The following article has been written by Yuri Orlov - honorary chairman of International Helsinki Federation, founder of the "Helsinki movement", former political prisoner in Soviet Union, professor in the Floyd R. Newman Laboratory of Nuclear Studies (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA) - as a contribution to the first issue of "La Nuova Frontiera - International Human Rights and Security Review", that will be presented in Rome in July, 1994.
Copyright Antonio Stango Editore. No part of the article can be reproduced without written permission by the publisher.
The "Red-Brown" Phenomenon
by Yuri Orlov
The rapid appearance of extreme nationalist groups in many Western and East European countries, and especially the development of an alliance between neo-Stalinists and newly born ultra-nationalists in Russia - known among Russian democrats as the "red-brown" movement - pose an obvious danger to international peace and security.
Some definitions.
In Russia, all sides often accuse their political opponents of "fascism", so it is important to define precisely and concretely what we mean by the labels "brown" and "red-brown". The most typical "red-brown" political system was the Stalinist regime after World War II. It was obviously "red", but also quintessentially "brown": extremely xenophobic, anti-Semitic, violent, and repressive inside the country and aggressive outside it; strongly opposed to the Western concepts of democracy, freedom, tolerance, and human rights; committed to the State as an absolute and supreme value; and convinced of the spiritual superiority of its best citizens (the New Soviet Man) over degenerate Westerners.
If we substitute "pure Aryan" for "New Soviet Man" and add
"Jews" to "degenerate Westerners" we get a picture of Hitler's Nazi
regime. And if we recall that the Nazi regime provided some social
and even political security for the racially pure and politically loyal namely, mass employment, state control over private business,
and even a worker class holiday, May 1, as a state holiday - the Nazi regime becomes not pure "brown" but, rather, "brown-red".
These two examples, by definition, provide a standard for
measuring the extent to which current movements are "brown" and "red-brown". Therefore, these terms properly apply neither to
moderate, new-style liberal communists, nor to moderate, civilized
nationalists. Such people are useful parts of a full political spectrum in a healthy modern society (so long as they are at its very margins), providing criticism, debate, and intellectual challenges.
Who are the Russian red-browns?
Economic anxiety, national humiliation and loss of hope are the dominant feelings among ordinary ethnic Russians today. And the leading hunters for "who is guilty?" of this mess are, as usual, to be found at both extremes of the political spectrum: leftist-communist ("red") and rightist-nationalist ("brown"). Both sides have been holding the US, so-called world Zionism, and their Russian democrat "tools" responsible for Russia's suffering and her destruction as a great power. Western democracy, in their view, has meant freedom of pornography, speculation, and corruption. Their theoretical idea has been to find a so-called "Third Way", something between a not-so-free market economy and old-style communism, concentrated on building a
strong state and restoring empire (Russia as superstate and world superpower). Ideally, they would like to construct what some openly
call a great Euro-Asian Empire from the Atlantic to the Pacific; strong "law and order", meaning strong central power, a strong national leader, a strongly regulated market economy, a strong army; and restoration of a state ideology, something like so-called traditional Russian national values plus state control of individual rights.
The red-browns have been convinced that the West, especially
the imperialist United States, aims to take over and destroy Russia just as it destroyed the Soviet Union. In particular, they believe that the Americans, Zionists, and Masons are conspiring to ruin their old enemy, Russia. Yeltsin is regarded as a puppet of America and betrayer of the Russian people and army.
The red-browns' social appeal to the masses lies in their stand against corruption and crime (about which, more later), as well as their advocacy of social justice. These are just the areas in which new Russian democrats, mostly former Communists themselves, have had no success.
Organizational structure of the red-brown movement.
Before Yeltsin banned it in October, 1993, their chief organization was the National Salvation Front (NSF), chaired by I. Konstantinov. The NSF formally proclaimed its existence in October, 1992 with its "Political Declaration of Left and Right Opposition", presented in the 31 October 1992 issue of its de facto publishing organ, the newspaper Den ("Today", now renamed Zavtra, "Tomorrow"). At the time, the NSF functioned as an umbrella for a very wide range of scores of organizations, some extremely radical and ready for violence, and some more moderate. Its members numbered about 50,000, sometimes called themselves the "red-white" movement, and included:
- National communists (like military general Makashov and former KGB-general Zyuganov, co-leaders of both the NSF and the restored and reorganized Communist Party of the Russian Federation). Among other things, national communists want to restore the USSR with Russian dominance and an alliance to the traditional Russian Church.
- Russian Nazis (leader, Barkashov).
- The Liberal-Democratic Party (chair, Vladimir Zhirinovsky), a semi-fascist organization. Zhirinovsky proclaimed himself a national-socialist and received 8% of the vote during the 1990 Russian presidential campaign. (In the parliamentary election campaign of December, 1993, his party received 25% of the vote.)
