note: Secretary of State's spokesman , James P. Rubin, thinks that B52 is a Belgrade radio! It may, alas, be the kind of tool necessary to keep Radio B92 on the air.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB # 131

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1998, 12:50 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

(...)

QUESTION: Yesterday's statements that were made here about Yugoslavia and Milosevic - one thing I noticed is

that it states that until there is democracy in Serbia there will not be a lifting of the outer wall of sanctions. In that

democracy in Serbia is associated with, I suppose, the removal of Milosevic, is that to say that there will be no

lifting of the outer wall until Milosevic goes, in effect?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we try to make our policies clear; you sometimes try to connect the dots. What I can say

about our policy is that we want to see democracy in the FRY itself. Democracy is more than an election;

democracy is a process. It is a process that doesn't include shutting down independent media. It doesn't include

harassing and jailing political opponents, and it doesn't include many other aspects of the behavior that has come to

mark the Milosevic period in Yugoslavia's history.

We believe that President Milosevic's grip on power is weakening. We believe far from the "greater Serbia" he

envisioned several years ago, things have shrunk. Not only is Croatia whole and independent, the Serbs of Bosnia

have an assembly and government control by moderates which rejects Milosevic's influence. Montenegro has

elected officials in open rejection of President Milosevic, and key municipalities in Serbia itself are controlled by

opposition political parties.

And now Kosovo, which for ten years President Milosevic considered his own backyard with no outside

interference, is now a location where up to 2,000 or at least 2,000 international verifiers are envisaged to supervise

election. This most recent purge of senior officials in Belgrade, including the head of state security and the chief of

staff of the army, smacks of desperation and distrust on his part.

Milosevic has been at the center of every crisis in the former Yugoslavia over the last decade. He is not simply part

of the problem; Milosevic is the problem. We have been promoting democratic practices and reforms in Serbia in a

number of ways, including through independent media, including democracy assistance programs for fledgling

opposition parties. That is something we are going to continue to do.

As far as what standard we will apply to the three issues -- that is Kosovo, cooperation with the War Crimes

Tribunal and democracy in Serbia itself -- in order to change the sanctions policy, I don't want to prescribe for you

exactly what those issues would require. Simply to say we will know cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal

when we see it; we will know democracy in Serbia when we see it; and we will know a real change in the situation

in Kosovo when we see it. We haven't seen any of those three things now.

QUESTION: But if Milosevic is the problem -- and there is a lot of evidence to back what you are saying -- then

how can you continue to deal with the problem? And how should the people of Serbia, or perhaps the various

forces in or out of the government at the moment, deal with the problem?

MR. RUBIN: Well, let's remember there are sources of the problem, and clearly Milosevic is the source of the

problem and the original sinner in this whole catastrophe that has befallen Yugoslavia in the last decade. We have

no illusions about that.

At the same time, we did face this summer and fall the prospect of an humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo --

hundreds of thousands of peoples' lives were at risk. In order to deal with that humanitarian catastrophe, that very

near-term disaster, we did meet with President Milosevic. And as a result of his belief that air strikes would ensue,

he changed his policies, removed his forces, stopped marauding in the country side and, as I understand it, the

UNHCR said that there is now no internally displaced persons without some form of shelter.

So this humanitarian catastrophe was dealt with in a way that we felt met the needs of the world in trying to prevent

that catastrophe from unfolding in a rather unique way. In an unprecedented action, NATO made a decision to use

military force inside Yugoslavia if he failed to meet the international community's demands. So we took

unprecedented action in that regard and we dealt with President Milosevic, and he reversed course and stopped

pursuing the behavior that was causing this grave risk to the people there and this grave risk of a humanitarian

catastrophe. That is the reason we did so.

We have no interest in propping up President Milosevic. We do have an interest in preventing humanitarian

catastrophe. We meet with many other - when Secretary Albright was there, for example, I know, she met with

many of the opposition groups. She, I believe, spoke to B52 , the radio. Ambassador Holbrooke and Ambassador

Gelbard and others who have been in the region make it a point to try to lift up, through their activities and through

financial assistance, the opposition groups and the independent media. That's how you balance principle and

pragmatism in a very complicated situation like Serbia.

