.PART I (Sent in previous e-mail)
A) News Summary (Compiled from news and wire reports): Political and
economic developments in Serbia; Serbia and Montenegro; Vojvodina and
Sandzak; media; universities; regional issues; international scene;
Belgrade vs. The Hague.
PART II
REPORTS FROM REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA
B) Media repression in Serbia
1. MINISTER VUCIC, STUDIO B HEAD DEBATE INFORMATION LAW
2. OSCE REPRESENTATIVE FREIMUT DUVE ON FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA
C) Growing tension with Montenegro
3. DJUKANOVIC SEEKS PROTECTION
4. MONTENEGRO PUSHED TO THE BRINK BY MILOSEVIC
D) Dinar diplomacy: Belgrade-Banja Luka relations
5. THE MEANDERING DRINA IS STEADILY GROWING WIDER
6. REPORT VIEWS PAYMENT OPERATIONS IN THE SERB REPUBLIC
E) Opposition in Serbia gathering strength?
7. FRY POLITICAL SCENE THE WEAKENING OF MILOSEVIC
8. THE NEXT BALKANS HOT SPOT?
9. WHAT IS "OTPOR"?
F. US policy on Belgrade viewed
10. MADE IN USA
B) Media repression in Serbia
1. MINISTER VUCIC, STUDIO B HEAD DEBATE INFORMATION LAW
Independent news service BETA (Belgrade) - December 3, 1998
In a fierce television duel with Serbian Information Minister Aleksandar
Vucic, RTV Studio B director and chief editor Dragan Kojadinovic launched
an attack on the Information Law, saying that it contained "elements
reminiscent of fascism" and that the law "offended the citizens of Serbia."
In a very fierce and at times tense duel on last night's program on BK TV,
Kojadinovic told Vucic that he could not "ban the citizens from hearing the
truth," reminding him that "there is such a thing as oral journalism."
"Information will go from ear to ear until the ears start bleeding. If the
emperor has no clothes on, then this will be heard. You will not be able
to hide it," Kojadinovic told the Serbian Information Minister, and
expressed his conviction that the Information Law "will soon be either
annulled or corrected."
Vucic first expressed his surprise that the topic of the television duel
was the Information Law, and then said that "some editors and journalists
have given themselves the right to give political lectures. I am proud of
this law. All the relevant political parties endorsed it in the assembly,"
Vucic said. He rejected Kojadinovic's accusation that the law was "imposed
and abused," saying that this would be decided "by the people at
elections." He also denied the claim that the Information Law was in
violation of the Serbian Constitution, stressing that it was in line with
all the provisions of the UN Charter on Human Rights.
As one of the basic qualities of the Information Law, Vucic stressed that
it was being applied equally to the prostate and the independent media, and
gave as an example the fact that the Politika daily has been fined twice.
Kojadinovic's remark to that statement of the Minister's was that "no one
is that naive in Serbia." The Serbian Information Minister then detailed
the work of Studio B, accusing the station of "favoring Serbian Renewal
Movement leader Vuk Draskovic," to which Kojadinovic retorted that at one
time Vucic, as a member of the Studio B Management Board, had given a
positive assessment of the programs of that television station. Asked by a
reporter what he would change in the Information Law, Kojadinovic said that
he would first change the information minister, and "not because he has any
say in the matter, but because he has done nothing to protect the
journalists."
Kojadinovic asked the Minister whether he thought that the fines of 50,000
to 800,000 dinars were too excessive considering the economic potential of
journalists and editors, and also asked him why the undermining of the
legal system and calls for a forceful overthrow of the authorities were
regulated through the Information Law as misconduct and with fines. "One
should get shot for treason, not be fined," Kojadinovic said, to which
Vucic responded by saying that this was a way to protect society from such
activities.
Kojadinovic reminded Vucic of all the reactions by international
journalists' organizations, which all condemned the Serbian Information
Law, and gave as an example the condemnation by the Reporters Without
Borders, which is a reputable organization for the protection of
journalists and which, in its latest report, mentioned the confiscation of
the Dnevni Telegraf daily as an example of repression of the media. "For
us, such criticism is only proof that we are on the right track," Vucic
retorted.
