RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

There were reports of extrajudicial killings, 'including some carried in the Chinese press. There is, however, no reliable information about the number of such killings or the adequacy of the government response. There have been numerous executions carried out immediately after mass summary trials. Often these "trials" occur under circumstances where the lack of basic due process protections borders on extrajudicial killing (see Section I.e.).

In April the official press reported that a guard assigned to maintain public order in Shenzhal village, Anhui province, was executed for murdering one farmer and wounding two others after they refused to pay illegal levies imposed on local residents. The village chief was given a suspended death sentence for his role 'in the incident. In March the parents of 33-year-old Wang Jingbo released a statement claiming that their son was beaten to death while illegally detained by the Public Security Bureau in Beijing's Chaoyang District. The victim's parents demanded an impartial investigation after an autopsy reportedly showed that their son suffered a brain hemorrhage and 12 broken ribs while detained. At least three Buddhist monks died as a result of mistreatment while in prison in Tibet (see Tibet addendum).

b. Disappearance

In January the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances reported on three new cases of disappearances that allegedly occurred in 1995. Most of the 56 cases which the Working Group has under review occurred between 1988-90. The majority were Tibetans, the others were political activists. The Government still has not provided a comprehensive, credible public accounting of all those missing or detained in connection with the suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations. Long incommunicado detentions continued (see Section I. d.).

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The law prohibits torture, however, both official Chinese sources and international human rights groups continued to report many cases 'in which police and other elements of the security apparatus employed torture and degrading treatment in dealing with detained and imprisoned persons. Former detainees have credibly reported that officials used cattle prods, electrodes, thumb cuffs, prolonged periods of solitary confinement and incommunicado detention, beating, shackles, and other forms of abuse against detained men and women. Persons detained pending trial were particularly at risk as a result of government failure to correct obvious systemic weaknesses 'in design and operation of pretrial detention. These weaknesses include a reliance on confessions as a basis for convictions and the lack of access to prisoners by legal counsel and family members until after authorities file formal charges, a step that often takes months. Some, but not all, of these problems were addressed in March, when the National P

eople's Congress enacted amendments to the Criminal Procedures Law. The amendments, which were to become effective on January 1, 1997, are a positive step toward bringing China's criminal justice process into conformity with international norms (see Sections I.d. and I.e.).

In April a Chinese delegate to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights stated that "the Chinese judiciary deals with every complaint of torture promptly after it is filed, and those found guilty are punished according to law." The Government also claimed in its report to the United Nations Committee against Torture that "the State, taking an extremely serious view of any incident of torture, has adopted commensurate measures through administrative and judicial means to punish by law anyone of guilty such an act." However, because prisoners remain inaccessible to international humanitarian organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), these claims are impossible to verify independently.

In March the Supreme People's Procuratorate reported that it had investigated 412 cases in which torture was used to extract confessions in 1995, but it provided no information on convictions or punishments. The number of actual incidents of torture and mistreatment by government officials is almost certainly greater than reflected in published government statistics.

Conditions in penal 'institutions are generally harsh and frequently degrading, and nutritional and health conditions are sometimes grim. Adequate medical care for prisoners continues to be a problem, despite official assurances that prisoners have the right to prompt medical treatment if they become ill. Political prisoners who reportedly had difficulties in obtaining timely and adequate medical treatment during 1996, despite repeated appeals on their behalf by their families and the international community, included Yi Yang, Zhou Guoqiang, Wei Jingsheng, Wang Dan, Bao Tong, Liu Nianchun, and Gao Yu. Chen Ziming, who has been diagnosed with cancer, was released for a second time on medical parole 'in November. The terms of his parole were highly restrictive, and he was placed under tight police surveillance.

China's 1994 Prison Law was designed, in part, to improve treatment of detainees and respect for their legal rights. The Government's stated goal is to convert one-half of the nations prisons and 150 reeducation-through-labor camps into "modernized, civilized" facilities by the year 20 1 0. In 1995 Government officials claimed that the Procuratorate had assigned officials to virtually all the prisons, houses of detention, and centers for reeducation through labor, in order to supervise prison management and enforce laws on treatment of prisoners. No information about the number of personnel assigned or the effectiveness of this step was available at year's end.

