functions, mostly at an
economic and social level. These include: the UNIDO (UN Industrial
Development Organization), the UNDP (UN Development Program) and the UNICEF
(UN Children's Fund).
3)
a) The initiative referred to in par. 2) could be implemented, from a
procedural point of view, by one of the Member State's proposing that it be
put on the agenda of the next General Assembly. According to regulation
no. 20 of GA procedure, a proposal of this kind must be accompanied by an
explanatory document.
As the provisional agenda of the GA is communicated to the Member States,
by the Secretary General, around mid-July, that is, at least 60 days prior
to the annual Session of the GA, it might be opportune to present our
proposal before said date (in the form of a written communication delivered
to the Secretary General by a permanent member from one of the States).
Neverthless, we do have some leeway in that the procedural regulations of
the GA also stipulate that a Member State can request that a supplementary
item be put on the agenda 30 days before the GA's annual Session.
If said proposal was "adopted" by the General Committee of the GA and the
subject put on the agenda of the GA, the most suitable place to discuss
same would be the Plenary Meeting of the GA, rather than its going to one
of the seven main Committees.
b) As far as content is concerned, the composition and functions of the
"parliamentary body" will be specified in detail in the draft resolution
regarding the setting up of said body. However, as it is not necessary for
a draft resolution to be enclosed with the reguest for the inclusion of an
item on the agenda, it is more feasible for details concerning the
composition and function of the subsidiary organ to be outlined in a
broader and more flexible manner, aaccording to various options, in the
explanatory document that must accompany the proposal for the inclusion of
an item on the agenda of the GA. This would give us two possibilites for
negotiating the text, and also give us time, between the first and second
phases of the negotiations, to muster as many co-sponsors as possible from
amongst the delegations to support the draft resolution for the creation of
the subsidiary organ in question.
It must be born in mind that, to whatever extent the creation of the body
necessitates a financial commitment which is either totally or partially
provided for by the normal budget of the UN, according to regulation no.
153 of GA procedure, the draft resolution cannot be put forward without a
an estimate of the cost of setting up said organ being presented by the
Secretary General or by the VI Committee (Administrative and Budgetary
Committee) of the GA.
Regarding the actual proposal, the most important element and the most
delicate, politically speaking, is the actual composition of the
parliamentary body.
On the one hand, in keeping with a formal interpretation of the principle
of "absolute equality" (Art. 2, par. 1), constantly referred to by numerous
developing countries, one could imagine an arrangement which, as well as
providing for the fact that the body will be composed of representatives
from all the Member States, also provides for each Member having "x"
representatives appointed from its own parliamentary assembly, at least "x"
of whom must belong to a group which is not represented on the Executive of
the Member State in question. The ratio specified in Art. 9 par. 2 ("each
Member can only have five representatives in the General Assembly")
indicates that each Member State has to include amongst its representatives
in the GA elements that do not belong to the Executive; however, the
States have not followed this indication which, on the other hand, is not
preceptive.
Another alternative could be to give each individual representative the
right to one vote, which is the same as saying that the body would be
composed of individual people, with each Member State having the right to
appoint "x" members. If, for example, each Member State was officially
empowered to appoint 3 members, the parliamentary body in question would be
composed of 540 representatives.
On the other hand, while remaining faithful to the principle of the
subsidiary organ being composed of individual members designated by Member
States, a variation on this could be developed, with each Member State
appointing a larger or smaller number of members, according to such
criteria as: size of population, extent of territory, GDP, financial
contribution to the UN.
Considering the options
The need to alter the consensual and "interstate" aspect of the UN system
and the need to promote a parliamentare body with real powers gives rise to
a number of reservations regarding an Assembly which is merely consultive.
Similar parliamentary assemblies (European Council, NATO, CSCE) play a
marginal role and are sometimes even used as an excuse to prevent the
effective control of the institutions of which they are part.
We must. therefore, decide if it might not be more opportune to propose, in
spite of the enormous difficulties involved, the highest option, that is, a
reform of the UN, including a Parliamentary Assembly with real powers.
We must also decide if it is really necessary to exclude those countries
which are not governed by a parliamentary system or are not democratic,
from the UN parliamentary body.
(more)
