Subject: Remarks prepared by Emma Bonino for the UN World Hearings on "Challenges Imperatives of Growth Su
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stainable Development - Putting People First", New York, June 7, 1994.
Introduction
A number of factors have recently called for a review of the development
cooperation policies of industrialized countries.
First, the profound transformations in the global political landscape
following the collapse of communism and the end of the East-West
confrontation.
Second, the notion of security has been extended beyond defence and
the military sphere to include economic cooperation as well as a number of
other issues: environmental protection, management of migratory flows,
population, war on poverty, democratization and the protection of human
rights.
Third, the international economic system tends to create regional
poles around strong actors in the North (the US, Japan, the European
Union).
Fourth, regionalization produces asymmetrical flows of resources from
the North to the South: these flows are not distributed evenly among Less
Developed Countries (LDCs) and are concentrated in a few areas or
countries.
Fifth, the countries of the developing world have become increasingly
differentiated with regard to growth prospects, economic policy options,
transformation of the political system. This diversification, which throws
doubt upon the idea of a single entity - "the South" - can fuel either
processes of integration or marginalization of the LDCs.
In this context, the instrument of cooperation, specifically created
to respond to development problems, can play an important role, if it is
provided with greater financial resources and made more effective than it
has been the case in the last thirty years.
1. Development Cooperation: Shortcomings and Problems
In the last decade, Official Development Assistance (ODA) has become one of
the main instruments of North-South relations. Since 1984, it has been the
most important item (over $ 50 billion a year) in the net transfer of
financial resources from North to South, making it an essential source of
financing for LDCs, especially the poorer ones. However, rather than an
increase in real terms of the total value of ODA to LDCs, this figure
reflects a decrease in other flows.
Unlike other international financial flows, ODA is disbursed only by
governments and multilateral agencies; loans are concessional, with a high
grant element: minimum 25%, according to the regulations set out by
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Its stated aim is to promote growth and
well-being in the recipient countries. Yet, development cooperation has
come to include a wider range of objectives and now exerts greater
influence on the economic policy-making of the LDCs.
Despite the importance of ODA in North-South relations, there is
general consensus that the cooperation system has not contributed
effectively to development to date. The persistence of underdevelopment in
many countries has even cast doubts on the validity of the instrument as
such. The shortcomings manifested by development cooperation can be related
to four factors.
First, the scarce linkage of cooperation funds to the declared
objective, that is, development. The official figures on ODA disbursed are
undoubtedly higher than the resources actually used for development in the
recipient countries. This is mainly a result of the frequent conflicts of
interest between the priorities of development and the real or presumed
requirements of the economic and security policies of the donor. Although
it is almost impossible to quantify this diversion of resources, many
examples can be cited of ODA being used for export subsidies or to support
crisis-ridden sectors in the donor country with little or no fall-out in
the beneficiary country. The specific instrument most frequently used to
this end is tied aid, that is, aid tied to the supply of goods or services
by the donor.
Second, the impact of aid on the development of the recipient.
Experience during the last decade has shown that consistency is needed in
the various North-South economic flows. In the '80s, ODA tried to
compensate for the diminution of other flows, rather than play a
complementary role to other instruments. It did not, however, manage to
compensate totally, as shown by the difference between inflows (ODA) and
outflows. The lack of consistency among the various instruments and their
specific objectives can also be seen in the use of aid in relation to
consumption when the reduction in other commercial and financial flows
affected investments and productive imports.
Despite both positive and negative experiences, the problem of the
impact of ODA programmes is closely linked to the general limits of the
cooperation system. In particular, the dominant organizational model is
characterized by static planning, based on a pre-determined definition of
development policy, from which a set of techniques and procedures for
ex-ante evaluation, for decision-making and for monitoring, and a structure
organized to conform with the decision-making and implementation process is
derived.