The official press reported in February 1995 that the Government has established 157 psychological treatment centers and 54 consultation clinics 'in the nation's 685 prisons. Official sources also claimed that more than 17,000 prisoners were treated at those facilities over the past IO years. Mental hospitals have reportedly been used on occasion to control political dissidents. The foreign press reported 'in September that dissident writer Wang Wanxing, who was arrested 'in 1992 for protesting in Tiananmen Square on the third anniversary of the 1989 demonstrations, was in good mental health but remained detained against his will at the An Kang psychiatric hospital 'in Shanghai. Neither conditions at such institutions nor treatment of prisoners at these centers could be verified because of lack of access by independent observers.

Conditions of imprisonment and detention for political prisoners vary widely. Bao Tong remained detained at a government residential compound after his 7-year prison term expired in May. Other political prisoners, 'including Wei Jingsheng, Chen Ziming, and Gao Yu were 'incarcerated with common criminals. Fellow 'inmates reportedly beat Liu Nianchun at a prison in Heilongjiang province. Imprisoned dissident Chen Loirigde reportedly attempted to commit suicide 'in August by 'jumping from a multistory prison building after he was kicked, punched, and beaten with electric prods. He survived the fall, but suffered serious injuries. According to nongovernmental organization (NGO) reports, Wang Hui, wife of jailed labor activist Zhou Guoqiang was detained 'in May, reportedly for pressing her husband's case. As a result of her treatment, including the withholding of liquids, she attempted suicide. Her attempt was . shed with a severe beating. She was released sometime prior to November. According to NGO re

ports, dissident Yao Zhenxiang also was beaten after his detention in April.

China does not permit 'independent monitoring of prisons or reeducation-through-labor camps. The Procuratorate is charged with law enforcement in the corrections system. The official press reported 'in July that 50,000 reprimands were issued to prison personnel during the first 5 months of 1996 for inappropriate conduct. Negotiations with the ICRC regarding access to prisoners have not been resumed since the Government suspended discussions in March 1995.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Under the Criminal Procedure Law, officials may hold detainees for up to IO days before the Procuratorate must approve a formal arrest warrant. In theory, the Administrative Procedure Law permits a detainee to challenge the legality of his detention. In practice, however, lack of access to legal counsel inhibits the effective use of this law to obtain prompt 'judicial decisions on the issue. In known cases 'involving political dissidents, authorities have interpreted the law in the Government's favor and strictly against detainees.

Activist Wang Dan was held in 'incommunicado detention for 17 months in connection with the issuance of a prodemocracy petition before being charged, tried, and sentenced in October to 11 years in prison. He is appealing his sentence to the Supreme Court, having lost a lower level appeal.

There is no system of bail, but at the discretion of public security officials some detainees can be released pending further investigation. The authorities must notify the detainee's family or work unit of his detention within 24 hours; 'in practice, however, authorities seldom give timely notification. Under a sweeping exception to the law, officials need not provide notification if it would "hinder the investigation" of a case. The Government held dissident Liu Nianchun incommunicado for more than a year without charges before his wife was notified of his whereabouts and permitted to visit him in July. His suit contesting his detention was initially dismissed in mid- 1 996 for reasons that 'included the fact that his legal papers were written with a ballpoint pen, a minor detail usually overlooked 'in Chinese courts.

The State Compensation Law provides a legal basis for citizens to recover damages for illegal detentions. Although the majority of Chinese remain unaware of this 1995 law, there is evidence that it is having some impact. The Chinese press reported several cases involving Guangdong and Fujian residents who sued officials for malfeasance and won damage awards. In Hebei a woman was awarded over $2,000 for wrongful detention.

Amendments to the Criminal Procedures Law enacted by the National People's

Congress in March, and effective January 1, 1997, are designed to address some of the problems related to detention. During the year, the Government initiated efforts to educate the Chinese legal community on the nature and function of the new amendments. Human rights activists and legal scholars in China and abroad acknowledged the positive reforms introduced by the new law, but they noted that they do not filly bring Chinese criminal procedure practices into conformity with international standards and may be difficult to implement. The amendments do not apply retroactively.