- The Russian National Assembly (chair, Sterligov, former KGB-general), a coalition of nationalist and semi-fascist organizations, a membership of 5,000-10,000, many of them ex-KGB, and a great deal of money from unknown sources.
- The National Republican Party (chair, Lysenko).
- "Labor Moscow" (later "Labor Russia"), a communist party (leader, V. I. Anpilov).
- Various branches of the famous Pamyat.
- The Union of Officers (chair, Terekhov).
- The Nazis, the National Republican Party, Labor Moscow, some branches of Pamyat, and the Union of Officers had their own paramilitary units.
- The unsuccessful uprising during the October, 1993 confrontation between President Yeltsin on one side and Parliament and Vice President Rutskoi on the other, as well as the elections that
followed, split the NSF and the anti-democratic opposition as a whole.
The Labor Moscow communists, red banners flying, attacked the State television station; the Russian Nazis, with their red swastikas,
occupied and defended the Parliament; the Russian Officers attacked
military headquarters; and General Makashov coordinated their
fighting. But Zyuganov's communists and Zhirinovksy's national-
socialist "Liberal-Democrats" did not participate. While the leader of the uprising were arrested and their followers went underground,
boycotting the coming elections and constitutional referendum, Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky and some other members were elected to the new professional parliament, the State Duma.
Recent developments.
Although the left-right coalition has decayed, the red-brown movement is in some respects more consolidated: the "reds" have become more "brown" than before. Take, for example, the newspaper of the most pure, dogmatic communists, the Bolshevik of famous Nina Andreeva. On the first page of issue No. 15 (1994), we naturally meet a portrait of Stalin; then we are offered long discussions about the readiness of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for a new, second socialist revolution. So far our impression is that this party is a normal bloody orthodox Bolshevik organization. However, on the third page there is a caricature: Yeltsin, Gorbachev and other reformers as small marionettes manipulated by a big fat capitalist with a Jewish star and "IMF" (the International Monetary Fund) on his shirt, and a yarmulke atop his caricature Jewish face. The purest Bolsheviks appear to be, in fact, "National-Bolsheviks".
Or consider the 1 May 1994 meeting in Moscow organized by the Labor Russia communist party of V. I. Anpilov, who had been recently released by the amnesty together with all other participants in the October uprising. In his speech under portraits of Stalin and Lenin, he, as usual, appealed for a war against "forceful capitalization
of our country". (Not empty words, these: Anpilov's fighters were the bravest during the uprising.) Following Anpilov, communist
leaders from the US, UK and Greece made their speeches. Thus, this looked like a normal communist meeting. However, the next speaker of Labor Russia, factory worker M. Vojdakov, gave a talk about
"Jewish ideology which succeeded in transforming into Yids the
leaders of all other nations of our planet!" (Russkaya Mysl, No. 4028,
May, 1994) Communists? No, national-communists, red-browns.
Among Russia's several communist parties, now, it is hard to
find a "red" one without an admixture of "brown". Even Zyuganov's Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the most moderate one,has strong connections with the NSF. Whether Zyuganov's parliamentary party is only the open, legal cover for some illegal underground organization remains to be seen. This is a real question, because the Russian Communist Party in the Soviet past was not a party at all in the ordinary sense, but a state structure conducting large-scale, secret, dirty activities all over the world (along with some theatrical open performances to foster the illusion that it was a normal party).
What lies ahead?
It is possible that at some crucial moment, probably just before the next elections of the President and parliament (in June, 1996), all anti-Western and anti-liberal forces will unite. Their common political platform will be revenge: to the goals described above they will now add that of punishing "enemies of the people", especially Yeltsin, but also Gorbachev, Gaidar, and their allies.
The most probable leader of this alliance will be the former general and Vice President of Yeltsin, leader of the October, 1993 uprising and then prisoner - Alexander Rutskoi. The chairman of the NSF, I. Konstantinov, has already declared he will support Rutskoi as leader of the opposition. Rutskoi, for his part, has appealed for creation of a "social-patriotic movement" to unite "reform-minded communists and nationalists." (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberti Daily Report, 24 May 1994) In the Russian context this means a coalition that would include Rutskoi's own "Russian S-D People' Party," all the National Salvation Front, the communist parties of Zyuganov and Starodubtsev, and maybe Zhirinovsky's "Liberal-Democratic" party. Until now, Rutskoi has expressed only contempt for Zhirinovsky. However, pressure from the army, the essential part of which voted for Zhirinovsky, can push them together. In the absence of radical improvement in people's lives, or at least in their hopes, such a coalition could win; an
d then Rutskoi would be the new president.
What would such a victory mean? Consider this declaration of Rutskoi: "Those countries that call themselves sovereign and independent never had their own statehood, never in their history. They were all parts of Russia, a great power." (RFE/RL, Daily Report, 16 May 1994) And here is his view on responsibility for the October, 1993 bloodshed: "Clinton sanctioned the actions" of President Yeltsin during the uprising. (Ibid.) A victory by Rutskoi and his allies would plainly mean a policy of an aggressive revanchism and anti-Americanism. And given most of the players, it would have a strong red-brown character. If these people came to power, no matter when and how, all post-Cold War development would revert to the old situation - but now on a more dangerous level, because these red-browns are much more aggressive than the old apparatchiks of Brezhnev's era.
