ITALY

NO EXIT WITHOUT STRATEGY

Statement by

Ambassador Sergio Vento

Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations

To the United Nations Security Council

New York, November 15, 2000

[...] We cannot exempt ourselves from concrete action. Prompt ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is the best way for Member States to meet this need. International justice has both a preventive and a constructive function. It fosters reconciliation through the search for truth. Let us not forget that at the basis of the concept of justice lie the principles of impartiality, generality and abstractness. They guarantee that Member States' demands will be met and that there will be an effective transition from the emergency phase of a crisis to its resolution and the successful exit of the international presence. [...]

Following whole Statement

1. Let me begin by paying homage to the Dutch Presidency of the Security Council for organizing today's open debate. This brainstorming session is an important complement to the Security Council's July debate on conflict prevention. It comes at an opportune time and forces us to look beyond contingent factors in our reflections on peace-building strategies. Peacekeeping without peace building is a headless torso.

What we need, and urgently, is comprehensive strategy covering conflict prevention, peace-keeping, and peace building. Such as strategy requires the coordinated efforts of all the actors in the UN system, especially in preparing exit strategies for peace-keeping missions.

2. There can be no exit strategy unless a comprehensive strategy is already in place at the start of a pence operation. Too often an exit strategy has amounted to little more than a quick escape route. We need a clear political vision to prevent the recurrence of another situation such as the unravelling of the mission to Sierra Leone. We need to move beyond a logic dictated by emergencies or by partial, temporary interests.

Instead we need to build a functional connection between the conflict prevention phase and the possible action to be undertaken if a crises degenerates into a threat to international peace and security. Such a strategy must also include provisions for peace-building, a phase that is essential to achieving sustainable peace once an operation has ended. Lot us not forget that a well-planned peace building can also have a preventive effect, by stemming any possible relapses.

3. Pence building in the context of an integrated strategy has two key dimensions: that of consolidating the judicial and public order systems, and that of the reconstruction efforts that also seek to eliminate the economic and social problems at the roots of conflicts. These two aspects are complementary: they require both a holistic approach and specific concrete actions.

4. Certain recommendations in the Brahimi report, such as the development of a standing rapid deployment capacity and the emphasis on the use of civilian police, dovetail with a reflection currently underway in the European Union. The UN and the EU have much to learn from each other in the fields of crisis management and conflict prevention. These same issues were high on the Secretary-General's agenda in discussions with EU leaders during his recent trip to Europe. And it is around such issues that United Nations-European Union relations can further develop.

5. "Rule of law" is fundamental to the success of any comprehensive peace strategy, particularly in the phase surrounding the withdrawal of complex UN missions.

Alongside the affirmation of the principle of rule of law, I would underline Italy's longstanding commitment to the advancement of international justice, the chief guarantor of the rights of the weakest. We need higher standards of international legality. Far from representing a threat, this trend creates a safety net against double standards. The time has come to put an end to the law of the strongest and to affirm a form of justice that will gradually foster an outgrowing of the need for an international presence in crisis areas.

6. We cannot exempt ourselves from concrete action, Prompt ratification of the

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is the best way for Member States to meet this need. International justice has both a preventive and a constructive function.

It fosters reconciliation through the search for truth. Let us not forget that at the basis of the concept of justice lie the principles of impartiality, generality and abstractness. They guarantee that Member States' demands will be met and that there will be an effective transition from the emergency phase of a crisis to its resolution and the successful exit of the international presence.

7. In this light, lot me draw your attention to "the chain of criminal justice," a series of measures involving police forces, investigating magistrates, judges, and incarceration. The Brahimi report makes a useful proposal to establish a system of transitional norms governing criminal law procedures in order to facilitate the work of those engaged in police and civil justice administration on complex peace missions. We have already experienced this need in Kosovo and East Timor.

Obviously we must be careful to assure that such developments respect local legal and social systems, by providing for an adequate degree of flexibility and adaptability to the situation on the ground.