Because the Government tightly controls information, it is impossible to estimate accurately the total number of people subjected to new or continued arbitrary arrest or detention. Nevertheless, Procurator General Zhang Siq'mg reported 'in March to the NPC that during 1995 the Supreme Procuratorate 'investigated 4,627 illegal detention cases. These figures likely 'include illegal detentions of those involved in commercial disputes as well as those detained for other reasons. Local officials and business leaders frequently conspire to use detentions as a means of exerting pressure in commercial disputes. In June the Chief Procurator of Hebei province reported that 600 persons were rescued 'in 345 cases of illegal hostage-taking in 1995. Such 'incidents often involve commercial disputes. There were similar cases 'involving detained foreign businessmen whose passports were confiscated during business disputes. Australian businessman James Peng, whom Chinese public security officials kidnapped in Macau in

1994 and brought to China for trial, was tried 'in November 1994 and sentenced to a lengthy prison term in September 1995. He remained imprisoned despite continued official and unofficial appeals on his behalf.

In practice, authorities often disregarded or circumvented limits on detention by using regulations on "taking in for shelter and investigation," "supervised residence," and other methods not requiring procuratorial approval. According to Chinese legal experts, the new Criminal Procedures Law amendments are designed to eliminate taking in for shelter and investigation. Recent reforms do not affect the reeducation-through-labor system, which permits authorities to extrajudicially sentence detainees to terms as long as 3 years in labor camps. Liu Xiaobo was detained on October 8 and within hours sentenced to 3 years' reeducation through labor under this system. Numerous other dissidents, including Liu Nianchun, Zhou Guoqiang, Bishop Zeng Jingmu, Chen Longde, Zhang Lin, and Bao Ge were held in reeducation-through-labor camps in 1996.

Authorities detained political and labor activists without cause at "sensitive" times during the year and also used parole regulations to control their activities. Guangzhou authorities detained dissident Wang Xizhe for 15 days in June, ostensibly because he violated his parole by attending a family dinner in an area outside of Guangzhou City. (Wang fled the country in October, see also Section 2.d.) Wang's arrest coincided with the anniversary of the 1989 Tian demonstrations. At the height of a period of increased political tension in mid-1996 between China and Japan regarding sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, the Government forced longtime anti-Japanese activist Tong Zeng to depart Beijing for a 2-week trip to Gansu province.

The Government continued to impose restrictions on reentry into China by dissidents and activists (see Section 2.d.). There were no reports of the Government forcibly exiling citizens.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

According to the Constitution, the court system is equal in authority to the State Council and the Central Military Commission, the two most important government institutions. All three organs are nominally under the supervision of the NPC. Officials state that China's judiciary is independent but acknowledge that it is subject to the Communist Party's policy guidance. All of these state organs are given policy direction by the high-level Party Political and Legal Commission. Party and government leaders use a variety of means to direct the courts on verdicts and sentences. Corruption and conflicts of interest also affect judicial decisionmaking. Supreme Court President Ren Jianxin reported in March to the NPC that in 1995 the judiciary cited some 962 court staff members for violations of discipline and law, and 61 judicial officers received criminal penalties.

The Supreme People's Court stands at the apex of the court system, followed 'in descending order by the higher, intermediate, and basic people's courts. Judges are appointed by the people's congresses at the corresponding level. There are special courts for handling military, maritime, and railway transport cases.

In February 1995, the NPC passed three new laws designed to professionalize judges, prosecutors, and policemen; the laws came into effect in July 1995.

In May the NPC passed a new lawyers' law designed to professionalize the legal profession. The law replaced temporary regulations adopted in 1980, 1 year after China permitted lawyers to resume the practice of law following a 20-year period when the practice of law was prohibited. The new law recognized for the first time that lawyers represent their clients, not the State. The bill also granted lawyers formal permission to establish private law firms, established educational requirements for legal practitioners, encouraged free legal services for the general public, and provided for the discipline of lawyers.

Officials often ignore the due process provisions of the law and of the Constitution. Both before and after trial, authorities subject prisoners to severe psychological pressure to confess. Defendants who fail to "show the night attitude" by confessing their crimes are typically sentenced more harshly. Criminal trials remain essentially sentencing hearings, despite official denials. Confessions without corroborating

evidence are insufficient for a conviction under law, but coerced confessions are frequently introduced into evidence. International observers were especially concerned that the Government's "strike hard" anticrime campaign, which extended throughout most of the year, further encouraged law enforcement personnel to arrest, convict, and punish suspects without according full due process rights.