Fortunately, nothing on such a scale is likely to happen before the 1996 elections. Why? First, the majority of Russian politicians fundamentally wants to keep the country as far as possible from any new violent confrontation. Second, the attractiveness of political and economic freedoms, political and economic games, has already seized the souls of hundreds of thousands, who will therefore support liberal reformers. Finally, it is unlikely that the standard of life will continue to go down; it seems to be stabilized now on some low but not unacceptable level.
Nevertheless, red-browns can be expected to maintain a non-trivial level of support. For even setting aside their economic distress, patriotic humiliation, and resistance to the number of Russian refugees from the "near abroad", many people cannot accept the current terrifying level of corruption and criminality, and they will turn to the red-browns to save them from it. Their concern is far from groundless. While many Russian politicians were absorbed by their struggles for political power and personal careers, a large number of profitable businesses have been captured by the former Party nomenklatura on one hand, and by entrepreneurial criminals on the other (both bandying about democratic slogans), so that now they form a powerful mafia-structure penetrating all society. We know, and the fresh Italian example has confirmed this, that such a phenomenon represents a deadly danger even for a well-established democracy.
Some recommendations.
In seeking to block extremists like the red-browns in Russia and elsewhere, it is important to understand what conditions help extremists like them to find mass support. An important one is lack of political culture and experience of negotiation and mutual compromise. In Russia, for example, after centuries of repressive regimes, the Russian people have experience of either silent obedience or bloody uprisings, and not so much of something intermediate. Lack of political culture and experience is a common reason for sudden explosions of ethnic, religious or social hatred. Moreover, it is often accompanied by lack of an established political framework for negotiations. Besides that, the confrontational forces usually do not seriously entertain, or are not even properly informed about, solutions already tested by other nations. Thus, if Gamsakhurdia and then Shevardnadze had introduced some sort of federal treaties between the nationalist central government and separatist-minded Ossetia and Abkhazia before t
he beginning of the armed conflict in Georgia, then both the integrity of the country and its internal peace might have been preserved in time.
International organizations bear some responsibility, too. The CSCE, for example, could and should have pushed all parties in Georgia toward such a solution - before the bloodshed - using both promises of help and threats of sanctions. But it did not. Likewise, with respect to the potentially much more serious conflict between separatist-minded Russians in Crimea and the Ukrainian authorities it would be appropriate for the CSCE, as well as the UN, to promote a kind of federal treaty now and not when it will be too late, as it was in former Yugoslavia. The treaties signed by Yeltsin and the presidents of separatist-minded Tartarstan and Bashkorostan would serve as good examples for solving delicate problems of national relations.
Long-term activities, activities to prevent the development of uncivilized conflicts sparked by extremists, must surely include global political and human rights education in all countries. Implemented under the auspices of, say, the CSCE or UN, this would be education, beginning in elementary school, on how to solve conflicts by negotiation and compromise, and without suppressing individual and group identities - in other words, how to co-exist. Such studies need to be rather practical, not abstract theoretical ones, with exercises and games modeled on real local situations.
As for other important conditions for mass support of extremists, one must cite disenchantment with democratic institutions (as in Weimar Germany, and today in Russia and to some extent now in Italy), along with national humiliation (as in post-World War I Germany and now in post-Cold War Russia). The Marshall Plan after World War II was the brilliant correction of the humiliating Western policy towards defeated Germany; however, no similar policy has explicitly been developed towards virtually defeated Russia - a failure that sits like a land-mine under the whole future of the world.
Given this fact, organizations like the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, which by definition is dedicated to promoting human rights in the context of European peace and security, should concentrate a great deal of activity on Russia as a country crucial to that context. Doing so can mean, in particular, not simply monitoring and analyzing red-brown developments, but also helping to coordinate the numerous anti-fascist groups in Russia and other countries; organizing education in human rights and anti-fascism; and even pressing Western governments and foundations to create and fund special programs. (Such programs might be to help the unemployed develop small businesses, or to gather and transport used agricultural and construction equipment to new private farms and businesses in Russia.)
In short, the new, post-Cold War Europe requires of human rights workers a very activist, entrepreneurial human rights policy that includes but also goes beyond our established important work of gathering and publishing information about, as well as protesting, violations of human rights. For we must confront the paradoxical fact that the decay of totalitarian regimes has not only created new freedoms for many peoples, as well as new possibilities for us to learn about violations of human rights. It has also created new problems for them, and new responsibilities for those of us who place the issue of human rights squarely in the context of international peace and security.
Ithaca, New York
8 June 1994