2. OSCE REPRESENTATIVE ON FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA, FREIMUT DUVE
Press Statement - Oslo, 2 December 1998 (excerpt)
...I would like to stress that the attitude of the Belgrade authorities
towards media is offensive to the OSCE, an organisation the FRY government
strives to rejoin as a full member. Only in October, the Serbian parliament
adopted a Law on Public Information that is draconian and in violation of
all relevant international commitments of that country. At my request the
Council of Europe has provided a legal expertise of the Law once again
underlining that it is in contravention with the European Convention on
Human Rights.
An open public debate to ensure the basic elements of a democratic society
is impossible without freedom of the media. This is especially imperative
concerning Kosovo. One can hardly envisage a peaceful solution to this
conflict without an open and pluralistic debate.
Freedom of the media should be one of the top priorities during
discussions with the FRY and Serbian authorities. Sanctions can not be
eased and the government has little chance of re entering the international
organisations it is either suspended from or its application is on hold
until it can prove its commitment to freedom of expression.
To change the current dire situation concerning freedom of the media in
FRY, I recommend the following:
1. The Government of FRY should be encouraged to adopt a clearset of laws
dealing with the media with an emphasis on the protection of the rights of
journalists against censorship of any kind. The draft media law prepared
in June 1998 by the Centre for Human Rights in Belgrade could be used as a
basis for all further legislative actions. The current Serbian Law on
Public Information should be abolished, I underline: abolished, not
rephrased or changed cosmetically.
2. The Government of FRY should ensure that all programmes on
statecontrolled media instigating hate cease immediately. I would like to
stress that fomenting national, racial or religious intolerance and hatred
is against Article38 of the FRY Constitution,
3. Any important decisions made by the Government concerning the media
should be initially also discussed with those organisations that represent
the independent media.
4. All bans on rebroadcasting of foreign programmes should be lifted
immediately and all journalists applying for an entry visa to FRY provided
with one in the shortest possible time. Unhindered access should be
guaranteed for all journalists to areas of conflict, especially in Kosovo.
C) Growing tension with Montenegro
3.DJUKANOVIC SEEKS PROTECTION
Independent news service BETA (Belgrade) - December 3, 1998 (excerpts)
In an effort to resist pressure from the Serbian and Yugoslav authorities,
Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic is increasingly more vocal in seeking
the support of the international community. It is obvious that the
Montenegrin authorities will soon ask for the OSCE mission in Kosovo to
spawn [as received] in Montenegro, well informed sources close to
Djukanovic told the BETA news agency. The sources said that establishing
the mission could be considered a "fait accompli." All that is left now is
to find adequate "packaging: so that the initiative would not stir negative
sentiments among "compatriots."
The same source also claims that "some observers are already in
Montenegro." Sources close to the Montenegrin authorities claim that
establishing an OSCE mission in Montenegro was proposed by Djukanovic
during his visit to Brussels in November. Montenegrin officials, however,
have avoided speaking publicly about the topic, while the state media leave
little room to speculate about an OSCE mission.
Montenegrin legislature speaker Svetozar Marovic did not wish to comment
on the initiative officially. "We will wait for a while with that, there
will be time to talk about it," he said for BETA. Montenegrin premier Filip
Vujanovic commented the possibility that the OSCE mission could spread to
Montenegro by presenting it as "necessary logistic support to the OSCE
mission in Kosovo," pointing out that the Montenegrin port of Bar "could
serve as a service for their supply lines." He added that he believed
that if "observers are deployed in Montenegro, the government will enjoy
their good cooperation"...
Observers in Podgorica assess that regardless of the official explanation
for the deployment of the mission, it is clear that its aim will be to
defend Montenegro from Serbia...
....Political analysts in Montenegro believe that the recent replacement
of the chief of Serbian state security, Jovica Stanisic and the Yugoslav
army chief of staff, Momcilo Perisic, represent parts of Milosevic's
preparations to lash out against Montenegro. According to interpretations
that could be heard in Podgorica, Stanisic and Perisic, did not want to
give their direct support to Milosevic in an attempt to oust Djukanovic.
The Montenegrin premier has a relatively strong and well organized police
and state security apparatus, so that without military and/or police
support, there can be no major internal conflicts in that republic.
Installing an OSCE mission is the best way to prevent Milosevic from giving
that support to his followers in Montenegro, BETA was told by a source
close to the Montenegrin authorities.