Under the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law, which was in effect in 1996, the authorities give accused persons virtually no opportunity to prepare an adequate defense while their cases are being investigated, the phase during which the question of guilt or innocence is essentially decided. The law provides that defense lawyers may be retained no earlier than 7 days before the trial. However, 'in some cases even this brief period is shortened under regulations issued 'in 1983 to accelerate the adjudication of certain serious criminal cases. Under the law, there is no requirement that the court appoint a defense attorney for the defendant unless the defendant is hearing impaired or a minor, although the court may appoint defense counsel if it feels an attorney is necessary. When attorneys do appear, they have little time to prepare a defense and rarely contest guilt; their function is generally confined to requesting clemency. The conviction rate is over 90 percent. The court's permission is required before th

e accused or his

representative can interrogate witnesses, produce new witnesses, or review evidence.

The Criminal Procedure Law requires that all trials be held 'in public, except those involving state secrets, juveniles, or "personal secrets." Under this provision, details of cases involving "counterrevolutionary" charges have frequently been kept secret, even from defendants' relatives. The 1988 Law on State Secrets affords a ready basis for denying a public trial. There is an appeals process, but appeals generally do not reverse arbitrary or erroneous verdicts. Under the Criminal Procedure Law, persons "exempted from prosecution" by procurators may still be deemed to have a criminal record, despite the lack of a judicial determination of guilt. Such provisions can be applied 'in counterrevolutionary crimes as well as for ordinary criminal offenses.

Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law, passed in March and effective January 1997, are designed to encourage adversarial criminal proceedings and thereby change the traditional practice of holding trials that have essentially been sentencing hearings. The amendments state that criminal suspects may, after being first interrogated by an investigative organ or from the day coercive measures are first taken, retain a lawyer to offer legal advice. Defense attorneys may conduct limited investigations, call defense witnesses, and argue their clients cases in open court. Moreover, courts are prohibited from treating suspects as criminals until they are convicted. Coerced confessions are expressly forbidden. The "exempted from prosecution" provision is barred. Throughout 1996 scholars and government officials took steps to educate legal, procuratorate, and court personnel about these amendments.

Government officials state that China has an insufficient number of lawyers to meet the country's growing needs. A key element in Justice Ministry efforts to encourage legal reform is a plan to have 150,000 lawyers, 30,000 notaries, and 40,000 grassroots legal service centers by the year 2000. Minister of Justice Xiao Yang stated 'm January that China currently has 89,000 lawyers, 16,548 notarial personnel, and more than 100,000 grassroots legal service workers. China has more than 7,200 law firms including 73 foreign law offices. In many cities, lawyers are organizing private law firms outside the framework of established government legal offices. These firms are self-regulating and do not have their personnel or budgets determined directly by the State. A foreign press report quoted Justice Ministry officials as stating that there were approximately 1,000 such firms in early 1995. Only a small percentage of lawyers practice criminal law. Political dissidents have frequently found it difficult to fi

nd an attorney willing to handle the most sensitive political cases. One explanation for the problem is that authorities have retaliated in the past by revoking the legal licenses of lawyers representing such defendants. Like other citizens, many defense lawyers still depend on an official work unit for employment, housing, and other benefits. Some lawyers are therefore reluctant to be seen as overzealous m representing certain defendants.

The impact of the lack of due process is particularly egregious in death penalty cases. China's 1979 Criminal Code contained 26 crimes punishable by death; 1995 legislation raised this number to 65, including financial crimes such as counterfeiting currency, pass' fake negotiable notes and letters of credit, and illegal "pooling" of funds. In May the Supreme Court called for wider use of capital punishment, including in the case of crimes that result in death. It stated that persons whose crimes result 'm death should be punished by death regardless of extenuating circumstances or lack of a prior criminal record. National figures on the number of executions are not available, but in 1996 it has been estimated that several thousand executions were carried out. The Chinese press confirms that large numbers of speedy executions were carried out in 1996 as part of the "Strike-Hard" national anticrime campaign. A high court nominally reviews all death sentences, but the time between arrest and execution is

often a matter of days, and reviews have consistently resulted in a confirmation of sentence. In June the Jilin Provincial Court held a news conference to report that, during a crackdown on crime 'm the preceding month, provincial authorities held 46 public rallies to "sternly and rapidly" sentence serious criminals. Defendants sentenced included three persons who were caught, tried, and executed within IO days after they allegedly looted a car, and within 7 days of their arrest. In February the Shanghai Municipal No. 1 Intermediate Court held three separate rallies within 2 days to sentence and execute 18 criminals found guilty of murder, robbery, or other crimes. No executions for political offenses are known to have occurred 'm 1996.

