April 1, 1997
Will War Criminals Escape Justice?
By Morris B. Abram
President Clinton recently announced that NATO troops will not arrest war
criminals indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia -- contradicting his previous pledges to cooperate fully with the
tribunal. His conciliatory suggestion that a permanent international
criminal court be established to pursue these culprits is incredible, given
that American backpedaling will likely douse the United Nations' 50-year
effort to create such body. Such a careless reversal of policy will do
far-reaching and enduring damage. Unless the U.S. and its NATO allies arrest
those indicted, the tribunal will be unable to fulfill Nuremberg's legacy of
war-crime deterrence.
This American policy shift could not have been more untimely.
Leniency toward those Serbs instrumental in orchestrating the Dayton peace
accord may have been understandable two years ago. But there is no reason
that the international community's hands should now remain tied. Certainly
in Serbia, recent political demonstrations have proved that there is a
viable opposition to President Slobodan Milosevic. Those protests, which
forced Mr. Milosevic to make concessions to pluralist elements within his
country, attest to the strength of the former Yugoslavia's pro-democracy
electorate. Rather than cultivate these seeds of peaceful democratic
society, however, the new U.S. policy will permit indicted outlaws such as
Radovan Karadzic and Gen. Ratko Mladic to remain in power, hiding behind
fronts for their policies of racial and religious incitement.
The Dayton peace accord, in which all parties pledged cooperation
with the tribunal, was largely a U.S. initiative. That's why it's so important thatthe U.S. continue to provide the leadership needed to fulfill the agreement's agenda. Now the world's only superpower refuses to lead NATO in arresting indicted criminals, because some soldiers may be harmed - a risk
police forces everywhere take daily.
Mr. Clinton's policy switch threatens to invalidate the work of the
tribunal the U.S. so vigorously sponsored. As a result, the slaughter of
tens of thousands will go unpunished, without even the balm of truth-telling
in the courtroom. One of the primary aims of the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg was to deter future aggression. This need for
deterrence has grown immeasurably as weaponry has become more sophisticated
and destructive and has fallen into the hands of scores of new actors.
Acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council
established this ad hoc tribunal in 1993, in order to prosecute violations
of international humanitarian law committed in the territories of the former
Yugoslavia. This tribunal was an inspired innovation designed to sidestep
inconclusive efforts to create a permanent international criminal court by
treaty. By this initiative, the Security Council intended to establish a
framework of international criminal justice that would govern all U.N.
members without the torturous process of treaty ratification. Thus, renegade
states could not escape the tribunal's jurisdiction simply by refusing to
sign a treaty. The creation of this tribunal renewed the hope that
Nuremberg's legacy
would finally be fulfilled.
Instead, the tribunal has been stymied by NATO's refusal to arrest
war criminals. Only seven of the 75 individuals indicted are in custody, not
one of them arrested by NATO troops. The Office of the Prosecutor continues
to amass evidence and issue indictments. Former Chief Prosecutor Richard
Goldstone and his successor, Louise Arbour, have been vocal critics of
NATO's failure to arrest the chief culprits. The prosecution team has worked
responsibly: leading investigations, conducting searches, issuing
indictments and holding in absentia hearings under its Rule 61 (proceedings
that have publicized the charges and evidence against the accused and
prompted the issuance of international arrest warrants). Ultimately,
however, NATO must arrest the indicted war criminals if the tribunal is to
be effective.
A failed tribunal will also thwart efforts to create a permanent
international criminal court. After all, what is the use of such an
ambitious undertaking when the U.S. is faltering with an ad hoc system authorized and in place?
The tribunal for the former Yugoslavia may be our last chance to
validate Nuremberg's legacy. It must be given the opportunity to prosecute
leaders such as Mr. Karadzic and Gen. Mladic, who top the list of the 75
current indictees. For unless these instigators as well as their henchmen
are arrested and brought to trial, the tribunal will be a mockery. Just as
at Nuremberg, compromise with the perpetrators is unnecessary and immoral.
Failure to prosecute the key culprits will also have practical consequences.
The billions of dollars spent by the U.S. in the former Yugoslavia to date
will be have been wasted, as new conflicts led by these indicted but untried
leaders will resummon us to the arena, at ever greater costs. If the
tribunal fails, our hopes will be dashed, our confidence diminished and our
cynicism reaffirmed. It is now or never.
Mr. Abram is chairman of United Nations Watch and former U.S. permanent
representative to the U.N. in Europe.