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INDEX
. The cost of war
. NATO expansion
. World power order
. Environmental management system standards
. Famine prevention
. Events
. Hague Appeal for Peace 1999 - contact
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THE COST OF WAR #
Expenditure on nuclear weapons (alone) since 1945 has been
estimated at US$8 trillion. Remaining nuclear weapons still total
700 times the total explosive power of the three major wars of the
20th century, which killed an estimate 44 million people.
War related deaths in the 20th century up to 1995:
1900-1950 89,000,000
1950-1995 22,000,000
TOTAL 111,000,000
Civilian deaths due to war (as a % of total deaths due to war):
1900-1950 1960s 1980s 1990s
50% 63% 74% 74%+
US Govt military research 1984-93 - 72% of total research budget.
European Govt military research 1984-93 - 28% of total research
budget.
The total number of soldiers (incl women) worldwide decreased from
27 million in 1989 to 22.4 million in 1995 (or -3%/an). The FSU
accounted for 1.6m of this reduction, while NATO troop cuts were
1.3m over the same period. In NATO these cuts, in part, reflect a
trend toward more automated warfare.
Global military spending as a percentage of Gross World Product
(GWP) fell below 3% in 1994 for the first time since 1960. Global
military spending has declined 18% from a peak of US$854b ($1994)
in 1987 to US$700 billion ($1994) in 1994 (or av -2.9%/an).
Global military spending estimates (different sources).
1989 1994 % drop
$ 854b $700b 18% (a)
$1040b $800b 23% (b)
(a) US$1994 World Military and Social Expenditure 1996
(b) US$year? GFB #4 'Global Peace Budget'
Between 1989-94, global spending on peace and disarmament rose
640% (US$2.5 - $16.0 billion) while global spending on the military
fell 23% (GFB #4 'Global Peace Budget').
In 1994, NATO spent US$369b while in the same year the Warsaw
Pact spent only US$37b ($1987).
US military procurement budget (US$b):
1990 1995 1996 1997
81 55 62 74?
Current US procurement plans include:
- 30 Centurion nuclear-fuelled attack subs - US$40b total
- 442 F-22 tactical fighter aircraft - US$72b total
- 120 C-17 Globemaster transport planes - US$40.8b total
- 20 B-2 Stealth bombers - US$44b total
It is suggested that the procurement budget increases will benefit
districts of key members of the (Republican-dominated) Congress,
and have been opposed by the Clinton Administration.
Eg Lockheed and Martin Marietta are located in Newt Gingrich's
Congressional District. It is also suggested elsewhere that the
Clinton Administration has supported increases in defence spending.
(GFB #6 'US military spending cuts in perspective')
Military expenditure in developing countries fell by 4% 1987-94,
with a drop of 20% in Africa and the Middle East, but a rise of 30%
1987-94 (av 3.3%/an) in the Far East. The drop in military
expenditure in Africa is partly due to the termination of military aid
by FSU and the US, and by World Bank and IMF loans criteria.
The peace process in the Middle East has paradoxically lead to an
arms build up with Jordan being rewarded with several hundred
million dollars of military aid, and Israel and Egypt both receiving
several billion dollars of military aid annually as a result of the Camp
David accord.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have spent US$80 billion 1987-94, partly
as a result of the 1990-91 Gulf War, though this high spending is
now abating.
The global conventional arms trade peaked in 1987 at US$60b ($'87)
and declined to US$18b ($'87) in 1994 (av -14%/an)! This is
equivalent in real terms to the levels of arms trade in the early 1970s
and the sharp decline virtually mirrors the meteoric rise in the late
1970s - early 1980s. Arms exports from the FSU dropped from
US$23b - US$1b 1987-94. This is partly due to the poor performance
of Russian arms in the Gulf War, end of subsidies of arms exports,
and uncertain availability of spare parts.
Arms exports 1994 US$
Developed countries $16b (US 9b, UK/Fr/Ger/It $6b+)
Transition (eg FSU) $ 1b
Developing countries $ 1b
TOTAL $18b
It is suggested there is increased pressure on developed countries to
purchase arms exports from the major military powers in order to
maintain an arms industry formerly fuelled by the Cold War and
domestic arms procurement.
