During 1991, as the United Nations took centre stage of the Gulf War, the US President declared that the community of nations had entered a "new world order". The President declared that this new order was not a Pax Americana, but rather a Pax Universalis. The Gulf war marked a turning point in history, reviving the possibility for the United Nations to play a central role in maintaing peace and security among nations.

Nonetheless, while the Gulf war proved the effectiveness of UN collective security, it might be argued that if Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace had been implemented, the conflict in the Middle East could have been prevented from escalating into a full-scale war.

The Dialogue will examine the events leading up to and during the Gulf War and determine which principles of UN collective security contained in "Agenda for Peace" could have promoted a quicker, more effective response to the crisis.

Events:

A. PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY:

In mid-July 1991, tension between Iraw and Kuwait was apparent worldwide when President Hussein publicly attacked the policies of its neighbouring Gulf states, principally Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Iraq accused them of exceeding their quotas and over-producing oil to glut the market and weaken prices. Iraq, due to its weak economy from the Iran-Iraq War, aimed to limit production and keep oil prices high. Despite previous agreements made between the thirteen-member Organisation of Petroleum Exporting countries (OPEC) in May and July, production continued to increase and oil prices to fall.

On July 17, President Hussein, during a speech to mark the 22nd anniversary of the "July 17-30 Revolution" threatened "if words fail to protect Iraqis, somithing effective must be done to return things to their natural course and return usurped rights to their owners." He accudes some (unnamed) Arab states of undermining Arab interests and security on behalf of the USA and warned that Iraq "will not forget the saying that cutting necks is better than cutting the means of living".

On the following day Iraq radio broadcast details of a memorandum dated July 15, which had been sent by the Iraqi Foreing Minister Tariq Aziz to the Arab League Secretary-General Chedly Klibi. In the memorandum, Iraq accused Kuwait of having deliberately pursued policies aimed at weakening it during its eight.year war with Iran. During the war, Iraq claimed, Kuwait had advanced into Iraqi territory and had set up military establishments and oil installations. Since the outbreak of the Gulf war in 1980, it was alleged, Kuwait had stolen oil worth US$2,400 million; and Iraq had every right to "retrieve" these funds.

On July 18, Kuwaiti army was placed on a state of national alert and the recently elected National Council held an emergency session to study the Iraqi charges.

Question: Given the escalating tensions between Iraq and Kuwait and Saddam Hussein's open threats of violence to Kuwait, could Preventive Diplomacy measures have been used:

i) Could the Secretary-General have turned to the World Court for an advisory opinion?

ii) Although some mediation efforts were taken on the part of the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Egypt, could the Secretary-General himself have proposed holding a discussion between the Iraqi and Kuwaiti leaders, and act as mediator for such a discussion?

B. PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT:

On 24 July, Egyptian leader Mubarak visited Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and announced that President Hussein had given his assurance that Iraq had no intention of attacking Kuwait or moving forces towards the Kuwaiti border. This report had been given in the light of US reports on July 24 claiming that Iraq had advanced two armoured divisions totalling about 30,000 soldiers towards the Kuwaiti border. Yet, general perception in the West was that this move was just an Iraqi "scare tactic".

Question: If Agenda for Peace had been in effect, Kuwait would have had the option of turning to the Security Council and requesting a preventive deployment force to be deployed, or a demilitarised zone be installed, on their side of the Iraq-Kuwait border.

In that event, would Iraqi aggression have been deterred?

Would you, as parliamentarians, have been prepared to have your forces participate in such a preventive deployment action?

C. MILITARY ENFORCEMENT:

On 2 August 1990, Iraqi troops continued overnight to mass at the border. They invaded Kuwait and within hours had complete military control of Kuwait. The US immediately responded by sending a carrier battle group to the area. It then sent small land force on the Saudi-Kuwaiti border with a view to deterring Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia.

On 2 August 1990, the UN Security Council condemned the Iraqi invasion and called for a withdrawal.

On 6 August 1990, the Council, "acting under ch. VII of the Charter", imposed economic sanctions against Iraq.

On 29 November 1990, the Council authorised Member States to "use all necessary means" to implement 2 August resolution for an Iraqi withdrawal, unless Iraq withdraws by 15 January 1991.

On 16 Januarym the coalition of states, led by the United States, commences military action to expell Iraq from Kuwait. During April, Iraq is forced out of Kuwait.

Questions:

- Did the Security Council give enough time for sanctions to have worked?

- Would it have been (a) politically preferable (b) militarily feasible, for the UN to have carried out the enforcement operation under UN command?

- Should article 43 have been specifically cited in the November resolution?

- Was there adequate reporting to the Security Council by the coalition states? Can the Council exercise adequate supervision of a military action carried out by Member States?