SPOTLIGHT (KOHA Ditore interviews Ambassador Hill, also question about Millosheviq about war crimes)

Hill: Now you are asking me? Isn't that a little late? That is a declaration. Maybe I should ask a question, since you made a declaration! OK, go ahead.

Koha: We mentioned Republika Srpska at the beginning. How can you explain the U.S. policy in the case of Republika Srpska, since it means an international recognition of territories taken by force?

Hill: I think one thing you need to remember about the Dayton Accords is that they were a negotiated document, i.e., we worked with three sides--which made it especially complicated--to come up with the settlement. Each side brought to the table some views, some points that they felt were extremely important to them. Because it was a negotiated document, sometimes people were not able to get the point that they wanted. I can assure you that the Serbs in the Dayton process brought a lot of points to the table, the first one being that they wanted, that somehow, the Serb entity, if you will, would be like an independent state or something. And that was clearly rejected, clearly unacceptable to the Croats and to the Bosniacs. So, in working on this, and trying to negotiate the different points of view, it was acceptable to the other two sides, the Croats and the Bosniacs, that the Serb entity could be called the Republika Srpska. That was acceptable to the other sides. So, you should not look at it as the media

tors creating the entity. The entity was created through a negotiated process. They sat down at a table--sometimes they didn't sit down at the same table, sometimes we had to shuttle between them. But, it emerged from the negotiation.

Koha: Bosnia was also internationally recognized state, as Yugoslavia is. How can you justify the difference in the policy towards Kosovo as compared to the situation in Republika Srpska?

Hill: OK. I'm not sure that I entirely understand your question, but let me say that Bosnia and Kosovo are different situations. I appreciate your point that there are similarities, but they're different situations. Secondly, let me reiterate that Bosnia was solved through a negotiated process. I believe Kosovo needs to be solved through a negotiated process. I think that two sides need to work out things that they can agree on, and compromise on things that they can't agree on. As for Kosovo's eventual status, you know there's a sharp disagreement between the majority view in Prishtina and the majority view in Belgrade. So, you will have to work this out.

Koha: I saw in the newspapers yesterday that you have drafted a new agreement, that, according to many constitutional law experts in Prishtina, it was translated and transcribed from Cyrillic. How do you comment on that?

Hill: Well, you are certainly entitled to your own opinion, but not to your own facts. And the fact is that these "lists" are of suggestions. And I don't want to call it a plan, because it was not a plan. There's a list of ideas--numbered, etc. to, look like a plan, but it wasn't, because we haven't had a reaction to it, no formal reaction to it. It was based on concepts, on ideas that emerged out of discussions. Clearly, there are elements of it that are unacceptable in Belgrade; there are elements of it that are unacceptable in Prishtina. The point is to react to those elements to find different language, to find different ideas, to take out certain sections, to put in different sections, to work on it. It's a working document. I can assure you that what you read in your newspaper in not going to bear much similarity to what eventually comes out of this negotiated process. This was an idea--a set of ideas--cooked up in Washington. And I can assure you; no one is reading "Cyrillic" in Washington! It was don

e in Washington. Of course, you may have recognized ideas you felt came out of Belgrade. I can assure you that there are other ideas there that came out of Prishtina. There are other ideas that came out of the Helsinki process, still other ideas that emerged very clearly from earlier Contact Group work. And it was an attempt to put down ideas on a piece of paper and start getting people to react to them, and to begin a process of narrowing the differences between Prishtina and Belgrade. This is a very normal course of events in any negotiation. And to try to look for the antecedents--whether an idea came from Helsinki, Belgrade, Pristina--I think it's a bit of a waste of time, with due respect. And I think you should be focusing on what are the things that you want, what are the things that you want to see in an eventual agreement.

Koha: You are authorized by the Contact Group to mediate. Are they informed about this list of ideas?

Hill: Yes, they are, and we stay in very close co-operation with our Contact Group partners. I continue to talk to them regularly. They have some points of view, which are also reflected in the document. I haven't gotten any formal comments back from them on that particular draft, I'm sure we will. Which is why I'm already convinced that even within a week we won't recognize too many of the elements, because it was there to stimulate discussion and ideas and maybe even somebody's newspaper circulation. Were you able to sell more newspapers as a result of having that in there? Was there economic benefit to Koha? Good. I really believe that we need to stimulate the economy in Kosovo, so I made my contribution!

