One, mistaken, step forward

by Veton Surroi

Within the efforts of the large international action to convince the Serb leader, Milosevic, that he must subjugate to the last UN resolution on Kosova, it is stressed that political negotiations should take place between the confronted parties, and in some cases it is even mentioned that these conversations should be developed based on the draft-plan for the interim solution adopted also by the Contact Group in its last meeting in London.

Although the main attention is turned towards, and so it should be, the withdrawal of the Serb troops from Kosova and the creation of the security conditions for the return of the internally displaced and the refugees to their homes, it is also true that in each conversation of foreign diplomats this political plan, which was a secret up to now, is also mentioned.

Regardless of the reasons, maybe even good, of why this diplomatic secrecy, our Editorial Board decided to publish the last proposal, as an information to the public and as an invitation for a public and democratic debate that should include all those capable of thinking, and not only a small group of people. These lands have many times savored the bitterness of secret words and suffered the lethal consequences of documents that were discussed without a democratic basis.

Anyhow, here is the new document, according to which Kosova in essence becomes a self-governed territory, part of the "Yugoslav" Federation and the Republic of Serbia, with all decision-making competencies, except in the explicit cases of Federal competencies: foreign affairs, defense, finances, unique market, customs, etc. According to this document, in all other areas, including the police, Kosovar bodies, elected democratically, will decide. In addition, these bodies, according to the document, are constituted based on the "organic laws", i.e. its basic acts.

Compared to the first draft of the Proposal, there is an advance in this new version, first of all the expansion of the self-governing competencies, which is most clearly seen in the new annex, on the activities of the Kosovar police. It also becomes evident by the elimination of the veto right that some Council of nationalities, presided by the President of Serbia, and which could declare null and void all decisions of the Kosovar bodies, had.

Moreover, the role of the "National Councils", a kind of organization that would gather national communities by separate in the way that they could influence over the decisions of the Kosovar bodies, has been restricted...

Thus we could continue point by point in this comparative analysis and prove the positive evolution. And, we can also go point by point and show the concrete deficiencies: for example, Kosova in the SFRY had delegated the right of the unique market, finances, foreign affairs and defense to the Federation, but at the same time these functions had broad rights of realization at the level of Kosova (through the respective Secretariats, of the same ranking as the ministries) as well as with direct participation, even with the right to veto in all these areas at the Federal level. Theoretically, Kosova could at that time block even the Federal budget, including the functioning of the defense bodies, etc. In the new proposal, Kosova has to subordinate to one financial, defense, foreign affairs, etc. policy, which even in better conditions than the present, would represent a dictate.

However, the main deficiency of this document, as in the past one, is the starting point.

And, the starting point here is that a document should be drafted not based on a list of principles, but based on the combination of principles, new realities that were created by force and the relation of physical forces on the ground today.

Moreover, this, in short would mean that anything could be negotiated, staring from something determined by the negotiators. This approach will lead to nowhere and, if based only on the relation of physical forces today, it can easily happen that instead of the imaginary 100% self-governance, the result of the negotiations, seeking a "middle path" could end with the right for Kosova to become an expanded municipality, and this to be proclaimed as a victory of the negotiating process.

The mistaken approach is evident. Kosova, in the last moment of an agreed status (i.e., in 1989), had its Constitution and bodies deriving from it. Therefore, it also had the constitutional framework that regulated the relationships with Serbia and the other federal units, as well as the Federation proper.

These were gained rights in the Kosovar constitutional stroll and they were taken away by force. Today, they must be restituted, within its frame of collective rights, and for them to be negotiated. Kosova can't renegotiate whether it should have a constitution and parliament, government and judiciary, police and taxing system... These must be restituted to the first phase of the negotiations. Meanwhile, negotiations, in essence, would turn towards the establishment of relationships that will exist between Kosova on one side, Serbia and Montenegro on the other, within the three-year interim period.

Meanwhile, international proposers find themselves in a situation where everything must be negotiated, even taking as equal the positions of that which has occupied Kosova and that which is under occupation, that of which uses tanks and police to ban the legal and legitimate Kosovar system with that which is suffering from that same tank and police.

In addition, the argument is not only moral, it is also practical. If such proposals and suggestions continue coming, the international proposers have two solutions that are not solutions: impose their own solution and seal this with the NATO presence, same as in Bosnia, or to continue for an indefinite time drafting versions between two irreconcilable stands, the Kosovar independentist and the Serb anexionist.

The second mistake in the starting point remains repeated as in the first document: there is no legal mechanism that would define what will happen after the proposed three-year interim period. Self-governance is a form of self-determination, let's say in its embryo form.

Nevertheless, the will of the citizens of Kosova is not to live in interim terms, temporary phases, and provisional agreements. Historically, citizens of Kosova deserve, as all other European people, to decide about their fate. What guarantees this in the second document?

Nothing; a promise that both sides would sit down and evaluate again the agreement after three years. Who will stop them from meeting after six months or after ten years? No one.

The obligation to evaluate again the document is equal to zero, and this makes the situation even more complicated because what pretends to be called a "Provisional Agreement" becomes a definite agreement. Both sides, if they would to sign such an agreement, seal their fate as it is defined, unless they wish to change it by war. And, such a version of the Agreement is the recipe for further wars.

To summarize: Where are we today with this version of the proposal? At the same point where Kosova was seven months ago, but now with all the killed, with hundreds of burnt villages and ruined houses, with hundreds-thousands of refugees and displaced, with the unpredictability what can tomorrow bring.

If someone thinks that it will be easier to impose such solutions on Albanians today, because of the terrible humanitarian pressure, he/she can be easily mistaken. The majority of political representatives has created the conscience that the approval of a document that leaves Kosova under Belgrade's jurisdiction is the creation of conditions to make Kosovars refugees and IDPs in their own lands.

Today's Kishnareke would become the permanent residence for Kosova.

Kosova would be called Kishnareke.