In agreement with the following: the first point of 1199 UN Resolution

of October 24, 1998, the October 3, 1998, UN recommendation and the

recommendation of the Group of Contact of October 10, 1998, with

understanding of the article 36 of 1907 Hague Regulations on war law and

behavior, the 1929 and 1949 Geneva Conventions, the conclusions of the

UN Assembly in 1952, and the appeal by the NATO committee, the General

Headquarters of Kosova Liberation Army informs all of the military

powers in Kosova, on October 10, 1998, of the following:

RESTRAINT FROM ALL MILITARY ACTIONS

I. General Headquarters of Kosova Liberation Army have pledged that as

long as the international bodies responsible for international

collective security, such as UN, SC, NATO, Contact Group, and the

American diplomatic mediators actively work toward finding a right

solution for the political status of Republic of Kosova, they will

refrain from taking any military actions against the Serb aggressor and

its forces.

II. This restraint has to do with respecting the first point of the 1199

S.C of UN Resolution and allowing way for a correct solving of the

political status of Republic of Kosova through political means.

III. In agreement with article 20 of the Hague Conventions of 1907,

article 75 of Geneva Conventions of 1929, article 118, 122 and 126 of

the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the conclusions of the General

Assembly of UN of 1952, General Headquarters of KLA AUTHORIZE Mr. Adem

Demaci , in cooperation with the International Red Cross, to mediate

with the other side the release of all war hostages, wounded, prisoners

and the ones kidnapped for allegedly being members of KLA, and a

permission for a safe return for all of those forced to leave Kosova.

IV. The restraint will be valid as long as the other side refrains from

making any military attacks on the KLA forces or innocent civilians.

The restraint will be strictly obeyed by the members of KLA, respecting

all of the laws and regulations of war, to the point where they have to

act on self-defense.

V. In agreement with Article 40 of Hague regulations, the side that

violates this restraint from any military actions will be considered as

an aggressor.

VI. KLA will consider its resistance finished if there is a solution for

the political status of Kosova found in agreement with the national

expressed desire in the 1991 Referendum.

The General Political Representative of KLA, Mr. Adem Demaci, is

authorized to oversee the restraint and contact the International Red

Cross, as well as the other side, and to inform the Security Council of

UN, UN, NATO, the member countries of the Contact Group, The Hague

Tribune Court and the Kosovar and world masses of this decision.

COMMUNIQUE Nr.2

After a long and serious contemplation of the sincere situation and

goals of the American diplomacy and of the Contact Group, the office of

the General Political Representative of KLA, for the local and

international masses, when considering the latest version of the

Project-Agreement for a solution to Kosova issue:

CONCLUDES

That the presented Project-Agreement has a few substantial weaknesses:

1. The validity of any agreement in the international level disappears

if the act of settling down the belligerent situation between two sides

with an international mediator does not include citations from

international acts for judicial backup and security. The disagreement

in the SC of UN Resolution on the political status of Kosova endangers

peace and security in the region and beyond. As a result of this, in

agreement with Article 35, paragraph 2 of the UN Card, Great Britain has

required from the Security Council of the United Nations (since Serbia

and Kosova are not and have never been a subjective factor in the

international scene or UN)-taking under consideration that the adoption

procedures, for formulation of this of this agreement have been achieved

by both sides-to base this agreement on Article 36, paragraph 2 of the

UN Card, with the Security Council of UN guaranteeing its success.

2. The subjectivity of the Kosovar side is not identified in any

dispositions or ways even though the disagreements have political

character in the issue of the political status. Not recognizing

Republic of Kosova as an equal part of this Project-Agreement, which is

a collusively normative conflict, is a political agreement whose primary

goals are to avoid inter-country conflict, and the elimination of the

necessity for Kosova with its own borders, subjectivity, and elements of

a country and sovereignty.

3. Justification for the agreement that prejudges the political status

of Kosova does not stand because anybody who knows the Serb constitution

and laws, as far as not recognizing Kosova goes and human rights and

liberties (except a few basic ones from the corpus of freedoms and

rights), does not differ with the regional regulation of Nish,

Kragujevac, etc. Therefore, if Kosova is not a figment of imagination

then is just another district in Serbia.

4. If the Project-Agreement does not aim at prejudging a political

status, then how was it able to earlier determine the destiny of

Albanians as an ethnic group? An ethnic group that represents the

defense of national minority by the universal human rights in accordance

with the international right, and other multinational and international

security institutions that does not have a right for independence.

These are also known as Reservations with specific rights - except those

for a political status. Therefore, the Kosova as an autonomous province

within Serbia is pre-assumed from the beginning. The composers of this

Project-Agreement are the same ones from the Dayton Agreement in

December of 1995. They could not find any circumstances under which the

Serbs and Croats in Bosnia would be named as ethnic groups, but they

found enough contingencies and judicial space to form states with

contractual sovereignty.

5. Appointing no judicial security means to carry out this

internationally characterized act and especially not appointing a dead

line for the acceptance of the requests in the Project-Agreement, makes

this agreement worthless.

6. Avoiding the generation of a deadline for this Project-Agreement and

the declaring of the will of Kosova people for the future political

status, in accordance with international mechanisms, it represents a

judicial and political stunt to disallow this possibility and with hopes

that this "temporary solution" will become a permanent one!

7. Considering all these weaknesses and legitimate complaints, KLA,

refuses to accept this Project-Agreement, and does not embrace, in any

way, this temporary solution that with elimination of the borders and

sovereignty of Republic of Kosova directly expunges KLA as a realistic

protective force of sovereignty.

General Political Representative of KLA

Adem Demaci