This organizational approach takes little account of feedback as an
essential element in a continuous decision-making process aimed at
correcting the strategy; it provides little room for the social and
economic subjects for whom the planning is destined; it assumes that the
scope of planning is limited to the planning approach and does not include
the strategy approach. In other words, it does not ensure the flexibility
needed to affect those factors that most experts now consider indispensable
for positive impact on development: social and cultural factors; the use of
appropriate technologies that can be interiorized by the LDCs; the
mobilization of endogenous resources and self-development.
Third, adoption of the wrong development models. One of the main and
now widely admitted mistakes was the concentration on physical investments,
on the assumption that they would automatically generate development. Other
factors, such as culture, the expectations of the recipient population, the
organization of social and political relations, the institutional order,
and the mechanisms reproducing poverty, were neglected.
incorporates autonomous and self-sufficient knowledge; furthermore,
its political and economic returns are clearly visible. Yet, these physical
objects have too frequently ended up as scrap metal, or worse, have drained
immense resources for their operation.
Fourth, the low level of coordination among donor countries. Although
development aid has become a consolidated system of bilateral and
multilateral institutions, the level of coordination among the donors, and
between the donors and the recipients is still minimal. Four main
conceptions of bilateral cooperation can be distinguished:
a) ODA as an instrument of security policy (the United States);
b) ODA as an instrument of foreign economic policy (Japan);
c) ODA as an instrument of foreign policy aimed at consolidating former
colonial ties with LDCs (France);
d) ODA for humanitarian reasons, without any utilitaristic ends for the
donor (the Scandinavian countries).
These bilateral models are alternative (and sometimes competitive)
rather than cooperative, and none has managed to function as a frame of
reference for all aid policies.
Then again, the fragmentation of bilateral ODA has not been
counterbalanced by the action of international bodies. The multilateral
agencies established by donor countries for coordination have only
partially fulfilled this role. This is because they have managed only a
third of total ODA and because they have added two alternative models to
the existing bilateral models: that of the UN development agencies and that
of the World Bank.
The new international situation has highlighted the limits of the
various national policies. Revision of the American model is necessitated
above all by the end of bipolarism and the new dimensions of international
security; the Japanese model is under discussion because it has aggravated
the already strong trade contrasts with the US and the EU; the French
model, with the accent on bilateralism, conflicts with the prospects of a
common European policy; and last, the Scandinavian model is limited by its
specific characteristics (small, rich and altruistic), which make
widespread application difficult. The development concepts and aid policies
of the multilateral agencies are also evolving towards greater homogeneity.
2. Economic transformations and social equity
The '80s were characterized by profound economic and social crisis in the
South of the world. Apart from rare exceptions (Southeast Asia and a few
other marginal cases), all LDCs registered low growth and drops in income.
The phenomenon was both financial and economic, thus multiplying the
negative effects on the production system and on society. In addition,
demographic growth has brought enormous problems to bear on already weak
governments and socio-economic systems.
In order to deal with the crisis, international financial institutions
worked out and sometimes imposed plans for economic stabilization, which
partially brought macro-economic variables back into acceptable bounds.
However, these policies were socially costly: increase in the number of
poor, accentuation of the dualism and disarticulation of the socio-economic
system.
Lower financial flows and monetary restrictions gave way, in turn, to
a drop in production and, thus, more financial and social difficulties. In
many cases, therefore, the economic reforms called for by the plans for
structural adjustment aggravated the crisis. But they also swept away the
previous models (equally inadequate) and created a new situation for
development prospects.
Crises in the last decade took on specific characteristics in each
country, deriving from the different situations already existing in the
South. The indiscriminate application of the same model of adjustment only
caused greater differentiation among the LDCs. Thus, a distinction must be
made between two groups of countries particularly hard hit by the crisis.
One group is made up mainly of those countries which are classified as
lower middle income countries by the World Bank and which occupy an
intermediate position in the human development index of the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP). These countries have a relatively complex
production structure, but with a number of weakness factors (structural
disarticulation, strong dualism, slight international integration, weak
institutions). For this group, the crisis has led to the progressive
destruction of the production system, with a substantial drop in national
income, especially of industrial origin (in many cases by as much as one
quarter in a year). The high social costs have often combined with
regressive income redistribution, resulting in an increase in disequalities
and extreme poverty. These characteristics are shared by many Latin
American countries and have also created serious difficulties for the more
advanced African countries and the large Asian countries.
