MILOSEVIC PLAYS GUESSING GAME OVER RECOGNITION

(The Independent, 31/05/95)

Not for the first time, Western governments are placing their hopes on Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian President, for a diplomatic breakthrough in the Bosnian crisis. Not for the first time, Mr Milosevic is keeping the outside world guessing about his intentions.

The breakthrough on which the West is counting is Serbian recognition of Bosnia as a sovereign state in its pre-war borders. This, it is hoped, will force the Bosnian Serbs to realise that they cannot unite all Serb-held lands into an enlarged Serbian state and must therefore sue for peace.

Western leaders have little choice these days but to seek Mr Milosevic's co-operation. Naturally it means setting to one side the fact that in 1991 and 1992 they identified him as a chief instigator of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, and as a man who promoted the right of all Serbs to live in one state.

The conventional wisdom is that Mr Milosevic will recognise Bosnia soon, because the Serbian economy requires a rapid end to United Nations sanctions. According to this view, he will extend recognition if he receives a clear timetable for the removal of sanctions and a promise that the West will not later reimpose them.

But sanctions may not be the dominant factor in Mr Milose-vic's thinking. Partly through smuggling, concealed foreign bank accounts and other forms of sanctions-busting, the Serbian economy has kept afloat.

Relief from sanctions is not Mr milosevic's only objective. His Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic, said on monday that

Serbia expected "political compensation" for recognising

Bosnia.

This appeared to mean that rump Yugoslavia, grouping Serbia and Montenegro, should have the legal right to succeed the former Yugoslav state, which included six republics, in international institutions. At present, rump Yugoslavia has an indeterminate international status because Serbia was punished for being largely responsible for the wars.

Even if Mr Milosevic recognises Bosnia, the Greater Serbia project, a nationalist dream for at least 150 years, is unlikely to die an immediate death. T he West's peace proposals, endorsed by Mr Milosevic, allocate 49per cent of Bosnia to the Bosnian Serbs, and will proba-bly allow that area confederal links with Serbia.

This is the reciprocal price the West is paying for having created a Bosnian Muslim-Croat entity, and allowing it confederal links with Croatia. In such an arrangement can be seen the seeds of a future attempt to forge a single Serbian state.

Then there is the question of what happens to the parts of Croatia that Serbian rebels seized in the war of 1991 and turned into a self-proclaimed republic. Mr Milosevic has yet to suggest publicly that he will recognise Croatia in its pre-war borders.

It is conceivable that he will one day sell out the Croatian Serb leader, Milan Martic, just as he may sell out the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic. However, he wants a deal that would leave part of eastern Croatia under UN protection, leaving the Serbs in control.

Mr Milosevic has several incentives to push for a Bosniansettlement that leaves Mr Karadzic isolated. it would improve the chances of keeping Serbia out of a wider war, and enhance Mr Milosevic's position as the supreme leader of all Serbs wherever they live.

But he has other good reasons not to extend recognition to Bosnia. He has learned how to exploit differences among the world powers to extract concessions for Serbia. From Mr Milosevic's point of view, it may be worth waiting a while longer if he can gain more.