8. In terms of policing duties, within the European Union Italy has been involved in efforts to develop greater consistency and coherence of action. In December 1999 the European Council of Helsinki set the goal of creating, by 2003, a rapid reaction force or 60,000 soldiers to deploy on peace-keeping operations, including those launched by the United Nations. Last June in Feira, Portugal, the complementary goal was set to establish, by 2003, a rapid response team of 5,000 police officers ready for deployment on peace-keeping operations. This development will foster more intense collaboration between the European Union and the United Nations.

9. Attention to economic and social aspects is an indispensable corollary to an international presence in crisis areas. This is even more true when we consider thee close connection in developing countries between deeply-rooted economic and social problems and the outbreak of conflicts. The Secretary-General's seminal report on the causes of conflicts in Africa underlines this critical nexus. We need to assure greater continuity between political and military action and the economic and social reconstruction that must be at the basis of any peaceful international pull out. Better synergy between the Secretariat and the relevant United Nations programmes and funds is essential to this goal. Success also depends on closer cooperation between the General Assembly, ECOSOC, and the Security Council. The Charter lays down procedures for this purpose.

One of these is the long ignored measure of article 65, that provides for information and assistance of ECOSOC to the Security Council.

10. Lot us also focus on elections as a crucial moment in complex peace operations. Exiting from an operation without first holding elections can be a recipe for failure. Here too the Brahimi report indicates concrete stops, such as strengthening the DPA's Electoral Assistance Division. Another need frequently cited in the debate on peace-keeping operations is training. Addressing the Security Council, the Secretary-General has underlined the importance of courses on early warning and conflict prevention given for some years now by the UN Staff College of Turin. These very days at the Staff College the DPKO and trio Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights are holding a course on peace-building and human rights for military and police personnel, with special attention to gender balance.

11. Integrated strategies also entail the rejection of arbitrary sunset clauses. In fact, the United Nations must assure that conflicts have been settled before dismantling a peace-keeping operation. We must pay close attention to the definition of clear, credible and achievable mandates. Such a goal can never be reached without Member States who are willing the contribute personnel. This is why Italy is pleased that two days ago the Security Council adopted a series of decisions pursuant to the Brahimi report and tried Secretary-General's action plan. These measures include a more regular and systematic involvement of troop-contributing countries in the Security Council's activities in every phase of a peace-keeping operation, from defining the mandate to implementing the relevant Security Council resolution to changes in a mandate dictated by the mutating situation on the ground. This is a first step in the right direction of more efficient methods of work of the Security Council and responds to widespread

expectations of troop contributors to be actively involved in decisions concerning their personnel.

12. Italy's heavy involvement in three very different peace-keeping operations has taught us some important lessons. In Somalia, the lack of a clear strategy and of a well-defined mandate led to the exit of the international presence. We are still suffering the consequences today. Troop-contributors were kept on the sidelines of the Security Council's and the Secretariat's decision-making, starting with the definition of the original mandate. When the crisis degenerated, the error was compounded with an even more ambiguous mandate, while ignoring the opinions of troop contributors.

We also learned from another experience, this time positive, in Albania in 1997.

Here the Security Council quickly authorized a resolution proposed by both Albania and Italy - both non-members of the Council - to prevent the deterioration of a political crisis that would have seriously threatened peace and security. A core group of countries was formed of participating countries. This guaranteed effective management of the crisis and ongoing contacts with the Security Council (as well as with the OSCE in Vienna, which successfully monitored democratic and fair elections in the country). We should think about the core group idea in designing future complex missions, for example if we attempt to re launch a mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Ambassador van Walsum's introduction to today's debate mentions another UN success story, the mission in Mozambique. Here the peace-keeping operation was preceded by an accurate preparation of the local political context, with the active contribution of an Italian NGO. This facilitated the maintenance of peace and the later withdrawal of the international presence, accompanied by elections and ongoing social and economic reconstruction. A positive situation that kept to constructive attention of the international community focused on Mozambique, as demonstrated by the response to the natural disasters that struck that country.

In a similar manner, the fact that the mission to Ethiopia-Eritrea was prepared and accompanied by intense political and diplomatic efforts by the OAU and the facilitators allows us to place greater trust in the outcome of the UNMEE mission from the outset.

We have much to learn from the example of Mozambique in designing future peace-keeping missions and exit strategies that are able to meet successfully the situation on the ground and interface actively and rationally with the various national and international actors involved.