In recent years, credible reports have alleged that organs from some executed prisoners are removed and transplanted. Officials have confirmed that executed prisoners are among the sources of organs for transplant. There is no national legislation governing organ donations, but officials assert that consent is required from prisoners or their relatives before organs are removed.

Only courts can sentence prisoners to facilities managed by the criminal justice system. Justice Ministry statistics issued 'in January 1995 showed that China has imprisoned and released approximately 10 minion prisoners since 1949; there were 1,285,000 prisoners in prisons or reform-through-labor camps at the end of 1994. Government authorities can, however, assign persons accused of "minor" public order offenses to reeducation-through-labor camps in an extrajudicial process. Terms of detention run from a normal minimum of I year to a maximum of 3 years. The labor reeducation committee, which determines the term of detention, may extend an inmates sentence for an additional year. According to prison officials, 200,000 detainees were in reeducation-through-labor facilities at the end of 1995, up from 153,000 at the end of 1993. Other estimates of the number of such inmates are considerably higher.

Since 1990 defendants have been able to challenge reeducation-through-labor sentences under the Administrative Procedure Law. While some persons have gained a reduction in or suspension of their sentences after reconsideration or appeal,, in practice these procedures are not widely used, and such problems as short appeal times and lack of access to lawyers weaken their effectiveness in preventing or reversing arbitrary decisions. Liu Nianchun unsuccessfully appealed the reeducation-through-labor sentence that he received in mid-1996. Irregular appellate procedures 'in his case included inadequate notice of the hearing and insufficient time and resources to prepare the appeal.

Government officials deny that China holds any political prisoners, asserting that authorities detain persons not for the political or religious views they hold, but because they have taken some action that violates the Criminal Law. However, the authorities continue to confine citizens for political reasons. Perhaps thousands of political prisoners remain imprisoned or detained.

Political dissidents are often detained or charged with having committed counterrevolutionary crimes under Articles 90 through 104 of the Criminal Law. Counterrevolutionary offenses range from treason and espionage to spreading counterrevolutionary propaganda. The authorities have also used these articles to punish persons who organized demonstrations, disrupted traffic, disclosed official information to foreigners, or formed associations outside of state control. Efforts are under way, through revisions to the Criminal Law, to redefine counterrevolutionary offenses as treasonous acts designed to threaten national security, but it is not clear whether such a change would make a significant difference in how political cases are treated. Labor rights activists Li Wenming and Guo Baosheng, who were arrested 'in May and June of 1994 on the charge of "counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement," were tried and found guilty 'in November on the more serious charge of "conspiracy" to subvert the

Government for spreading information among workers about their rights. By year's end, they had not been sentenced. Of the 12 others who were indicted with Li and Guo, 2 have been sentenced to 1 -year terms of reeducation through labor, 2 are being tried in Beijing, and the rest were released.

In January 1995, a Justice Ministry official said that there were 2,678 people serving sentences for counterrevolutionary crimes at the end of 1994. These figures include people convicted of espionage or other internationally recognized criminal offenses, but they do not 'include political prisoners detained but not charged; political or religious activists held in reeducation-through-labor camps; and persons detained or convicted for criminal offenses solely 'involving nonviolent political or religious activities.

The 1988 Law on State Secrets provides justification for denying a public trial. Details regarding cases falling under this provision are frequently kept secret, even from defendants' relatives. At least 14 persons were imprisoned on "state secrets" charges 'in 1996. In May, after being detained for exactly I year, dissident Li Hai was tried for stealing unspecified state secrets. Li's family was not permitted to attend the trial. hi December authorities announced Li had been convicted and sentenced to a 9-year prison term for "prying into and gathering the following information about people sentenced for criminal activities during the June 4, 1989 period: name, age, family situation, crime, length of sentence, location of imprisonment, treatment while imprisoned." The verdict stated that these data constitute state secrets.

The Government released certain prisoners detained for their political or religious beliefs, including Ren Wanding, Fu Shenqi, and Zhang Xianliang. Fu and Zhang departed China in September. Others were released and then detained again. Tong Yi was released 'in June after serving her full sentence but was briefly detained again shortly thereafter for traveling without official authorization. Bao Tong was also released from prison in May but remained held 'in custody in a government facility at year's end (see Section I.c.). Liu Xiaobo was released 'in January but was rearrested on October 7 and administratively sentenced to a 3-year term of reeducation through labor the next day. Many others, including Wei Jingsheng, Xi Yang, Hu Shigen, Kang Yuchun, Liu Jingsheng, Jampa Ngodrup, and Ngawang Phulchung remained imprisoned or under other forms of detention during the year. Ngawang Sangdrol, a 19-year-old Tibetan nun serving a 9-vear sentence for taking part in a proindependence demonstration and for singin

g nationalistic songs in prison had her sentence doubled 'in July (see Tibet addendum).