At the start of December relations between Podgorica and Belgrade fell to
their lowest level so far. Montenegro did not send any representatives to
attend the commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the creation of
Yugoslavia, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, established in
1918, following World War One. Serbia and Montenegro joined Yugoslavia as
two independent states. The commemoration was held on Nov. 30, while the
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, was founded on Dec. 1.
Djukanovic's Democratic Party of Socialists on Dec. 1, issued a very
sharply intoned announcement, accusing the authorities in Yugoslavia and
the Socialist Peoples Party of Montenegro, lead by Momir Bulatovic, of
struggling for a "unitary Yugoslavia, neocommunist or nationalist in
concept."
...The most likely occasion [an attempted coup of Djukanovic] is Jan. 14,
when his political rivals, Bulatovic's Socialist People's Party, intend to
commemorate the first anniversary of the riots in Podgorica during which
they attempted to prevent Djukanovic from taking the office of the
Montenegrin president. Armed conflicts broke out during those
demonstrations, resulting in 40 wounded police officers and several
civilians. The Montenegrin authorities fear that following the
replacements of Stanisic and Perisic, Milosevic could gather the support of
the army and Serbian police, which was left out during last year's
demonstrations because of the opposition posed by these two men.
Should he miss that opportunity, Milosevic will definitely have to give up
on his attempts to jeopardize Djukanovic's position. Starting as early as
February, he will have to pay far more attention to the issue of Kosovo,
where the Albanian armed insurgency could be renewed in the spring. Premier
Vujanovic expressed the hope that in case there are any forceful attempts
to oust Djukanovic, the possible OSCE mission in Montenegro could come to
deal with "other issues" as well, rather than just logistic support to the
verifiers and observers in Kosovo.
4.MONTENEGRO PUSHED TO THE BRINK BY MILOSEVIC
Financial Times (London) December 5, 1998 (excerpts)
...Leaders of Montenegro's pro-western government admit that the current
state exists in little but name and that the isolationist policies of the
Yugoslav president - and Serb leader - Slobodan Milosevic are pushing them
towards secession. "On a long-term basis, Milosevic wants Montenegro dead
or kaput," says Branko Perovic, Montenegro's foreign minister.
"With Milosevic pressing Montenegro, this will bring about an easier and
earlier secession which is not our choice but our response to his extremely
devastating policies towards Yugoslavia. . . The international community
should not underestimate the possibility of a new conflict. This is the
moment to warn him."
Apart from the army - the sole functioning federal institution - Serbia
and Montenegro are held together institutionally only by a common currency
and joint sports teams. Montenegro has taken authority over customs and
foreign trade previously run by federal bodies. It issues its own visas and
plans to set up representative delegations in Washington and Brussels.
While Montenegro, with a population of just 650,000, has placed all its
hopes in support from Europe and the US, the hardline nationalist regime in
Serbia has suggested a political alliance with Russia and Belarus.
The crisis came to a head last week when Montenegrin deputies in the
Yugoslav federal parliament loyal to Milo Djukanovic, the republic's
reformist president, refused to take part in debates on the 1999 budget...
"Milosevic is preparing a new strike against Montenegro," said Srdjan
Darmanovic, a political analyst in Podgorica. "I don't expect him to accept
peaceful cohabitation with Djukanovic. For possible plans in Montenegro,
Milosevic wants the loyalty of the army."
Supporters of Mr Bulatovic's Socialist People's party (SNP) intend to hold
anti-government protests in Podgorica next month. The Montenegrin
government fears another attempt by Mr Milosevic to put his allies back in
power now that he has the powerful Serbian security apparatus firmly under
his control. The SNP denies it supports violence. "We have a great number
of citizens supporting us. If we had wanted to we could have removed
Djukanovic from power at least five times," said an official.
Under Montenegro's constitution independence can only be declared through
a referendum. Such a vote would be too close to call. Montenegro is a
clan-based society, mostly sharing the same language and Orthodox Christian
heritage as Serbia. Although part of the mountainous state succeeded in
resisting Ottoman rule, two traditions run deep - "Greens" who would back
independence and "Whites" who regard themselves as Serbs and want union.
"Djukanovic will not take a big risk with a referendum," predicted Mr
Darmanovic. "He's very pragmatic. An independent Montenegro is not his
obsession as was Croatia under Tudjman. .. He will only proclaim
independence if Milosevic throws Montenegro out of the federation.
