The following report, written by Erik Siesby (professor of International Law in the University of Copenhagen, chairman of the Danish Helsinki Committee and author of several books on minorities issues), has been published on the first issue of "La Nuova Frontiera - International Human Rights and Security Review" (Rome, March 1995).
THE DEMANDS OF THE KURDISH POPULATION OF THE SOUTH-EAST OF TURKEY
On May l2th, 1993, twentyfive members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly representing five different parties most of whom were elected in the South-East and Eastern Turkey issued a declaration that mentions "the sufferings which take place in the South-East and Eastern region of our country, where mostly our Kurdish citizens live...". As reasons for these sufferings the declaration mentions economic underdevelopment, unemployment, lack of infrastructure, lack of education, migration etc. The declaration also mentions "oppression and prohibition of the political, religious and cultural rights of the local people. All the governments which have governed the country from the very beginning of the Republic have kept their eyes and ears closed to the rights and freedom of these people. All the governments have followed the same policy of denying the Kurdish identity".
Unfortunately, the situation in that region has not improved since then. The Turkish government apparently still believes that a military solution to the problem can be found. The sufferings continue and there is now an obvious need for a new policy in order to solve the problems of the South-East of Turkey.
In order to survey the Kurdish demands and wishes the chairman of the Danish Helsinki Committee, professor Erik Siesby, visited in June 1994 a number of Kurdish organisations and Turkish and Kurdish personalities. None of the interviewed persons declared an independent Kurdish State to be the political goal of the Kurdish population in Turkey. Some mentioned a federal system as a possible solution of the problem. Most of the spokesmen for the Kurdish population in the South-East formulated the political goals summarized below.
In order to protect the persons interviewed against accusations of 'separatism' their names will not be mentioned in this report.
The Kurdish demands may be summarized as follows:
I. Respect for human rights in the South-East of Turkey.
II. Respect for the Kurdish identity, language and culture.
III. Economic development.
(I) 1. Abolish the state of emergency and remove the special forces which terrorize the population.
2. Freedom of organization. Freedom to establish local political parties which would enable the Turkish government to learn the demands and wishes of the various Kurdish population groups living in the South-East of Turkey.
3. Freedom of expression. Freedom of the Kurdish Press. Access for the Kurdish people to the electronic media.
(II) 1. Respect for Kurdish identity. Freedom to study, write about and teach Kurdish language, history and culture.
2. Freedom to use Kurdish as a language of instruction where desired by the parents.
(III) Economic development in cooperation with locally elected bodies.
Comments
(I.1) The oppression of the Kurdish population has taken place in varying degrees since 1924 and has resulted in no less than twentynine Kurdish uprisings. The Turkish government has made no attempts to meet Kurdish demands. The Kurdish population of c. six million in the South-East of Turkey are at present being terrorized by security forces estimated at c. 600.000. The forces are organized in several corps among which the following:
1) Jandarmes i. e. gendarmerie;
2) Kommando birlikleri i. e. commando units;
3) Kara Ordu birlikleri i. e. Army forces;
4) Hava Kuvvetleri i. e. Airforce (airplanes and helicopters);
5) Ozel Tim i. e. special police team;
6) Ozel Silahli i. e. special armed forces;
7) Ozel Harp Dairesi i. e. counterguerillas;
8) Polis;
9) Cevik Kuvvet;
10) MIT = Milli Istikbarat Teskilati i. e. National Intelligence Agency;
11) Koy Krucusu i. e. village guards (c. 70.000);
12) Ozel asirat birlikkeri i. e. special tribal units;
13) Hizbullah ve itirafcilar i. e. religious groups and confessors organized by the State (a law of 1991 allows mitigation of punishment for 'confessors' who give important information on criminal activity).
Koy Krucusu, the village guards, were originally ordered by the military to protect their own village against attacks from PKK. Now the village guards form a paramilitary group which take part in the æevacuationÆ of villages. The village guards are dressed in uniforms well equipped and armed, and well paid. Many men who have been dependent on alcohol or narcotics have been persuaded to join the village guards.
An example of the pressure used to recruit the village guards was given in 'Turkish Daily News' of Monday June 20th, 1994: a Turkish Kurd, Sabri Cetin, 54, was interviewed in Hizawa, a refugee camp in Northern Iraq. He explained that his village had been under siege by the Turkish military for over eight months and that the men in the village had been under pressure by the Turkish military to join the village guards. The military eventually torched the houses of those who refused to join. Gradually the military killed people as well.
(I.2) Art. 5 of Law on Associations no. 2908: "No associations may be founded in contravention of the general principles of the Constitution. Associations may not be founded to allege that there are minorities on the territory of the Republic of Turkey based on differences in race, religion, sex, culture or language with the intent of destroying the indivisible unity ot the territory and nation of the Turkish State, or to create minorities with the intention of ensuring that a race or class or adherents of a specific religion or sect have sovereignty over others or have privileges over others by preserving, developing, publishing or broadcasting languages other than the Turkish language and culture"."
This provision prevents the establishment of legal representatives of the Kurdish population, and prevents the Turkish government from having a democratic dialogue with the Kurdish population in the South-East of Turkey.