The Government subjects many prisoners--including political prisoners--to "deprivation of political rights" even after they have served their sentences. This status explicitly limits rights of free speech and association. Former prisoners often find their status 'in society, ability to find employment, freedom to travel, and access to social services severely restricted. Economic reform and social change have ameliorated these problems for nonpolitical prisoners to some extent in recent years. Former political prisoners and their families, however, are frequently subjected to police surveillance and harassment and also may encounter difficulty in obtaining or keeping employment and housing. Dissident Liu Gang cited constant police harassment, his inability to work, rent an apartment, or accept help from friends as reasons for his decision to flee China in April and seek resettlement abroad. Government harassment has prevented relatives of Chen Ziming, Liu Nianchun, Q'm Yongmin, and other dissidents fro

m obtaining and keeping steady employment.

f Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

Economic liberalization is creating diverse employment opportunities and introducing market forces into the economy, thus loosening governmental monitoring and regulation of personal and family life, particularly 'in rural areas. In urban areas, however, most people still depend on their government-linked work unit for housing, permission to have a child, approval to apply for a passport, and other aspects of ordinary life. The work unit, along with the neighborhood committee, are charged with monitoring activities and attitudes, although these 'institutions have become less important as means of social or political control in urban areas.

Although the law requires search warrants before security forces can search premises, this provision is often ignored in practice. In addition the Public Security Bureau and the Procuratorate issue warrants on their own authority.

The 1982 Constitution states that "freedom and privacy of correspondence of citizens are protected by law." In practice, however, authorities frequently monitor telephone conversations, fax transmissions, electronic mail, and Internet communications of foreign visitors, businessmen, diplomats, residents, and Journalists as well as Chinese dissidents, activists, and others. Authorities also open and censor domestic and international mail. In March Procurator General Zhang Siqing reported to the National People's Congress that in 1995 the Supreme People's Procuratorate investigated 1,739 cases of illegal searches of residences or surveillance and 87 cases of hindering postal and telecommunications and encroaching on freedom of communications. Government security organs monitor and sometimes restrict contact between foreigners and citizens, particularly dissidents. Rules implementing the State Security Law define as a violation of the law "activities of individuals outside the country ('including non-Chines

e citizens resident in China) who disregard dissuasion and meet with personnel in the country who have endangered state security or who are seriously suspected of endangering state security."

The Government encouraged expansion of Internet and other communications infrastructure. The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications licensed more than 20 companies as "agents" authorized to offer Internet access, and access is becoming easier. There are no reliable statistics on the number of Chinese Internet users, but the number in Beijing alone is thought to exceed 10,000. Nevertheless, authorities dedicated increased attention and resources to efforts to control Internet content and usage. In January authorities issued regulations requiring Internet users to register and sign a vaguely worded pledge not to use the Internet to endanger security. hi September the Government blocked access to more than I 00 news sites on the World Wide Web, including many Chinese language sites in Hong Kong and Taiwan and the sites of major Western news organizations. Sites hosted by dissidents were also blocked. During the year, China's Ministry of State Security was tasked with controlling material on line. Regul

ations allegedly adopted to preserve public security were used to implement Internet censorship.

In April the Government issued regulations requiring foreign wire service providers of economic information and financial market data to register, pay substantial fees, and face penalties for the transmission of information deemed "harmful to Chinese national interests." Providers were further required to provide equipment allowing Chinese authorities to simultaneously monitor information provided to customers. All operations, customers, and contracts also were subject to government preapproval. Foreign News' e services in China strongly protested and began discussions with the authorities to resolve concerns over the nature and scope of the new regulations. No foreign News e service had completed registration procedures by the end of the year.

The authorities continue to 'am Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts, but the effectiveness of this interference varies considerably by region, with audible signals of VOA and other broadcasters reaching most parts of China, including the capital. The British Broadcasting Corporation monitoring service noticed in May that the government-owned China Radio International (CRI) was using English-language programming purchased from an Australian entertainment company to 'am the "Voice of Tibet," a Tibetan dissident radio station which is produced outside China.

