Subject: POLITICAL INITIATIVES OF THE TRANSNATION RADICAL PARTY
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(5) POLITICAL INITIATIVES OF THE TRANSNATION RADICAL PARTY
by Emma Bonino, Secretary of the Radical Party
Sofia, 15-18 July 1993, Radical Party General Council
(5) Action to redefine the UN's peacekeeping role and to strengthen
humanitarian intervention - The creation of a Civil Guard for Democracy
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For a new "international" order to support democracies with a vital
contribution being made by permanent UN military forces (under the direct
control of the UN) and the humanitarian intervention of volunteers and
conscientious objectors ("a Civil Guard for democracy").
SUMMARY: The mainstay of the regulations governing world order, as laid
down in the UN Statute, consists in the ban on the use of force (Art. 2
par. 4) and in a collective security system (Chap. VII), which gives the
Security Council a monopoly on the international military force. Art. 43
of the Statute STILL makes the provision that Member States must place
their armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council. When the
international community was still divided into two opposing blocs, the
accord for the creation if military contingents was never finalized; during
the period that followed, with one war being waged after another, an
"evolving statutory practice" was at least adopted which made it possible
to create ad hoc subsidiary organs responsible to the Security Council,
which became operative under certain circumstances, subject to the
agreement of the parties engaged in conflict and with extremely limited
possibilities of self-defence.
A little more progress has actually been made during the war in Bosnia.
The UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) employs three different peacekeeping
methods: a) protection of the population and maintenance of the cease-fire
in Protected Zones in Croatia (UNPAS); b) protection of humanitarian aid
convoys in Bosnia-Hercegovina; c) prevention of conflict and monitoring of
borders in Macedonia. This Protection Force constitutes an important new
departure in peacekeeping. Today, UN peacekeepers are not so much - or not
only - concerned with putting international crises on hold, but also have
to be able to intervene rapidly and effectively in the most diverse
situations; and to respect international opinion. In Angola, Cambodia,
Namibia and Mozambique, the UN peacekeeping forces also have to carry out
non-military functions, to the point of helping local authorities to run
democratic elections. The UN has been less successful in upholding peace at
a "regional" level. For example, the EC contents itself with maintaining a
symbolic, or "political" UN presence (but we don't quite know what the
latter means) in the Ex-Yugoslavia.
However, current events are producing some new developments. The Secretary
General of the UN Boutros-Ghali has put forward a series of important
proposals in his document "An Agenda For Peace", which includes finally
putting in into effect Art. 4 and subsequent articles in the Statute, by
setting up military contingents that would be permanently at the Security
Council's disposal, with a General Staff which would be the "military arm"
of the Government of the international cmmunity. A second proposal offers
an intermediate solution, that is, the formation of Peace Enforement Units,
composed of police, and civilian and military personnel. In the interim,
while we are waiting for these proposals to be put into effect, it must be
noted that crises such as those in the Ex-Yugoslavia and Somalia, which
require "humanitarian" action, have slipped dangerously out of the UN's
control, precisely because international structures are both inadequate and
insufficient. Problems and difficulties are multiplying. Besieged by
ethnic or social conflict, many countries are torn apart by requests for
autonomy and self-government, and fragmentation, in situations in which
there is a great risk of human rights and democratic principles being
violated. It is a widespread, and devastating, problem that is often part
of a vicious circle of poverty, demographic pressure environmental damage.
We are convinced - and we are not the only ones - that all this cannot be
put at the mercy of uncontrolled forces but requires a more determined
commitment from the UN in the area of humanitarian action.
A few hestitant steps have, however, been taken in this direction, for
example: the setting up of a Department for Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and
the appointment of an Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and
the Co-ordination of Emergency Aid. This will most certainly serve as a
basis for furthering UN intervention, but we must bear firmly in mind that
Emergency Aid must not only be of an economic nature but also linked to
development, in order to create a stronger bond between emergency aid and
democratic growth.
It is necessary to have a Resolution passed by the General Assembly, and we
must take the action required to bring this about, which proposes a
restructuring of the Department for Humanitarian Affairs and establishes as
its main objective the creation of operational units, composed of
volunteers and conscientious objectors, which would comprise a permanent
institional force that the UN could call on whenever help was requested,
under whatever circumstances. In particular, we recommend the formation of
a Civil Guard of "blue helmets" - to support the military forces under the
direct control of the UN - composed of volunteers and conscientious
objectors, which would occupy itself with "humanitarian" intervention and
actions, the protection of human rights and the furthering of democracy.
This force could be responsible for effecting "aggressive" pressure, and
carrying out "preventive" actions and "nonconventional warfare", which
would render actual war unnecessary, or at least make it less of a foregone
conclusion. This proposal will be presented to the Department for
Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) as this is the most suitable structure for
putting it into effect.
1. The actual UN structure for international government and cooperation
between States in maintaining world peace.