QUESTION: You say you have no interest in propping up Milosevic. Are you prepared to turn that around and

say the US has an interest in seeing him leave office?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I think I've stated rather clearly our views on President Milosevic. Nobody gets up in the

morning thanking the Lord that President Milosevic is the leader of Serbia. On the other hand, we do go about

promoting democratic change in Serbia as we do in other places through these programs. I certainly don't think

anybody would lose any sleep if that changed.

QUESTION: One last thought. Kosovo is of great importance to Serbia. And you describe the fragmentation of,

first, of Yugoslavia, the problems with what remains of Serbia - of what remains of Yugoslavia. Why then -- you're

coming awfully close to being happy with a destabilizing situation. But why do you maintain a policy, then, of not

wanting to see Kosovo go independent? Because, in a sense, that might be the last nail in his whatever - if he lost

Kosovo.

MR. RUBIN: Those points were designed to make clear the extent to which Milosevic has harmed the interests of

Serbs in Serbia and Serbs everywhere. We have demonstrated that, I think, through the points that I've made about

the harm that his rule and his policies have caused. To the extent that Serbs better understand the harm that

President Milosevic has caused them, perhaps they will understand better the danger of his rule to them. But that's

a very different point than changing our view as to how borders should be changed in Europe in the modern era.

QUESTION: For the most part, I want to ask, has Milosevic kept the deal that he was forced to change his mind

about, change his policy about? And if he's keeping the deal for the most part, then perhaps isn't he a guy that

NATO would want to deal with if they have a proven track record of getting him to turn around? What do you say

to that?

MR. RUBIN: Well, turning him around on problems he causes is not something we take great joy in. If he didn't

cause the problem, he wouldn't have to reverse course and solve the problem. So that's the first answer to that

question.

With respect to is he complying, let me say that largely, yes; largely Kosovo is relatively quiet. There are no

cease-fire violations that have been reported. Our observers continue to accompany police patrols in the Malisevo

area, and in that regard there is a concern we do have - that is the excessive Serbian police presence at Malisevo

remains a troubling instance of Serbian failure to comply fully with the UN Security Council resolutions.

It is the primary cause of the high level of tension in the Malisevo area. The police presence in Malisevo is an issue

that we have raised directly with the government in Belgrade, and we have underscored to them the importance of

complying with UN resolutions in this as in all other cases.

As the verification agreement authorizes them to do, our observers are accompanying Serbian police patrols in the

Malisevo region in an effort to reduce tensions in an area where the KLA is particularly visible. Our monitors'

efforts have borne fruit over the last few weeks, as the number of incidents of violence has dropped significantly.

But we still do have a problem with the excessive presence there.

QUESTION: But largely stable?

MR. RUBIN: Well, largely the compliance has largely occurred, as evidenced by the lack of cease-fire violations.

QUESTION: I'd like to go at Barry's question from a little bit of a different angle. There's a large British

newspaper basing a report, as far as I can see, from your statements yesterday; saying that the Clinton

Administration is actively seeking the overthrow of Milosevic. Is that true?

MR. RUBIN: As I said, I don't think we would lose any sleep if he passed from the scene. With respect to our

policies and what we are pursuing, the policies that we are talking about are the ones that I am describing to you in

promoting democracy. I know there are a lot of reports out there about other things that I just make it a practice

never to talk about one way or the other. And that's not implied meaning there's any truth to them, either.

QUESTION: Let me put it another way. If Milosevic complies in all these areas to your full satisfaction, you're

willing to continue to work with him?

MR. RUBIN: We want to see democracy in Serbia. There is no democracy in Serbia. That is the long-term policy

of the United States - to have democracy in Serbia.

When you talk about dealing with Milosevic, as in response to the last question, and is he complying with a

particular promise, let me point out the promise that he's complying with is something that was only necessary

because of the policies that he pursued in the first place, which generated the humanitarian catastrophe that then he

turned around in the face of NATO air strikes and solved.