Djukanovic is aware of the danger of civil war."
Miodrag Vukovic, senior adviser to Mr Djukanovic, warns of another Bosnia
in the making and calls on the international community to take a more
aggressive stance against Belgrade. "We never asked for help before, but
today is not yesterday."
The US administration, which has given strong moral but little financial
support to Montenegro's reformists, is aware that a final break-up of rump
Yugoslavia would also complicate efforts to end the war in Serbia's Kosovo
province. A US-proposed peace plan hinges on persuading Kosovo's ethnic
Albanian majority and a separatist rebel army to remain nominally part of
Serbia while holding positions in the federal Yugoslav government,
parliament and courts. "With no Montenegro in Yugoslavia, out goes the
solution for Kosovo," said one diplomat.
D)Dinar diplomacy: Belgrade-Banja Luka relations
5.THE MEANDERING DRINA IS STEADILY GROWING WIDER
Independent weekly NIN (Belgrade) -- December 4, 1998 (excerpts)
Regardless of how the obscure dispute over the dinar payments between
Yugoslavia and the Serb Republic [RS] ends, even a layman can tell that the
trade across the Drina will be possible in the future, possibly a very near
future, only in hard currency. The RS is Yugoslavia's leading trading
partner, with Yugoslavia recording a trade surplus. The signal that the
RS, as the damaged party, does not want to accept the depressed dinar in
payment operations, and the periodical signals from Podgorica that
Montenegro is considering introducing its own parallel currency, are
actually glaringly red warning lights for everyone who does not pretend to
be color blind: the Yugoslav monetary system is on the brink of disintegration.
...It has even been officially asserted in Belgrade that the move made by
the [Milorad] Dodik government runs counter to the Dayton accord. There
have also been political implications, as a result of official Belgrade's
attempts to influence the outcome of the parliamentary crisis in the RS:
Someone is allegedly intentionally drawing Bosnian Serbs away from Serbia
and Yugoslavia, while the MuslimCroat federation is establishing
increasingly closer ties with Croatia. The RS Government has taken the
position that the suspension of payment operations was damaging to both
sides, Bosnian Serbs and Yugoslavia. It has decided to set the parity of
the "convertible mark" and the dinar at 17.5 in order to protect the
interests of the RS, whose income dropped 20 percent in October alone due
to the depressed dinar...
The question that presents itself now is how will the RS public get the
goods they have so far been obtaining strictly from Yugoslavia, such as
flour, cooking oil, and sugar, and how will pensioners and disabled war
veterans get their pensions, disablement benefits, etc. These were
probably the chief reasons for Premier Dodik's visit to Belgrade and talks.
Our independent economic analysts have been very explicit. The Yugoslav
Government's decision to cut off payment operations is a "radical and
brutal measure," since it is aimed at forcing the RS to accept the dinar's
unrealistic exchange rate to its own detriment. Thinking that it was in
this way also protecting the RS economy, Yugoslavia has left itself without
the most favorable market for the purchase of hard currencies at the most
favorable prices for a dinar that is worth less than in real terms.
It is interesting that no one has even touched upon an important fact, one
that concerns the implementation of the Dayton accord and not its
violation: BosniaHerzegovina, of which the RS is a part, is under a regime
of the Currency Board, a powerful international banking body that controls
the value of the money in circulation and does not allow states under its
authority to issue any money without hardcurrency backing.... It is
precisely under the Dayton accord that the RS belongs to the group of
countries with a stable hard currency, whereas Yugoslavia, despite being
the chief trading partner of the Serbs across the Drina, has, objectively
speaking, remained what it is: a country of barter trade and an unstable
currency.
...On the left bank of the Drina we have a convertible market system, and
on the right bank an anachronistic, isolated clearing system. The epic and
proverbial border between Bosnia and Serbia is not being widened only by
capricious Westendorp and disputed Dodik, but most of all by the
"convertible mark."
6.REPORT VIEWS PAYMENT OPERATIONS IN THE SERB REPUBLIC
Pro-government daily Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo) -- December 2, 1998 (excerpts)
...Dnevni Avaz has learned that the current government in Banja Luka is
not far away from resorting to the solution of stopping payment operations
in dinars and switching to the convertible mark [KM]. The convertible mark
is welcomed even in the border towns in Serbia simply because its rate is
as firm as that of its German "mother."