Radio Free Asia began operation in Chinese 'in September and in Tibetan in December. Reception has been good to fair, and there are no reports of jamming.

The Government continued to implement comprehensive and highly intrusive one-child family planning policies first adopted in the late 1970's. The State Family Planning Commission formulates and implements government policies with assistance from the Family Planning Association, which has 83 million members in 1.02 million branches. China's population policy most heavily affects ethnic Han Chinese in urban areas. Urban couples seldom obtain permission to have a second child. Exceptions are allowed for many of the 70 percent of Han who live 'in rural areas, and ethnic minorities are subject to less stringent population controls. hi special circumstances, minorities 'in some rural areas are permitted to have as many as four children.

Population control policy relies on education, propaganda, and economic incentives, as well as on more coercive measures, 'including psychological pressure and economic penalties. Rewards for couples who adhere to the policy include monthly stipends and preferential medical and educational benefits. Disciplinary measures against those who violate the policy include fines, withholding of social services, demotion, and other administrative punishments that sometimes result in loss of employment. Penalties for excess births can be levied against local officials and the mothers' work units providing multiple sources of pressure. Fines for giving birth without authorization vary, but they can be a formidable disincentive. In Fujian, for example, the standard fine has been calculated to be twice a family's gross annual income or twice the calculated average income of rural families with no quantifiable cash 'income; additional, unauthorized births incur fines assessed 'in 'increments of 50 percent per child.

In Guangzhou the standard fine is calculated to be 30 to 50 percent of 7 years' income for the average resident. Unpaid fines have sometimes resulted 'in confiscation or destruction of personal property. There were also reports that teams of village officials expelled women and their families from their homes and then destroyed the houses.

According to a 1995 government white paper, more than 200 million married couples of childbearing age, or about 80 percent of all couples in that age group, use contraception. The Government does not authorize the use of force to compel persons to submit to abortion or sterilization, but officials acknowledge that there are 'instances of forced abortions and sterilizations. Officials maintain that, when discovered, the responsible officials are disciplined and undergo retraining, but they have not provided any data or examples to verify this assertion. Officials admit, however, that more severe punishment is rare. The State Family Planning Commission has limited ability to punish lower level offenders. Individuals can sue officials who have exceeded their authority in implementing family planning policy, but there are no known successful suits on these grounds.

Poor supervision of local officials who are under intense pressure to meet family planning targets results in instances of abuse, 'including forced abortion and sterilization. During an unauthorized pregnancy, often a woman is visited by family planning agents and pressured to terminate the pregnancy. There were credible reports that several women were forced to undergo abortions of unauthorized pregnancies 'in Fujian. The press sometimes reports instances of abuse. For example, a newspaper in Shenyang reported that family plaruu'ng agents convinced a woman, 7-months pregnant, to take "appropriate measures." A well-documented incident of a 1994 forced 8-month abortion has been reported 'in the coastal province of Guangdong. A 1995 incident 'involving a forced sterilization was also reported 'in Guangzhou.

Regulations forbid the termination of pregnancies based on the sex of the fetus, but because of the traditional preference for male children, particularly 'in rural areas, some families have used ultrasound to identify female fetuses. Use of ultrasound for this purpose is specifically prohibited by the new Maternal and Child Health Care Law, which calls for punishment of medical practitioners who violate this provision. According to the State Family Planning Commission, a handful of doctors have been charged under this law. The Chinese press has reported that the national ratio of male to female births is 1 14 to I 00. One October 1994 survey of births 'in rural areas put the ratio as high as 117 male births to 100 female. The statistical norm is 106 male births to 100 female. Official statistics may exclude many female births, especially the second or third in a family. Such births are unreported so that the parents can keep trying to conceive a boy. These statistics also probably reflect, however,

the abuse of sonography and the termination of pregnancies based on the sex of the fetus. Female infanticide or neglect of baby girls may also be a factor in some areas.

The Maternal and Child Care Law, which came into effect in June 1995, calls for premarital and prenatal examinations to determine whether couples have acute infectious diseases, certain mental illnesses (not including mental retardation), or are at risk for passing on debilitating genetic diseases. The Ministry of Health, not the State Family Planning Commission, implements the law, which mandates abortion or sterilization 'in some cases, based on medical advice. The law also provides for obtaining a second opinion and states that patients or their guardians must give written consent to procedures (see also Section 5). At least five provincial governments have implemented regulations seeking to prevent people with severe mental disabilities from having children.