The mainstay of the regulations governing world order, as laid down in the
UN Statute, is a ban on the use of force (Art. 2. par. 4) and a joint
security system (Chap. VII) which gives the Security Council the monopoly
on the international military force.
Art. 43 of the Statute still formally makes the provision - which has
remained a dead letter - that Member States put military forces at the
disposal of the Security Council, via agreements (between individual Member
States and the Secuirty Council) which "shall determine the number and
types of armed forces, their degree of preparation and their general
dislocation (...)".
Owing to the fact that the international communit was split into two
opposing military and ideological blocs at that time, the accords for the
formation of UN military contingents were never finalized. To give you an
idea of what this force might have consisted in, the US had originally
agreed to put three hundred thousand troops, one thousand fighter-bombers
and two thousand jet fighters at the disposal of the UN.
The impossibility of reaching an agreement as to how the regulations of the
original Statute were to be interpreted, became evident during the
Arab-Israeli conflict. From that point on a "minimalist" solution was
adopted which was not provided for by the Statute, but which was justified
as being an "evolving constitutional practice". This practice involved the
creation of a special subsidiary organ (which was only done occasionally,
but sometimes as a long-term arrangement) responsible to the Security
Council. The organrequired the previous consent of the parties engaged in
the conflict and had extremely limited capacities for self defence.
There has been a little progress, in that a Resolution on protected zones
in Bosnia was recently passed, which gives the UN more power to effect its
mandate.
With regard to the financing of UN forces, it is important to remember
that, since 1973, all operations have been financed by Member States,
according to a variable scale based on specific parameters. Nevertheless,
a Member State, which particpates in a mission with its own men and
military equipment has to pay the normal quota, plus an additional cost per
man-month (for example, Italy has to pay a total of 9,000,000 lire per
man-month with a recoupment by the U.N. of $800 per man-month; while
Pakistan has to pay $30 per man-month with the U.N. recouping $800 per
man-month). Even though a limited number of peacekeeping operations have
been carried out, Member States were in arrears to the tune of $800,000,000
at the end of December 1992.
Concerning the improvement of peacekeeping forces -one of the more recent
innovations at the UN - the UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force), the latest
peacekeeping "model", employs three principal methods for "keeping the
peace": a) protection of different populations and enforcement of
cease-fire in the Protected Zones of Croatia (UNPAS); b) protection of
humanitarian aid convoys in Bosnia-Hercegovina; c) prevention of conflict
and monitoring of borders in Macedonia.
This "Protection Force" constitutes an important new departure in
peacekeeping strategies. During the Cold War, peacekeepers used to
"freeze" international crises in order to maintain the balance of power.
Today, UN peacekeeping forces have to take swift action and, as there is
now only one superpower, they have the difficult task of respecting
international opinion.
With regard to the actual composition and responsibilities of peacekeeping
forces, the most important new development, which could be seen recently in
operations carried out in Angola, Cambodia, Namibia and Mozambique,
consists in non-military actions involving a large number of civilian
personnel. Another extremely important aspect, is that on some of these
operations the UN mandate covers assisting local authorities to run
democratic elections.
Lastly, it must be pointed out that UN peacekeeping operations have not
been as successful at a "regional" level. Chap. VIII of the UN Charter
states that regional organizations, upon request to the Security Council
and in collaboration with same, must assume the resposiblity for putting
peacekeeping initiatives into operation.
The EC has no real international policy and no power to uphold democracy in
the European Parliament; therefore, it contents itself with maintaining a
"political" or, in other words, symbolic presence (ECMM - European
Community Monitoring Mission) in the Ex-Yugoslavia. The CSCE initiatives
can also be included in Europe's assuming a political rather than active
role in the Ex-Yugoslavia.
It is still difficult to predict NATO's role, and also that of the European
Union, which is included in the section on cooperation of the Maastricht
Treaty on political union.
2. Redefining and restructuring UN peacekeeping forces
The Secretary General Boutros-Ghali put forward a series of proposals in
his document "An Agenda for Peace", which the Security Council asked him to
present.
The first proposal consists in finally putting into effect Art. 43, and
successive articles, of the UN Statute, by forming permanent military
contingents at the disposal of the Security Council, which could then
impose its authority in situations like the invasion of Kuwait - something
it has never been able to do in the past. It would be a question of
putting into effect the Statute regulation which provides for a General
Staff: the "military arm" of the Security Council and the "Government" of
the International Community.
The second proposal puts forward a intermediate solution, that of setting
up "Peace Enforcement Units". They would carry out actions designed to
prevent crisis situations from degenerating into war. It would be a
provisional measure, one that would strengthen rather than radically change
UN peacekeeping actions. From an operational point of view, it is most
important to have a permanent force available, composed of civilians and
police as well as military personnel, all of whom have been adequately
trained. In this respect, the Secretary General solicited Member States
and nongovernmental organizations to take the necessary steps to fill this
requirement, inasmuch as training must not only cover the military aspects
but also provide a knowledge of electoral procedures, treatment and
assistence required by refugees, and methods for distributing humanitarian
aid, etc.