A second group is composed of all the least developed countries
(LLDCs). These countries are characterized by socio-economic systems with
very weak institutions, extremely deficient infrastructures, the
progressive destruction of the environment and indiscriminate use of
natural resources for survival. In short, these systems are close to
structural collapse. Many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and some
countries in Asia are in this state.
To the internal crisis of the LDCs must be added some external factors
of particular importance related to the three main aspects of North-South
relations: international trade, direct investment flows, and LDC debt.
International trade tends to be concentrated increasingly within the
industrialized area (OECD countries account for three fourth of world
exports) and tends to be heavily protected (before the completion of the
Uruguay round, some 80% of world trade was subject to tariff or non-tariff
barriers). This makes access to the international market difficult for the
LDCs. Only the semi-industrialized countries of Asia have managed to
increase their share of the international market in recent years, thanks to
the exceptional increase in their exports (12% annually in the second half
of the '80s, as compared to a 6% world average). Furthermore, the growing
concentration of manufactured exports in the industrialized area
(approximately 90% of the total) strengthens the specialization of the LDCs
in primary products (that is, in products that have lower value added, and
of which the terms of trade have worsened drastically).
Foreign direct investments (FDI) have been one of the most dynamic
components of financial flows: between 1983 and 1989, direct investments
rose by 29% per year (more than three times the growth of exports).
However, almost all FDI originates in developed countries (three-quarters
in the US, Japan and the EU) and is directed mainly (again three
-quarters) towards the same countries, once again leaving the LDCs in a
marginal position.
In the first half of the '80s, the foreign debt problem of the LDCs
took on great importance in both the South and the North. But while the
danger to the international financial system has largely passed, the
implications for the LDCs are still very serious. Suffice it to recall that
financial flows towards debtor countries fell so much that LDCs recorded a
negative balance in net transfers of resources as early as 1984.
Two typologies of countries and situations can be distinguished in
this case, too: the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (with 5% of the total
debt, of which two-thirds is of official origin) and the most indebted
countries, in particular Latin American countries (with over 30% of the
total debt, of which only one-third is of official origin). In the former
case, the problem is one of insolvency, not volume. In the latter case, the
problem is mainly the size of the debt and its negative impact on economic
recovery.
To undertake new strategies, two general conditions are essential: on
the one hand, a redefinition of the development process in the LDCs
(favourable internal conditions); on the other, important changes in
international economic relations (favourable external conditions). As the
legacy of the '80s shows, these conditions are complementary and must be
given coherence by a strategy of sustainable development.
Generally, such a strategy calls for the construction of internal
socio-economic equilibria (between development and the environment, between
production sectors, between the government and society) as an essential
factor of economic growth. More specifically, it calls for a concept of
development that combines economic transformation with social equity.
Debate on the subject has already begun in the LDCs and has resulted in the
indication of some initial concrete choices that must be taken into
consideration in formulating a concept of development cooperation aimed at
promoting a strategy of sustainable development.
The goal of economic transformation with social equity is very
difficult to achieve in the countries of the South: first, because the
process of productive transformation is an integrated and indivisible whole
(each reform has its repercussions and is linked to the developments in
other sectors of the economy and society); and second, because it calls for
the contemporaneous mobilization of strictly economic factors and
socio-political factors (thus, social and instititutional organization is
considered a factor of production).
In brief, the objectives of economic transformation and social equity
require consistent and simultaneous action aimed at progress in two fields:
an increase in the productive capacity of the system; a reduction of
dualism, i.e. differences or gaps in social and economic efficiency and
functioning.
The two objectives can be brought together by basing the development
process on the nodal points of the system: the social, productive and
institutional nuclei that can have dynamic effects on the whole system.
