Strasburg, 16 september 1998

Ferrero-Waldner, acting Council President. "Ladies and gentlemen! The discussion show, that it is not only a discussion about Kosovo, but also most certainly about the common foreign and security policy and about our possibilities within the institutional framework. I must say, that I regret it that we are simply not further along in the institutional scope. But you know, the principle of unanimity holds sway in the Council, and that there are unfortunately states, which do not wish certain measures. I must unfortunately say that the same holds for the Security Council. In the Security Council to there are permanent members, but perhaps others also, who do not accept certain decisions, which some of us would like to seem implemented. This does not mean, that it could not be done in the future either. But I have already mentioned in my address, that there are few such prospects at this time. I am pleased that, and this information was not yet known to me, that the French unlike the way they have reacted up

to now would, if worst comes to worst, be interested in a new draft of a Security resolution, in which case the situation could at least be changed.

I should like to go briefly into the issue raised, namely to what extent stricter measures other than a military intervention in fact mentioned in the discussion, which have not been accepted. In connection with the discontinuance of investments, which we have decided, and also the freezing of bank balances, the measures we have taken are relatively weak. However, this is attributable to the fact that it was the smallest common denominator, on which we were able to agree. I must say, as Council President, I must now defend this position, although I do not always agree with it.

I would then like to broach the issue as to who at this time is actually acting as our special emissary. It is Ambassador Grobmeyer, who already last year was active in Albania as the representative of the then Chancellor Vranitzky, who is thoroughly familiar with the situation, and who can begin immediately on the spot, to engage all parties again in a dialogue, and of course work in co-ordination with the OSCE and other institutions. I agree with the Commission, that further options must be sought, but unfortunately we have not succeeded in the past either in sending a WEU mission to Albania. In the final analysis, the OSCE managed to render very good services there for a brief period of time, but was of course not in a position to establish new institutions in Albania.

The issue of 'safe havens' has been addressed. Naturally, we are aware that which led to a catastrophe in Bosnia, cannot be applied in Kosovo in this form. I have myself discussed the problem of refugees at length with Emma Bonino, and believe me, we too are aware that what has been proposed hitherto is little. It is however very difficult to take far reaching measures at this time and to try to attain maximum results. There was a dialogue between the European Union and the United States. In this connection, we have pondered wither we could create a multi-ethnic police unit, which would oversee the return of and guarantee a certain security for refugees on the spot. That too however is not yet possible at this time and I must stress at this time. Thus, the least we could do, was to mix the ECMM and the KDOM , so as to reinforce both of these missions, which I have discussed in my address, since one thing I believe always disturbs Milosevic: If he is kept under control and if information keeps flowing.

I should like to broach yet one point: It has been stated that there were no possibilities to come into contact with the refugees. This is not entirely true. The UNCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross certainly do have possibilities of access. It is true that they are often hindered, but on the whole they function relatively well. So much was confirmed to me by Emma Bonino, who was recently there herself.

Mr President, I nonetheless believe that a certain consensus has emerged, that a cease-fire must be achieved in Kosovo as a matter of priority and the disastrous human situation must be improved. I believe that we are more or less agreed, that only if these two preconditions are met, will it be possible to engage in serious negotiations about the future status of Kosovo. We are in any event committed to work further in this direction.