Due to 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, NATO countries
had to reduce conventional weapons. Greece and Turkey have been
among the recipients of surplus weapons, planes and ships,
encouraging a dangerous arms race between these two countries.
Both excess military production capacity and surplus weaponry have
radically increased competition in the arms bazaar, which has led to
sales of previously restricted technology such as the US F-15 Strike
Eagle and the Russian Tu-22M Backfire Bomber, European diesel
attack submarines and supersonic anti-ship missiles.
New factors in the arms trade include barter of arms for products
such as petroleum, sugar or coconut oil, and debt-for-arms swaps (eg
between Russia and Korea/Hungary).
In 1995, France was cited as the leading arms dealer to the Third
World, climbing to $US11.4 billion a year, surpassing the US which
dropped from $US25 billion to $US6.1 billion in 1994 (GFB #1
'France leads arms sales to Third World'). Note, these statistics
differ radically from above figures for total arms exports from
UK/France/Germany/Italy combined, of approx US$6b for 1994.
86% of arms sold to developing countries come from the five
members of the Security Council. Wealthy nations typically give
significant subsidies to arms exporters to win markets in the
developing world. It is generally difficult to obtain official
information on the level of subsidies to arms exporters (GFB #2
'Global military spending').
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# Except where otherwise indicated, all data has been extracted from
'World Military and Social Expenditures 1996', World Priorities,
Ruth Leger Sivard (Ed).
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NATO EXPANSION #
NATO is pursuing a high-risk option in pushing for inclusion of
Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic into the organisation while
excluding Russia. Russia has successfully negotiated a voice in
NATO, but has been excluded as a member.
Russia's military forces are fragmentary and are said to be incapable
of fighting a modern war. It is relying on its nuclear weapons for
national security, which are currently placed on 'launch-on-warning'.
Many ICBMs have been accidentally switched over to 'combat mode'
over the past few years. Due to lack of funding, Russia's nuclear
weapons are deteriorating dangerously.
While NATO is expanding to include Hungary, Poland and the
Czech Republic (with the possibility of also including Latvia, Estonia
and Lithuania in the future), the US is forcing these countries to
purchase US F-16 and F-18 fighters as a condition of entry, further
straining already depleted foreign cash reserves.
There are limits as to how many foreign troops can be stationed in
these countries. Indeed, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty of
1990 limit troop numbers in all European signatory countries.
However, there is no limit on aircraft that can be based in these buffer
countries. And as was demonstrated in the Gulf War, advanced
fighter aircraft are the crucial element in modern warfare.
The main risk of NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe, but with
Russian exclusion, is that an isolated Russia could see a resurgence of
ultra-nationalism in that country and a breakdown of the fledgling
spirit of cooperation between the former Soviet Union (FSU) and the
G7.
*
# interview with Dan Plesch, BASIS Research, London, UK, May
1997.
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WORLD POWER ORDER
The bipolar world order of the two rival superpowers has ended. One
could argue that this has been succeeded by a monopolar world order
guaranteed by the US and NATO. Rotfeld argues that a new world
order has not yet emerged [1].
If the majority of countries can continue steady economic growth and
increase standards of living, and quality of life, while macro-
environmental crises are averted, and general degradation of the
biosphere controlled; if regional conflicts can be minimised through
peace diplomacy and negotiation to resolve longstanding grievances;
if steps can be taken toward reducing inequity between nations and
within nations; one might consider that the current monopolar world
order might continue for the next half century.
Two ways in which the current world order (US supremacy) may be
displaced are:
1. the rise of other major powers determined by their large population
and per capita GNP; ability to acquire key leading-edge technology
and expertise to facilitate endogenous production of the same;
diffusion of advanced entrepreneurial skills, management practices,
and a dynamic business culture; the ability to foster endogenous
TNCs; and the ability to acquire, and moreover, to produce advanced
weaponry.
The ability of a rising power to lead the agenda of key international
fora and carry out key international diplomacy such as major peace
negotiations, may also be an important component. However, as the
US has discovered, it carries with it major risks (eg failures in
diplomacy, and backfire) and costs (there is often an element of
bribery in successful peace agreements). European powers and Japan
have generally allowed the US to take the political risk and shoulder
the financial cost. The benefit is difficult to quantify.