A strategy of sustainable development requires not only new internal
conditions, but also a new external context: basically, it calls for
greater insertion of LDCs on the international market, reducing their
marginality. This implies both the acquisition of international
competitiveness by the LDCs and promotion of processes of regional
integration, a course which some developing countries have already taken.
The acquisition of international competitiveness, means real
competitiveness based on increased productivity through the incorporation
of technological progress. Technology, information and organization are
important factors for success on international markets, with respect to
which LDCs generally have no comparative advantages. In other words, a
slower but more stable process must be promoted, a process able to enrich
the country (growth of productivity) and at the same time integrate the
productive systems of the LDCs into the international system. The internal
and external liberalization that many LDCs have undertaken may be
functional to these objectives as a basis for development of the country's
productive and innovative capabilities.
Promotion of South-South integration processes is one way in which the
LDCs can attempt to prevent the polarizing trends in the North (EU, US,
Japan) from selectively coopting only some LDCs, leaving the rest of the
South to a fate of widespread marginalization.
In fact, regional integration favours policies promoting trade, allows
for the implementation of infrastructural cooperation programmes in the
integrated area, and provides for the definition of common positions
towards third countries in international negotiations on trade.
Furthermore, regional and integrated LDC markets can provide a platform for
export of manufactured goods to industrialized countries.
Opening the market of industrialized countries to the products of the
LDCs is thus probably the single most important action required to change
economic North-South relations. This is a consequence of the greater direct
impact that trade has on the productive structure of the LDCs, as well as
of the dominant economic models in those countries (dependence on exports
as the leading factor in growth). Negotiations in the World Trade
Organization (WTO) must, therefore, provide positive responses to the needs
of the LDCs, above all in manufacturing and agriculture.
3. Taking development assistance seriously
If ODA is to become the indispensable instrument for the development of the
South, a number of changes are in order. First, it should be freed of the
goals of the donor country's foreign economic policy. Such goals can be
pursued by other more appropriate instruments (export credits, direct
investment, non-concessional loans).
Second, better coordination is required among donors, starting with
the Europeans. A more precise definition of the purpose of the aid is one
of the main prerequisites for coordination. Orienting ODA towards one
priority objective can, in fact, reduce the conflict of national and
particularistic interests in bilateral policies hindering coordination.
In order for aid to be coordinated and targetted, the conflicts of
interest between the donors and the recipients must also be overcome. The
new interdependence between North and South has divested these conflicts of
their justification. Relations are no longer based on strictly economic
factors (as seen, the South seems to be increasingly marginalized), but on
the fact that some global issues that concern the North are concentrated in
the LDCs (environment, population, security).
Then there is the question of the absolute level of resources
presently going to ODA. Here the international community is in desperate
need of a system of enforcement sanctions against unfulfilled commitments.
True enough, this applies as well to other fields. To give just one
example: Iraq would have gotten away with its violation of the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, had it not invaded Kuwait and thus triggered the
coalition's response.
Without a set of enforcement rules, however, ODA policies will keep
showing a huge gap between their intentions and their results. Who is still
believes in the commitment coming from developed countries to devote to ODA
0.7% of their income? The point is rather that, no matter what the figure
of choice may be (0.7%, 1%, or even 0.5%), it is vital to arrive at rules
that make the ODA pledges taken in the international fora binding. It goes
without saying that as long as nation-states dominate world politics there
are no ways, short of war, to impose on them an external will.
States, however, do enter agreements that imply the provision of
resources. Think, for example, of the system of quotas to finance the
United Nations. Countries can and do delay the payment of their dues. But
they usually end up making good on their promises - the sanction, the
enforcement rule, being in this case the loss of face incurred by doing
otherwise.
A similar system could be applied to ODA. The UN Security Council
could and should come up with a resolution that mandates the fulfillment of
donors' pledges (as to the absolute amount of aid, its environmental
impact, its development orientation etc.) and of recipients' conditions (as
to democracy, human rights, disarmament etc.), together with a verification
machinery to ensure implementation. Delinquent donors should be subject to
sanctions, if ODA has to be taken seriously.