So we prefer not to have the problem in the first place that Milosevic would then have to reverse course to help

solve.

QUESTION: But if he woke up a different person tomorrow morning and did everything you want him to do, it's

fine with you if he stays in power.

MR. RUBIN: Democracy in Serbia is the goal. It's not a personality-driven policy; it's a process-driven policy -

the process of democracy.

QUESTION: Can we move to another undemocratic country? Senator Lugar yesterday, I think, in The

Washington Post, wrote a list of suggestions on what might be done regarding Yugoslavia. Do you have any

reservations about the various proposals he's made?

MR. RUBIN: Well, when we looked at them, in large measure we supported them. That is largely because many

of them are things we are trying to do. We'd love to have additional support from the Congress for additional

programs to assist the media and to assist the promotion of democracy there. That is something that we have been

doing. It's a cornerstone of our policy in the Balkans, to promote democracy and to assist in the development of a

free and independent media.

As I indicated yesterday, we are spending $15 million in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including $2 million

for independent TV. So the kind of measures that Senator Lugar helpfully emphasized are measures that we do

agree with. We're always looking at ways to pursue such policies better, and we'll take a careful look at his ideas.

QUESTION: What about his (inaudible) perspective, though; do you share that as well?

MR. RUBIN: You need to be more specific.

QUESTION: Well, he does say that there is -- no lasting solution to the Balkan crises is possible without

fundamental change in Serbia and in the leadership of Yugoslavia. Do you have any reservations --

MR. RUBIN: We have no illusions about President Milosevic. We do not see him as a guarantor of stability in

Kosovo or elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, including Bosnia. We also recognize quite clearly, as I have in

several responses this morning said to you, that we believe he is the cause of many of these problems not the

solution to many of these problems.

Beyond stating these positions as I have, I don't know how to be more specific in response to your question.

QUESTION: You're not exactly stating a reservation to what Lugar is saying.

MR. RUBIN: We read it with interest.

QUESTION: Then the other issue that comes up that I think you mentioned earlier was Montenegro. That's really

a place where they are trying to go their own way, but it's a direct threat to Milosevic's rule. I was just wondering,

should the Montenegrins continue down the path they're taking and find themselves in some jeopardy as a result, to

what extent is the United States willing to support them so that they are not put in jeopardy or put at risk?

MR. RUBIN: Secretary Albright had a very constructive with Mr. Djukanovic when he was here in the United

States. Other than being a very tall person, which was astounding, he was someone who had a very tall view of

democracy and a view that we found quite appealing.

We have not taken the position that we are in favor of some breaking away of Montenegro. We have said, and I

can repeat, that we respect the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as the final act of

Helsinki commits us to do. But we will insist that the authorities in Belgrade, including President Milosevic, meet

their commitments under the Helsinki Final Act to allow for democracy, independent media and freedom of

association and expression in Montenegro.

Beyond saying that, I don't know how to respond to what I think you would acknowledge is a hypothetical case.

However likely it might be, it is hypothetical at this point.

QUESTION: Do you want to give an assessment, then, of what is a threat to the regime of Djukanovic? Milosevic

now has a new security chief, a new army chief, people who may not be so reluctant to intervene in Montenegro as

the previous people.

MR. RUBIN: It's a matter of concern for us.

QUESTION: How do you address that concern, both with regard to dealing with the Montenegrins and the

Yugoslav regime? Are you warning Milosevic or telling him what you think he should do there, or are you giving

the Montenegrins some sense of --

MR. RUBIN: Well, we're in regular touch with the Montenegrin authorities - part of our normal policy in the

region. We have certainly made clear to President Milosevic the fact that his isolation from the world is not solely a

function of what he was instigating in Bosnia or not solely a function of what he was instigating - the effect he was

having on the people of Kosovo, but is also a function of permitting the kind of democratic freedoms and the

freedom of independent media and association and expression in Montenegro. We've made that very clear to him.

(...)