The condition for that is that someone provides them the money to buy the
KM120 million that they lack in cash operations. In other words, according
to the information that we heard at the Serb Republic Finance Ministry and
that was confirmed by the Information Minister Rajko Vasic, that is the
equivalent value of the amount of Yugoslav dinars in payment operations of
this entity under the mentioned rate of six dinars for one convertible mark.
However, many who would be willing to lend the money wonder how to provide
that amount, as the prospect of its being regained through manufacturing is
uncertain.
Besides, there is also a doubt about the trustworthiness of the Banja Luka
wishes, that is, a suspicion that the money may end up in Belgrade and that
the use of dinars may be accepted for semipublic operations, in the way
that is done with Croatian kunas in a part of the Federation. According to
Milorad Dodik's personal assessments, in this way nearly DM50 million
melted across the Drina river this year under the rate of 4.4 and 5.9
dinars for one German mark, whereas the set blackmarket rate from Belgrade
already went up to 7.5 or 8 dinars.
That is why they decided to raise their own official rate as they buy the
products of FRY companies under the blackmarket rate, very often paying for
the goods with foreign exchange received from the international community...
It remains to be seen for how long the brethren across the Drina will be
sold not only the ideology but all the drawbacks of the economic system as
well. If further inflation of the Yugoslav dinar takes place and it is
unofficially expected salaries in Yugoslav dinars could again drop to
twodigit numbers. And then let us see who will endure that. The option
that the western part of the Serb Republic switches to the convertible mark
is not excluded either, while the eastern part would keep dinars in payment
operations as an expression of "brotherly love"...
E) Opposition in Serbia gathering strength?
7. FRY POLITICAL SCENE THE WEAKENING OF MILOSEVIC
Independent news service BETA (Belgrade) -- December 3, 1998 (excerpts)
...The first response to the US move came from the leader of the Serbian
Renewal Movement [SPO], Vuk Draskovic, who on Dec. 1 said that the US
administration had his party in mind when announcing support to democratic
forces in Serbia, and added that other democratic bloc parties were far too
weak to be considered for serious cooperation. In the Serbian legislature,
the Serbian Renewal Movement holds 45 seats of the total 250. Since the
beginning of the year, at the time when the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS]
and the Yugoslav Left [JUL] formed the Serbian government with the
ultrarightist Serbian Radical Party [SRS], Draskovic and his party have
been avoiding all disputes with the Socialists, insisting that the Radicals
and the Yugoslav Left were to be held responsible for all the problems in
the country, Kosovo, economic difficulties and the controversial university
and information laws included.
The Renewal Movement is still considered as a potential partner in the
republican and federal governments, that is, a constant threat to Seselj's
Radicals that they might be excluded from power. The Serbian Renewal
Movement is not in favor of new elections, because according to some
estimates, the party had lost a large portion of its voters due to a
"silent collaboration" with the Socialists, and numerous allegations of
having used its power at the local level, and especially in Belgrade, to
illegally amass wealth.
The Alliance for Change
...The leaders of the Alliance for Change estimated as realistic a
possibility that new general elections might be called next year and base
all their activities on this assessment, counting that the authorities in
Serbia and the FRY will be significantly weakened next year due to economic
problems, the situation in Kosovo, and pressure of the liberal leaders in
Montenegero and Republika Srpska [Serb entity in BosniaHerzegovina]...
Dragoslav Avramovic plays a prominent role in promoting the alliance, but
BETA's sources from the group's leadership say that the coalition
officials fear he could let down his allies at a crucial moment, as he did
on the eve of the 1996 elections, when he withdraw due to "poor health"
though he was the main candidate of the Zajedno coalition (composed of
Serbian Renewal Movement, Democratic Party and Civic Alliance of Serbia).
Prospects
...The Serbian Resistance Movement, gathering the Serbs from Kosovo,
should also be included among the regime's potentially dangerous opponents.
This groups is led by Momcilo Trajkovic, a former Socialist party official
in Kosovo, and Bishop Artemije. The position of this organization began to
substantially change since the US envoy, Christopher Hill, started meeting
with its leaders... In the course of 1998, the two of them visited the US
on several occasions, and have frequent contacts with the embassies of
Western countries and Russia in Belgrade.