Outside the UN, private institutions, Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs), could do the same. Such groups as the Helsinki watch, for example,
made a great job in helping fighting human rights abuses in Europe and
ultimately in defeating Soviet rule. Why not having an International
Cooperation watch?
Donors and recipients could also come together immediately and form a
club - let's call it International Cooperation Group - based on the
voluntary acceptance of rules - those at both ends of the trade that I just
mentioned. On the negative control side, the group could name names and ask
delinquent members to explain why they did not follow the rules agreed
upon. On the positive control side, the group could lobby the international
institutions, financial and otherwise, to have higher-profile development
cooperation policies.
Beyond the enforcement of aid pledges, the question remains as to how
optimize the use of ODA. Following are some priority areas of action.
Actions aimed at the growth of human resources. These should mainly
involve improvement of the training system and the standard of living
(health, nutrition, serious economic and social marginalization), which is
essential for the development of production in general.
Actions aimed at the growth of technological capability take two
directions: the strengthening of domestic resources and the transfer of
technology. The latter can be promoted directly or by using ODA as an
incentive for direct investment, especially in the form of joint ventures.
Technology transfer must, in any case, must be seen in terms of
implementing strategies rather than projects, that is, in terms of
technological systems rather than technological objects.
Actions aimed at improving the efficiency of institutions. Technical
and financial assistance must serve to reconstruct (or construct) a network
of social services (education, health) and a network of services linked to
production (management assistance, trade union training, import-export,
information, setting up of consortia). Particularly important is assistance
in the strengthening of public institutions, especially those that have
strategic roles in development (tax office, promotion of production and
savings, technical training) and those that reinforce local government.
Global objectives include the following.
The war on poverty. The situation is extremely serious in the LLDCs
and calls for the mobilization of enormous resources, efforts, mental
powers and culture. But given its structural nature, the crisis cannot be
overcome easily or in the short term; its solution will call for the
consensus and integration of the efforts of all sectors of the
international community. Priority countries are the countries of
Sub-Saharan Africa and more generally, the LLDCs.
A fund for extraordinary aid (distinct from emergency aid necessitated
by unexpected or occasional events), aimed at acting on the structural
causes of the crisis could be created. Such a fund would have to be in
harmony with other programmes combatting poverty (World Bank). Coordination
could be achieved through multilateral management of funds.
Reconstruction of the socio-economic system. ODA must give priority to
the reduction of dualisms, both the traditional dualism between city and
country and the modern dualism produced by the vast phenomenon of
urbanization, the main poles of which are the formal and the informal
economies. Aid should aim at institutionalizing the informal economy,
reducing poverty and creating productive outlets for the sectors of the
population involved in these activities, giving particular attention to
support of micro and small enterprise. Priority countries are in Latin
America and Asia.
Aid to a certain region from various donors could be channeled through
a regional bank; the management of these regional funds would thus
strengthen coordination of both the donor and the recipient countries.
Another level of coordination would have to be established among the
multilateral cooperation agencies, regional banks and other regional
bodies.
3. Cooperation for Democracy
Consensus has been growing over the last few years on the need to consider
the political conditions of development. The old assumption that
authoritarian governments are needed to guarantee economic growth, greater
equity and consolidation of the nation-state has been finally proven wrong.
To the contrary, it is increasingly clear that the growth and
liberalization of a given economy go hand in hand with the growth and
liberalization of its society, i.e. with democracy.
One of the major factors in democratization is a greater awareness of
human rights. Respect for human rights has, in many cases, been taken as
the basis for the construction of democratic processes. This is also
attested to by the birth of local organizations working in this direction
and the adoption by some of developing countries organisations of charters
committing their members to protect and promote these rights.
Another unifying factor is the role that the growth of civil society
has played in making the more political democratic demands. This role has
been emphasized in all studies of the democratization processes under way
in the South and in the East.
