Moscow, January 27, 1995

From the very beginning of the Chechen crisis I have tried to establish contact with the first persons in our government in order to bring to their attention information about the real course of events as well as my ideas for resolution of the conflict.

My efforts in this respect have not been entirely without result.

After my meeting with you, I returned to the zone of conflict. On January 9, I twice spoke by phone with Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin and pressed for a ceasefire. The Prime Minister agreed with my ideas and told me that he had given appropriate orders to the military. The consequences are known: the initiative was sabotaged by the generals, and a provocative statement, signed by "The Government of Russian Federation", wrecked implementation of the 48-hour ceasefire, which might have initiated the peace process.

On January 11, I sent the Prime Minister new proposals for a ceasefire in the city of Grozny and for pursuit of a broad political settlement in Chechnya and the Caucasus. Later, I noted with satisfaction that Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's January 16 television address contained several key provisions corresponding to my proposals. Soon after his address, he entered into talks with a Chechen delegation headed by Abubakarov and Imaev, and an oral agreement for a ceasefire was reached. But then the talks were in effect disavowed by public statements of the first persons in the Russian Federation, by the shady game of Vice-Premier Sergei Shakhrai, by Deputy Minister for Ethnic Affairs Vyacheslav Mikhailov, and, once again, by the generals' sabotage.

On January 26, I met with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, and we had a detailed and friendly conversation. I mentioned that obstacles might be put in the way of my mission to the North Caucasus.

That same evening I learned that my name was not included in the passenger list for the special flight to Mozdok which was to transport the OSCE delegation to the zone of conflict. My trip had been agreed to by the delegation and by Valentin Kovalev, chairman of the Temporary Commission to Monitor Constitutional Rights and Civil Liberties in Chechnya. Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev had also been informed of my plans.

I was told that the passenger list for the special flight had been put together by the Ministry of Defense and could be altered only by order of Minister Pavel Grachev himself.

It's clear why I was left off the list. It's no secret that I intended to investigate the accuracy of reports I've received concerning a "screening camp", organized by Nikolai Egorov and Pavel Grachev in Mozdok, and allegations that Russian citizens have been beaten, tortured and even executed there without trial.

It's quite understandable that my plans might not suit some people. But how can someone presume to obstruct me in performance of my duties, without giving thought to the major international scandal which his action will inevitably create?

Boris Nikolaevich!

The State Duma elected me the Russian Federation's Commissioner for Human Rights. By your Decree, you ordered me to begin fulfilling my constitutional function immediately, without waiting for the Duma to adopt the relevant Federal Law.

I see two ways out of the current situation.

You can repudiate your Decree "On Measures to Implement the Constitutional Functions of the Commissioner for Human Rights," dated August 4, 1994.

Or you and Victor Chernomyrdin can use the means availiable to you to restore constitutional order in the state and government administrations subordinate to you.

Sergei Kovalev

Commissioner for Human Rights

of the Russian Federation