The people whose services Milosevic has discarded as no longer useful can
relatively easily establish ties with the member parties in the Alliance
for Change. One of the group's leaders, Nebojsa Covic, is also a former
Socialist party member, and he has close ties with the ex party vice
president, Milorad Vucelic, and especially with the ousted state security
head, Jovica Stanisic.
One other leader of the alliance, Vuk Obradovic, is a general of the
former Yugoslav People's Army, who still has close ties with military
structures, including the dismissed chief of staff, Gen. Perisic. Though
ever more numerous, Milosevic's opponents, however, are still incapable of
properly organizing themselves and establishing a firmer common political
platform. Therefore their effectiveness in removing the Yugoslav
president will ultimately depend on the strength and nature of the support
received from the international community.
8. THE NEXT BALKANS HOT SPOT?
The Christian Science Monitor -- December 1, 1998 (excerpts)
...International observers fear that Vojvodina could gain inspiration from
Serbia's other province, Kosovo, which was torn apart by a struggle for
autonomy, and eventually become another trouble spot in the Balkans. "We
are keeping our eyes on Vojvodina, especially this autonomous strain," says
a Western diplomat in Belgrade. "It may have a polarizing effect. Something
radical in Vojvodina could destabilize the region"...
[Pro-autonomy] politicians in Vojvodina have been gathering momentum for
years. Their platform is largely based on democratic reform and economic
freedom from the centralized government of Belgrade - which they see as the
best way to break Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's monopoly on power.
...Although Vojvodina is far from being another Kosovo, opinion polls
taken over the past four years indicate that the Vojvodina movement has
great potential to grow, with 65 percent of those questioned saying they
support greater autonomy and another 15 percent favoring republic status
that would make Vojvodina equal to Serbia and Montenegro...
But the comparisons stop there. Vojvodina is the richest part of Serbia,
Kosovo the poorest. Vojvodina was ruled for centuries by the
Austro-Hungarian empire, Kosovo by the Ottoman Turks. In Vojvodina, Serbs
are more than a 60 percent majority; in Kosovo, Albanians outnumber Serbs 9
to 1.
The Vojvodinian autonomy movement is led by Nenad Canak, a part-time rock
'n' roll musician who has been arrested at least twice for antiwar
activities. His plan is to encourage similar movements for greater autonomy
throughout the country and eventually make Yugoslavia a federation of
regions - somewhat like the United States.
Vojvodina, with its ethnic diversity and intellectualism, would be the
ideal place to start, he says.
Mr. Canak is careful to point out that he does not see autonomy as a step
toward outright independence, as many ethnic Albanian in Kosovo do. But he
is nevertheless labeled a "secessionist" by radical forces in Belgrade. "We
don't want independence, and we don't want to change the borders," he says.
"But our supporters are afraid [that what has happened in Kosovo will
happen in Vojvodina]. We can live with less money, but not in burned houses."
Canak is loosely allied with an ethnic Hungarian political party in the
north of Vojvodina, near the Hungarian border. Although the Hungarians
largely support Canak's vision, they also seek somewhat greater autonomy
based on language and cultural rights. According to Istvan Istvanovic, a
Hungarian leader in the city of Subotica, Hungarians are underrepresented
in the judiciary, education, and police systems. "We stand for the changing
of the constitutional position of Vojvodina," says Mr. Istvanovic. "But we
have certain misunderstandings with [the Serbs who want autonomy for
Vojvodina], because they think our concept will lead to ghettoization of
the Hungarians. They don't understand our problems."
The split among the Vojvodinian autonomists, however small, could weaken
the movement in the long run. "Autonomy [for Vojvodina] is a healthy idea,"
says a Western diplomat. "But I don't think it will happen."
9. WHAT IS "OTPOR"?
Independent weekly Vreme (Belgrade) - November 14, 1998 (excerpts)
VREME: What is "Otpor"?
MIROSLAV HRISTODULO [head of "Social Democratic Youth"]: Otpor is a
campaign, organized in an action way, not an organizational unity. Members
are the activists from other Student Unions, Student Federations, Student
Organizations, Initiatives,... from different Universities.
Q: How was "Otpor" established?
A: I remember how some two weeks ago, I got a peace of paper promoting
"Suggestion of Activities and For Disturbing of the University". It stated:
Monday-ETF [Faculty of Electrical Engineering], Tuesday-Philological Univ.,
Wednesday-Law Univ. ... Out of all these actions, only ETF one succeeded,
by itself. Now, it is starting on Philological Univ. Too. There were some
attempts on Law Univ.. Press service was established too, led bu Jovan
Ratkovic and marketing service. Then, the Crisis Center was organized...