The role of civil society is also underlined by the coincidence of the
economic crisis with the growth of the democratic movements. The
concurrence of the phenomena is interesting for a number of reasons. First
of all, it belies the assumption that an increase in poverty leads to lower
political and social activism. Quite the opposite, the crisis in the LDCs
seems to have given society the decisive impulse to work out autonomous
responses (in short, the phenomenon known as informal economy, which can be
extended to take in informal society and informal politics) that are beyond
the reach of and in some ways against the state. Moreover, it has also
demonstrated the importance of longer-term factors (the social changes
fuelled by the political developments of the '60s: the increase in
urbanization, the formation of a young educated class, etc.)
Secondly, authoritarian regimes seems more dependent on economic
results for legitimacy than democratic systems, a fact which weakens the
neo-authoritarian theses predominant in Asia. From this point of view, the
inability to generate development manifested by most authoritarian regimes
seems to have led to the demise of a concept of state which, inasmuch as it
accentuated its dirigiste and centralizing nature (in the economy and in
society), tried to gain unlimited powers, and was plagued by corruption and
inefficiency.
As a consequence, it seems justified to speak of a power of attraction
for democracy (or a preference for democracy) in many areas of the South in
that the political system is perceived as being more suited to promoting
development.
The relation between development and democracy can also be seen from
another, more specific, perspective. The reconstruction and austerity
measures involved in economic reforms and adjustment programmes have
political elements that seem to be easier to construct democratically. They
include good government, transparency in decision making, and government
accountability. Given the social costs of the reforms, especially for the
weaker strata, difficult choices in spending and the allocation of
resources (that is, in the social division and distribution of costs and
benefits) must be made and the consensus for those choices found.
This requirement seems to underlie many of the cases of liberalization
from the top down. It is irrelevant whether these policies were dictated by
a kind of survival strategy on the part of the ruling elites. Even if they
are controlled from the top, processes of liberalization have a way of
going beyond original intentions. This is particularly evident in the
relation between economic liberalization and political liberalization: for
example, although the decision to give the private sector a more active
role in stimulating growth may be aimed at broadening consensus for the
regime among the middle class, it can also undermine the base of the
authoritarian state.
Three main areas of positive action should be incorporated into aid
programmes.
First, the protection and promotion of human rights. Respect ot the
fundamental rights of the individual represent the minimum and necessary
basis for any process of democratization. The rights must be accepted as
universal, that is, not subject to cultural, ideological, political or
economic variations. It is this universal nature that justifies actions for
their protection and promotion as a right/duty of the international
community and, therefore, as a limitation on the principle of
non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.
In operational terms, the application of this criterion is supported
by international agreements signed by states, that is by a negotiated
framework. This does not, however, make enforcement of those agreements any
easier. Considerable progress could be made in this direction by combining:
a) a strengthening of multilateral instruments for verification,
monitoring, and reporting on the state of human rights in individual
countries; the most suitable forum is the UN, but effective action on its
part would call for the creation of specific instruments (such as a High
Commission on Human Rights) and the extension of competences of its bodies
to the field of human rights;
b) the establishment of a more direct political link between disbursement
of development assistance and the state of human rights in the recipient
country; the criteria for conditionality would be established on the basis
of the data supplied by competent international bodies and would be adopted
jointly by donor countries (in DAC or, for European countries, in the EU)
to avoid unilateral politicization of the issue;
c) the explicit integration of human rights policies into the broader
context of policy dialogue between donor governments (individually or
jointly) and recipient governments; the introduction into cooperation
agreements of specific clauses on human rights resulting from dialogue and
negotiations between the parties would increase the possibility of
undertaking concrete actions;
d) the creation of funds for the support of both human rights legislation
in the aid recipients and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
operating in the field of human rights, giving the latter access, on the
basis of pre-determined criteria, to financing disbursed through
multilateral channels (EU, UN).