Remilitarization of Japan and a possible resurgence of Japanese
nationalism may give greater autonomy and assertion of Japanese
foreign policy. China's culture and foreign policy is distinctly
independent and is likely to remain so as China gains in economic
strength and military power. India, Brazil, Indonesia, a reinvigorated
Russia and a reunited Korea should also figure substantially in a
more diversified pluralistic global power mosaic by 2030.
The mosaic is further complexified with the imposition of
international blocs such as the EU, APEC, NAFTA, ASEAN, CIS,
and the Arab League. The question is whether sane policy can be
developed through a democratic process in inclusive fora such as the
UN, WTO etc rather than through competitive jostling, backroom
deals and manipulation by the most powerful nation states; and
whether a pluralistic power structure would be more effective in
maintaining global stability than the Pax Americana we have today.
2. the rise of a new politico-cultural movement. This may come out
of boredom with the status quo, or rising expectations which are not
being met (eg in the quality of life), but more likely it may arise from
frustration with deteriorating circumstances regarding poverty, or
equity, environment, violence/conflict, repression, excessive influence
or social control by the corporate sector, or erosion of democracy (or
perhaps the failure to broaden democratic participation), urban
system overload, acute unemployment, or regional economic
marginalisation and depression.
Such a politico-cultural movement may lead to new alliances of
nations or strengthen established alliances such as the Non-Aligned
Movement or the Group of 77. Alternatively the power structure may
not be in terms of nation states, but of international alliances of
NGOs. Or a combination of civil society and certain nation states
forming alliances to rival, or balance/influence the existing order.
Alliances would be necessary if such a movement encountered
substantial resistance or inertia from the core of the power structure.
Otherwise it could remain largely spontaneous. Alliances between
peak environmental NGOs already occur - usually to target specific
issues and with expected outcomes predefined. Similarly this occurs
with peace groups who then lobby and form alliances with individual
governments - as in the case of the campaign to impose an
international ban on the trade and deployment of land mines. But
broader cross-movement alliances could form with broader goals to
challenge the NATO - G7 capital pyramid - from within - should this
pyramid not address rising expectations for progressive socio-
ecological change.
NGOs may expand their powerbase further by employing more
sophisticated fund-raising strategies; by becoming more
commercialised eg by developing their own consumer markets (green
products, ethical investments, products from cooperatives, crafts,
products for new lifestyles etc); by receiving royalties from products
they endorse; by successfully lobbying government so that part of tax
revenue goes to NGOs of taxpayer's choice; by developing more
effective consumer organisations which exert greater influence over
major investment brokers and superannuation funds, and more
effective targeting of culprit corporations.
*
[1] Rotfeld A D, SIPRI Yearbook 1996, p1
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ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM STANDARDS
The debate surrounding the most effective combination of
environmental regulation - government-imposed and enforced
regulation, self-regulatory mechanisms and the market-oriented
regulatory approach, continues.
Environmental policy matrix [1]:
Using markets subsidy reduction
environmental taxes
user fees
deposit-refund systems
targeted subsidies
Creating property rights/decentralisation
markets tradable permits/rights
international offset systems
Regulations standards
bans
permits/quotas
Engaging the public participation
public consultation
information disclosure
informal negotiation
community pressure
NGO involvement
A self-regulatory mechanism which is gaining currency involves
corporations developing environmental management systems (EMS)
to assess the environmental impact of their operations, set goals and
policies to improve their environmental performance, set an action
plan to achieve goals, monitor progress relative to goals, report
results, review the process to ensure its effectiveness and to set
further goals.
Two international standards for environmental management systems
have been developed - the European EMAS system and the
International Organisation for Standardisation ISO 14000 series.
These two standards are currently being harmonised.
The potential exists for large companies who conform to ISO 14000
standards to influence similar compliance from their suppliers.
On the otherhand, the ISO 14000 standard merely ensures that a
corporation has an EMS in place and guarantees nothing as far as the
level of environmental standards being upheld.
Another system which directly addresses environmental standards
has been piloted in Indonesia. The PROPER PROKASIH program by
the National Pollution Control Agency grades factories according to
their pollution levels - from black, red, blue, green and gold. Such
government-certified performance ratings make it easier for
environmental agencies and community groups to bring pressure to
bear on culprit companies to make improvements, and can reduce
expensive legal enforcement procedures [2]. Similar pilot schemes
are underway in the Philippines and Colombia.
