On May 13, 1997, members of the NGO Coalition for an International

Criminal Court met with Judge Antonio Cassese, the President of the

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in order to

discuss issues of common interest including ICTY-ICTR Funding, Gratis

Personnel, and the ICC negotiations. There was also some discussion about

the Tadic verdict, including concern regarding the decision not to find

grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. (Please see the Tadic decision

on-line at the International Criminal Tribunals web site at

http://www.un.org/icty if you need more details.) A list of the relevant

UN documents are included at the end of this update.

The meeting was arranged at the last minute with Judge Cassese, who was in

NY to attend meetings of the UN Fifth (Finance) Committee and the Advisory

Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ).

1. ICT Budget, Secondment and Gratis Personnel

ICTY Budget. The Tribunal had requested a budget of $64 million US dollars

that would include 200 additional posts, mostly investigators. However,

the Secretary-General's Report (A/C.5/51/30 Rev.1) recommended only

$49,983,100 US dollars with only 50 additional posts. There was concern

expressed that, as a rule, it is highly unlikely that the Fifth Committee

and the ACABQ will increase the amount recommended by the

Secretary-General. If anything, they might very well decrease the amount.

Gratis Personnel. Another damaging effect on the Tribunals is that due to

decisions and rules relating to seconded and gratis personnel, the ICTR

and ICTY are faced with the likelihood of losing a number of existing and

offered posts. First, there are serious objections by the G-77 countries

against geographical imbalances resulting from seconded personnel, most of

whom are offered by Northern governments. Second, (no pun intended) there

is concern by governments North and South that the loyalties of personnel

seconded and paid for by national governments are to those governments and

not to the international organization which they are to serve, thus

risking unacceptable politization of a body.

Recommend Action by Coalition Members. Coalition members at the meeting

offered several options for action. First, with the Fifth Committee and

ACABQ, members are encouraged to consider communicating to governments

their hopes that they will not reduce further the recommended budget by

the Secretary-General. (Contact information for the ACABQ will be forward

to the ICC listserv shortly.) Second, members could encourage governments

and the UN, especially Under-Secretary-General Joseph Connors, to allow

exceptions for the ICTY-ICTR regarding secondments or gratis personnel, on

the basis of "expanded need or an urgent requirement for expertise" as

provided for in UN resolutions.

Funding. Amnesty International representative, Andrew Clapham, suggested

that, given the unlikely prospect of the Fifth Committee increasing the

ICT budgets, an alternative is to recommend that governments and others

(foundations, corporations, etc.) contribute to the ICT trust fund,

earmarking at least one-half of the money for experts from Developing

States, who would be brought on as consultants not as secondees.

Suggestions for countries that could be approached included: Germany,

Sweden, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Nigeria, and Brazil. Reportedly, The

Netherlands is already committed to making this kind of contribution.

2. ICC Negotiations and the ICT: Role of the Prosecutor

One of the fascinating aspects of this meeting with Judge Cassese was an

"off-the-record" discussion about the linkages between the ICT and the ICC

and aspects of the ICC negotiations. The discussion focused on ways in

which both the problems and successes of the ICT could favorably and

unfavorably impact the ICC negotiations. On one hand, dramatic

"successes" of the ICTY-ICTR could "scare" governments relative to the ICC

negotiations. Similarly, the perceived "failure" of the ICTY or ICTR

could either diminish or bolster the public and political resolve for

creating the ICC.

Prosecutor. During this discussion, while all present strongly endorsed

the goal of seeking a strong and independent prosecutor, concern was

expressed that many governments not favor or allow the Prosecutor the

independence to initiate an investigation. One suggestion made was

consideration of a "dual" role for the Prosecutor, which in addition to

obvious duties would include an additional mandate that the Prosecutor

prepare regular "reports" concerning information brought to the Tribunal's

attention concerning possible violations of international humanitarian

law. Thus, the Prosecutor could serve also as a kind of "Commission of

Experts" or "Special Rapporteur" by collecting serious reports on crimes

being committed around the world. On the basis of these reports some

governments might take the actions to trigger a formal investigation. It

was suggested that these reports by the Office of the Prosecutor could

include a "feasibility" assessment of the possible investigation.

3. ICC Negotiations and the ICT: ICT Expert at the August 1997 PrepCom

CICC members reaffirmed to Judge Cassese that we continue to support the

inclusion of expertise of the ICT in the upcoming PrepComs of the ICC.

The Coalition will be sending messages on this to the ICT, officers of the

PrepCom, and possibly to other international organizations.

4. Apprehension

At the meeting, again the extreme disappointment was expressed regarding

the unwillingness of the governments in the Former Yugoslavia and the

Security Council to apprehend and turn over indicted individuals to the

Tribunal. In a wide-ranging discussion several issues were raised.

Regarding the apprehension of Mladic and Karadzic, substantial pessimism

persisted among members. Unless the USA changes its position, few

expressed hope that others in NATO (especially the UK and France) would do

anything. Some hope for changes from the UK might emerge with the new

government. Contributing to the problem of apprehension is the Russian

reaction to what they perceive as an imbalanced, prejudicial focus on

arresting Serbs. An appeal was made that NGOs call for the arrest of all

those indicted, not just the Serbs. It was also noted that the obsession

by the USA and others in NATO to secure Russian acceptance of NATO

expansion also decreased the changes that the US would press inside NATO

for the arrest of Mladic and Karadzic.

On the positive side, there was some indication that the economic

pressures on Croatia could result in the transfer to the ICTY of several

individuals this year. And Judge Cassese gave no indication that the lack

of cooperation by the Security Council, States and funding would result in

a mass exodus from the Court by judges and others.

5. List of Documents re: Financing and Budget

A/C.5/51/30 Financing of the International Tribunal for the

Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International

Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since

1991, (15 November 1996)

A/C.5/51/30 Rev.1 Financing of the International Tribunal for the

Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International

Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since

1991 (9 May 1997)

A/51/848 Programme Budget for the Biennium 1996-1997 (1 April 1997)

A/51/688/Add.2 Review of the Efficiency of the Administrative and

Financial Functioning of the United Nations, Gratis personnel provided by

Governments and other entities (8 May 1997)

A/C.5/51/29 Rev.1 Financing of the International Tribunal for the

Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International

Humanitarian Law Committed in Rwanda (soon to be released)

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