The party DEP, which tried to be a spokesman for the Kurdish people, was banned by the constitutional Court. Six of DEP's members of the Grand National Assembly are being prosecuted under article 125 in the Turkish penal code which article criminalizes upon penalty of death ôan act intended (...) to separate a part of its (the State's) territory from the Administration of the State.
(I.3) The Turkish State has four TV channels and one international channel aimed at the Turkic republics outside Turkey. There are several private channels but none Kurdish although twenty per cent of the population have Kurdish as their mothertongue and several villagers in the South-East only speak Kurdish.
The case against the six DEP members of the Grand National Assembly, which is based solely upon speeches held by the six parliamentarians, illustrates the extent of freedom of expression allowed persons trying to explain the views and wishes of the Kurdish population.
Many Kurdish newspapers have been banned and canfiscated.
(II.1) The great and courageous Turkish sociologist, Ismail Besikci, who has written a number of books on the Kurds, their culture and history, has spent more than ten years in prison for his scientific writings. Several cases which have not yet been finally decided may result in keeping Besikci in prison for the rest of his life.
Another scholar, Mehmet Bayrak, is at present being prosecuted for his writings on 'Kurdology'. His latest book has been confiscated.
The Turkish Human Rights Association's April report mentions as other examples of scholars punished for their writings on the Kurds, professor Fikret Baskaya, Munir Ceylan, and ass. professor Haluk Gerger. These are just examples. There are hundreds of journalists and writers who have been punished for their writings on the Kurds. Several journalists have been murdered by unknown murderers.
(II.2) Children who grow up in Kurdish surroundings and who know only Kurdish will from the first year at school hear only Turkish. Every morning the teacher will ask the pupils to repeat after her: "I am Turkish. I am proud of being Turkish, etc. etc.": a long creed of 'Turkishness' and its moral values. A solid knowledge of Turkish is of course of great potential importance to these children. A total exclusion of their Kurdish mothertongue both as a subject for instruction and as a language of instruction can be a serious handicap for the spiritual development of the children.
(III) The Kurdish area is economically underdeveloped. The average income is said to be c. 1/3 of the national average. The huge GAP project which eventually may bring some wealth to the area is being planned without the participation of the people whose lives will be fundamentally changed by the project. Because of the unrest and terror of the area investors hesitate.
An outline of a solution
The negative attitude which the Turkish governments have taken with respect to Kurdish demands has been determined by a wish to protect the integrity of Turkey against 'separatism'. It appears from the rapporteurÆs meetings with Kurdish organisations and experts on the Turkish Kurdish history and culture that the vast majority of Kurds do not demand an independent Kurdish State.
The above-mentioned demands can be met by general legal reforms without introducing special privileges for the Kurdish population of the South-East. A solution may be found by introducing a system of democratic local government in all of Turkey and by implementing the principles of the Helsinki Accords concerning human rights, and the later CSCE Documents, especially the Paris Charter.
A decentralised system of democratically elected authorities to administer the local school systems could satisfy the various wishes of the local populations.
The steps indicated above could be part of the democratic reforms which have recently been planned by the present government.
The Military Solution of the Kurdish problem sought by the Turkish gavernment is inhumane, counterproductive, and extremely burdensome from an economic point of view.
Inhumane. The population of the reqion c. 6 million are terrorized. Killings by unknown murderers are frequent. In Diyarbakir, the capital of the region, an average of ten killings occur per week. All are killed by bullets in the head fired from behind. More than 1.000 villages have been 'evacuated'. In December 1993 the Turkish minister of the Interior admitted that 871 villages had been emptied. According to the Human Rights Association æInsan Haklari DernegiÆ the real figure was 874 and now the figure had risen to over 1.000. The evacuation of villages has been executed by destroying the harvest, burning or bulldozing of houses, by killings etc. The homeless villagers seek refuge in the cities. The population of the city of Diyarbakir has now grown to 1.5 million from 380.000 three years ago. It is estimated that the military solution has created c. 2 million displaced persons, who now live under extremely difficult and unhealthy conditions.
Counterproductive. The violent resistance movement, PKK, which began in 1984 as a very small and extreme Maoist organization, has grown to very important dimensions as a result of the attempts to find a military solution. The facts that peaceful Kurdish political organizations have been prohibited, villages destroyed, and Kurdish political leaders imprisoned or murdered by unknown murderers, have caused a great many Kurds to join the PKK forces.
The "military solutions" have only made the situation in the South-East more desperate.
Economically burdensome. The costs of the military, paramilitary and police activities in the South-East have been estimated at 160.000 million $ per year.
A Recommendation
After seventy years' oppression of the Kurdish population in the South-East a simple solution to the Kurdish problem can hardly be expected.
A step by step solution may be a possibility. The first step towards a solution must be for both parties to show the will to find a solution without the use of violence. Freedom to organize local political parties would eventually give the Kurdish population the voice they need, and it would make it possible for the Turkish government to get a representative of the Kurdish population with whom to negotiate. Without a dialogue between the parties there is hardly any hope for an end to this very old conflict.
The CSCE could be the instrument to help the parties in the conflict find a way towards a solution.