3. Operations carried out by a "Civil Guard for Democracy"
Recent events demonstrate that UN actions are most effective when it comes
to solving crisis situations between States; whereas they appear to be
increasingly less adequate in complex situations involving guerrilla forces
and nongornmental militias (Angola, Bosnia, Cambogia and Somalia).
Nowadays, it is only the humanitarian actions carried out in poor areas in
which there is no economic interest (Mozambique, Angola and Cambodia) that
are placed under UN leadership. The sponsors of humanitarian intervention
could not agree over the crisis in the Ex-Yugoslavia (neither were there
any joint interests), which explains the lack of coherent and effective
action at an international level up until now.
The humanitarian aid sent to the Former Yugoslavia consists mostly in
emergency aid, but this only satisfies a very small percentage of the needs
of individuals and groups. Even so,it is difficult to imagine what other
kind of aid could be given in zones still engaged in conflict. In those
zones where the war has been placed "on hold" (the zones protected by
UNPROFOR in Croatia) it is necessary to come up with a different
humanitarian approach which encourages local productivity.
In any event, the UN needs to supplement aid distributed via humanitarian
actions with programmes to support the local economy, which would restore
dignity to these human beings and make them self-sufficient.
The most enlightened proposal in this area is volunteer forces in the
service of the UN (see proposal put forward by Sir Brian Urquhart, Chief
Officer of the UN).
A strong action to protect human rights, to further democracy and freedom
(and plurality) of expression is essential to creating a new world order
(established according to principles of democratic representation), but it
must be rendered effective by the necessary guarantees and controls. We
must promote and put forward a proposal to give the UN the necessary
responsibility and operational capacity to maintain a state of equilibrium
in the world; to promote a new approach to peacekeeping which realizes that
military support is necessary but not enough.
We must strengthen the "right of interference" in a State's internal
affairs, as it is just beginning to be enforced. For an international
action for the respect of human rights to be effective, it must be
accompanied by various forms of humanitarian intervention.
The answer, therefore, lies in combined nongovernmental civilian forces and
military forces under the direct control of the UN, which would reduce the
"endemic" resistance put up by the peoples in question.
4. Strengthening of UN humanitarian action and proposed structural changes
The growing number of crises involving humanitarian issues, like the ones
that beset Somalia and the Ex-Yugoslavia, have slipped dangerously out of
the U.N.'s control, owing to ineffective and inadequate international
structures.
In the presence of ethnic or civil war, many countries are literally torn
apart by requests for autonomy or self-government and fragmentation, in a
situation in which there is a very serious risk of human rights and the
rules of democracy being violated.
This is often part of a vicious circle of poverty, demographic pressure
and environmental damage, necessitating an even greater commitment to
humanitarian aid on the part of the UN.
A small amount of progress has been made in the last few years. The GA
adopted Resolution No. 46/182 for improving the coordination of
humanitarian aid, which lays down the basic principles governing
humanitarian aid supplied by the UN, and recommends specific measures to
ensure swift and coordinated action in dealing with complex emergency
situations and natural disasters.
It was as a result of this that, in April 1992, the Secretary General
created a new Department for Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), and an
Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and for the Coordination of
Emergency Aid (the former UNDRO and the former Emergency Unit for Africa,
Iraq and South-East Asia were absorbed by this new Department). It is the
task of the DHA to develop rapid, coordinated actions to deal with complex
emergencies, in order to save human lives and to assist in the
rehabilitation and development of the countries in question.
Resolution no. 46/182 supplies the United Nations with the necessary
coordinating instruments, by dividing the various tasks amongst specialized
institutes within the UN "family", which will enable the world body to
respond more quickly in difficult emergency situations.
The Department operates in the "grey areas" where political, humanitarian
and security interests overlap. Political coordination, policy development
and alert functions are carried out in New York, which is in constant
communication with the organs of the U.N. and the political, financial and
ecoonmic Departments of the Secretariat. The Geneva Office provides
operational support and coordinates aid during emergencies, and also
coordinates measures for reducing the effects of the disaster.
However, the Department's role is not merely that of a coordinator. When
undertaking humanitarian action it is not only necessary to consider the
humanitarian emergencies in the light of actual difficultires, but also to
combine such action with a more long term effort to deal with the
fundamental causes of the crisis and the structural problems involved in
development and democracy.
Emergency relief cannot take the form of economic aid. It needs to be
linked to development in order to establish solid links between aid,
development and democracy.
Besides, in situations where on the spot emergency operations are either
limited or negated for political reasons, it is only an humanitarian form
of diplomacy that can be effective in reaching the desired objective and in
maintaining peace.
All this must be specified in a GA Resolution on the structure of the
Department for Humanitarian Affairs, whose principal objective should be
that of creating operational units composed of volunteers and conscientious
objectors, which would combine to function as a permanent UN force that
would keep the peace by strengthening democracies. These individual units
would be put at the UN's disposal at any time and under any circumstances,
even though based in their own countries.
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