Second, actions aimed at strengthening institutions and social
subjects. This line of action has the greatest potential for simultaneously
stimulating democratic progress, achieving greater articulation of society,
and propelling the dynamics of development. Through it, the economic and
social advancement of a number of weak groups - in terms both of income and
of social status - could be incorporated into an aid programme for
democratization. For this kind of action, "decentralized cooperation" could
no longer be conceived of as a subsidiary action, and would have to become
the backbone of the assistance programme. More specifically it should:
a) base aid programmes on a broad concept of development, which includes
the dimension of freedom, the equitable distribution of resources, services
and income, and the full mobilization of human resources; the human
development indexes set up by the UNDP offer a good basis for establishing
operational criteria;
b) strengthen the associative fabric of LDCs (intermediate structures,
farmers association, trade unions, professional organizations, women's and
youth groups, etc.) is essential to make the democratic system function
fully, to ensure transparency and control of decisions on distribution of
resources and economic policy, to make political participation more
effective;
c) progressively include the social galaxy of the informal economy in the
political scenario: the return to the state of broad and dynamic sectors of
the population of many LDCs - now marginalized - must be one of the
priorities of any attempt to narrow the widening gap between citizens and
the state;
d) institutionalize the role and functions of intermediate associative
structures and private subjects operating in the informal sector, ensuring,
recognizing and regulating their existence. This calls for the definition
of appropriate framework legislation ensuing from dialogue and negotiations
between the state and the various sectors of society. The formulation of
legislation is obviously an internal process, but international development
cooperation should be aware of the fact that an inadequate normative
framework in the recipient countries can lead to the failure of attempts to
stimulate development through a strengthening of the role of society;
legislative aspects must, therefore, be included in an integrated aid
package, possibly offering technical assistance to that end.
Third, the promotion of political and institutional changes or
politico-constitutional reforms. It may be superfluous to point out that in
this case the fundamental thrust for reform must also come from inside the
country and that the international community can only try to flank and
support processes already under way. Nevertheless, the need to provide the
role of social subjects with an adequate legislative framework can only be
wholly satisfied if the role is given suitable institutional and political
outlets and if it can develop in parallel to the formation of regulations
and channels allowing society to influence the decision-making process.
From this point of view, the right to form political parties, to
compete in free elections on the basis of alternative platforms, to change
governments by electoral and constitutional means, to elect a parliament
endowed with real legislative powers, and to institute an independent
judiciary is decisive for the stable integration of society into the
political system.
Growing pressure in many LDCs for pluralistic political reforms offers
the international donor community the possibility of expressing preferences
in that regard through the introduction of democratic clauses, as already
occurred - at the request of the parties - in the EU cooperation agreements
with Chile and Argentina.
One last sector of interest for a development cooperation policy aimed
at combining participative development with institutional change is
assistance to political and administrative decentralization. The diffusion
of power and a retrenching of the prerogatives of the central state with
respect to those of the local governments offer various potential
advantages as far as participation is concerned. Moreover, aid can play a
direct role in this sector, by setting up networks for the exchange of
information and experiences between local authorities in the North and in
the South, and by ensuring specific forms of technical assistance for the
strengthening of local institutions, the training of personnel, the
improvement of procedures and regulations, and the strengthening and
improvement of the supply of social services.
Conclusions
What precedes in this paper is nowadays part of the standard diagnosis of
problems related to growth and sustainable development. There is also no
shortage of cures around, and they probably enjoy a remarkable degree of
consensus.
Thus, in concluding my remarks there is no need to do the usual work
of summarizing this paper's main points.
Nonetheless, let me emphasize again that what we need most is a set of
enforceable rules of the international aid game. As much as it seems
logical, and even just, to tight aid to various conditions on the part of
the recepient, we need to bind donors to the fullfillment of their aid
pledges. I urge the Security Council to take up the matter soon.
Without enforceable rules of the international aid there is little
doubt that we will keep meeting over and over again, always complaining
about the state of North-South cooperation programs. We need to be creative
to find the new rules; but we also need to be rigorous to enforce them, to
enforce in this field as well the rule of law.
The author gratefully aknowledges the assistance of the Center for the
Study of International Politics (Centro Studi di Politica internazionale -
CeSPI) of Rome and of prof. Giandonato Caggiano director of SIOI
(International Society for International Organizations) in the preparations
of these remarks