*
[1] Environment Matters Winter/Spring 1997 p26
[2] ibid p7
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FAMINE PREVENTION
Famine and chronic hunger/subnutrition are both serious problems,
and interrelated, but they are also distinct, and may involve different
political analyses and strategies for their prevention.
It is well known that there is usually a considerable lead time between
crop failure, encroaching famine, and finally, an exodus of refugees,
so the potential to prevent famine and famine refugees is enormous
[1] (GFB#34 'Migration and food scarcity').
International food aid can hinder more effective prevention of
famine. Not that international food aid should be curtailed. However
more pressure can be brought to bear on governments, as well as
expertise and financial resources to establish effective national food
relief systems.
A number of countries which had established such worthy food relief
systems over the past few decades have let them deteriorate. The
political will, and the recognition of food as a basic right, is no longer
apparent in these countries. Examples include:
Ethiopia - RRC
Somalia - emergency health units
Sudan - Commission on Refugees
Tanzania - early warning system
Zimbabwe - national food reserve
All these famine prevention systems have now gone, and even the
drought-relief programme of Botswana (a country with one of the
most successful records of famine prevention among famine prone
countries) has been weakened. The dismantling of Zimbabwe's
national food reserve can be traced to structural adjustment [2].
Sen has argued that there is a link between aversion of famine and
the presence of a free press and democratic institutions [3].
Compare, for example, India and China (famine of 1959-61 killing
30 million), Zimbabwe and Botswana versus Ethiopia and Sudan.
But de Waal argues that the situation is far more complex, and
unique to each country's political history.
India is said to have one of the most sophisticated famine-prevention
systems in the world, not so much because India has a relatively free
press and democratic institutions, argues de Waal, but because the
famine of 1943 in Bengal (killing 1 million +) was used as a key
argument to overthrow the British Raj, so that famine prevention
became part of the same discourse as Indian independence, and
access to food came to be seen as a basic human right [4]. This right
has not been established to the same degree in the political cultures of
many other countries.
The World Bank's approach to food security 'is so flexible and
theoretically catholic that it can legitimate anything from old-style
developmentalism to neoliberal structural adjustment theory' [5].
Because famine generally afflicts the poor and powerless,
governments rarely lose office as a result. Exceptions include the
effect of the Bengal famine on the rule of the British Raj, the 1973
Wollo famine in Ethiopia which contributed to the overthrow of Haile
Selassie, and the 1984-85 famine in the Sudan which was used to
unite opposition forces to topple the Nimeiri government.
International food aid agencies endeavour to take a 'neutral' political
stance. This de-politisation is carried through in international media
reporting. If national governments were more readily held to
account, and that loss of the mandate to rule were a likely outcome of
famine, one could expect that effective famine-prevention systems
and national food reserves would be maintained.
*
[1] Adhana, A H, AMBIO 20, 1991 pp186-188.
[2] de Waal A, Disasters, v20 n3, 1996 p199
[3] Sen A, Prospect, Oct 1, 1995 pp28-35
[4] de Waal A, op cit p196-197
[5] de Waal A, op cit p199
EVENTS
Possible Urban Worlds - 7th INURA Conference, 16-18 June, Zurich.
Three-day conference on urban theory and action, with leading urban
scientists such as David Harvey, Margit Mayer, Alberto Magnaghi,
Saskia Sassen and some of the most inspiring urban action groups
from Europe and North America.
Info and registration:
http://www.geo.umnw.ethz.ch/human/inura.html
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HAGUE APPEAL FOR PEACE 1999 - CONTACT
The coordinating committee of the Hague Appeal for Peace (see GFB
#34 'World Peace Conference - May 1999) currently comprises of the
International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms,
International Peace Bureau, International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War, and the World Federalist Movement.
Contacts: WFM, 777 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017, USA
tel 1 212 599 1320, fax 1 212 599 1332 e-mail or
Ialana International Secretariat, Anna Paulownastraat 103 2518 BC,
Den Haag, The Netherlands, tel 31 70 363 44 84,
fax 31 70 345 59 51 e-mail *
*
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