Koha: You said that you are going to get the responses in Prishtina to this draft and send them to Washington. Won't that take too long, now with the winter approaching?

Hill: Don't worry, we have things called fax machines and e-mail and telephones, so we are fairly rapid in our ability to transmit information across the Atlantic. We will try to push as quickly as possible on this. We are not waiting for the winter to set upon us, but if you're getting at the question of can I predict when the two sides will be able to make some progress in narrowing their positions, I can't predict that.

Koha: You said in Ohrid, two months ago, that Kosovo problem can be solved in two weeks.

Hill: I did not say that, that is a total misquote, and I don't know who said that. I said I would like to see it solved in weeks rather than months. Alas, it's now been, what, two months, eight weeks. Look, I would like to see this problem solved yesterday if we can, but it's proving to be a very difficult problem.

Koha: Do you think, since you have met him many times, that Milosevic is ready for Kosovo republic in Yugoslavia?

Hill: You'll have to ask him.

Koha: Milosevic is responsible for so many things now, and this radical party wants to see him indicted in front of the International Court in the Hague. Why does Washington still consider Milosevic as relevant partner in negotiations?

Hill: Let me ask you, as a keen observer of events in the Balkans, with whom would you like me to talk to in Belgrade? Assuming that when you mediate you has to talk to two sides. I'm turning the question to you. Who should I talk to, if I'm mediating? And by definition the mediator has to talk to two sides, otherwise you are not a mediator. So, whom do I talk to?

Koha: But Mr. Gelbard said in May, that it is no longer possible to talk to Milosevic.

Hill: I'm asking you, as a mediator. And bare in mind, I was assigned this job to be helpful as a mediator to try to resolve the problem. Now, mediator means dealing with two sides. So, just tell me whom I should talk to on the other side? Let's back up. Who should I talk to on the Prishtina side?

Koha: What do you mean, you have Mr. Rugova.

Hill: OK, that's good advice, thank you. Who should I talk in Belgrade?

Koha: But, you are missing on the Serbian opposition.

Hill: Would you like to talk to them too, on the agreement? That's a good idea.

Koha: But, Milosevic's position seems reinforced by being the partner of the international community. Do you think this is a good approach?

Hill: I don't think my having discussions reinforces anybody. I think I'm simply having discussions on a very difficult issue, and trying to find some common language to see if we can put this difficult issue behind us. I don't think I'm reinforcing anybody in any of the discussions I've had.

Koha: But, Milosevic is trying all these years to promote himself as the sole person in Serbia that can talk to the West?

Hill: I'll just restate. I'm sorry to be a bore to your readers--and maybe you won't sell as many newspapers in this edition as you did with the previous one! But my job is to try to work out a political settlement, to try to find some common language between the sides, to share some ideas and try to get a settlement. That's what I'm trying to do. And I welcome ideas that you have on how I can do that job better.

Koha: Do you think that the military component of the negotiations that was present in Bosnia is missing here, and do you think it has negative impact on the situation?

Hill: I don't know, but I think you raise an important issue, which is, what will the post-settlement look like. And we feel very strongly that the agreement needs to be lived up to, absolutely needs to be followed to the letter. And we need to make sure that we have adequate mechanisms for making sure that every aspect of the agreement is followed, and I can assure that's very much on the minds of the International Community.

Koha: Last question. Yesterday you said that you are not here to stop the violence...

Hill: I did NOT say that I did not say that! I'm sorry, you know, look: a little precision would go a long way. I never said I'm not here to stop the violence. I emphasized that my job is to work on this political settlement. I fully understand what the violence does to that political settlement. I am doing all I can within my powers, to find ways to stop that violence, and energize a political process.

Koha: Is it possible to create peace without stopping the violence? Our readers would like to know that?

Hill: I think that when people believe that there is progress on the political track, when people believe that there can be a solution to the political problem, that will be, in itself, an inducement to stop violence. I mean, why should police be attacking a village, which is an Albanian village, which is going to remain an Albanian village. Why to do that, when there is a political settlement? So the hope is that as the political process moves forward, that will be a greater incentive for everybody to join in that political process and to realize that violence will not contribute to it.