Q: What is its goal?
A: The goal is to make some waves at the University, because of the
University Law and Information Law, to help people who are directly struck
by these new laws. All this started right after the bombing psychosis was
over. However, so many things are happening, so we always jump from one
issue to another, every single day. The goal gets defined day after day.
Some people's aim is to change the regime, some to win particular mandates,
some just to live better. But all these aims are connected. In any case,
all what is happening now, is acceptable to many people, because many of
them got involved.
VREME: Yesterday, during your interview for B92, you said that at the
beginning of "Otpor", there were only three, four people. Who?
RASTKO SEJIC [publicity, OTPOR]: Let's say all that started after the ETF's
protest. Then the protest on Law University happened. Our friends called us
to participate because we had some previous experience with student
protests, 96-97, and with some other things too.
Q: Action "Otpor" is led by two entities...
A: I would not like to talk about the actual organization, because I think
that it is better to keep it as a secret, not for the mystification
purposes, but because it may cause some problems... It is more important to
get exposed with some actions and to influence people in that way, calling
them for resistance. "Otpor" is not an organization, but an idea. There are
a group of people from different sides. There are people from...Student
Federation, non-governmental organizations, people from different
organizations and whole organizations...[Otpor] is an action. That is the
best word!
Q: What is the way to resist?
A: We will give rise, ways and ideas to the people. There were four people
arrested, and as it was stated, they were convected because they were
attempting to repeat that incident. Well, if this is my town, then I think
there will be 500 fists/graffiti in 15 days.
Q: OK, let's all start buying spray paint. Is it going to come out that JUL
is the main importer of it?
They do not profit from that when we create some consciousness about civil
resistance. One of the first petition signers for release of our arrested
colleagues is professor Radomir Reljic. On that occasion, he said that we
are dealing with humongous dying reptile who is waiving with its tail and
hits/crashes everything around, not seeing what he's crashing.
F. US policy on Belgrade viewed
10. MADE IN USA
Column by Stojan Cerovic, independent weekly Vreme (Belgrade) -- December
5, 1998 (excerpts)
The Serbian opposition just got the support it had been counting on for so
long. Even Washington has joined a Milosevic "enemies club," while
admitting that all these past years, it had been relying on him. Of course,
it is better now than never, but this time this delay cost a lot. There was
too much death and destruction while people were waiting for the biggest
power to make the conclusion that "Milosevic was in the center of all
Yugoslav crises the last decade".
Many people did not experience it, many avoided him, or gave up, or have
lost hope, or even joined him. In the meantime, all peoples are in sorrow,
while the Serb nation was brought to the insanity level. Again, in the
meantime, any hope or belief in democracy, law, rights, order, and common
sense are defeated. Milosevic's Serbia approached Seselj and JUL. Not even
America was able to prevent those events, but in the beginning it did not
want to even try...
The opposition, which will be supported by Washington, had its bright
moments, but it is not in good standing right now, and it obviously was not
a reason why America changed its relationship with Milosevic. However, it
would be nice to see if this is the case of a total turn-around. One could
think that the State Department's statement was just a way of applying
public pressure on Belgrade in order to soften its attitude towards Kosovo,
so if Milosevic would agree with that, he could again become a "stability
factor".
However, I do not believe that this is what it is about, this time. Now,
Washington put itself under no ambiguous obligation, which would seem that
there are no more concessions for Milosevic and that no one like Holbrooke
will come here any more. It appears that that negotiator, who got famous
when eating from Milosevic's hand, somehow gained disfavor in Washington.
Finally someone had realized that Milosevic's concessions are always
temporary or imminent, or both; therefore Holbrooke's achievements are more
TV spectacle than realistic...
It appears that the last couple of changes, in the highest military
rankings and Ministry of Internal Affairs, together with the choking of
media, just made Washington's belief stronger that Milosevic is getting
ready for tight defense and that he insists on being against everything
that could remind him of Western values. It looks like they [the US] are
sick of dealing with him forever, because he seems to be starting a new
crisis in Montenegro even before he closes the doors on Kosovo. Anyhow,
America has promised not to extinguish local fires with help from the main
arsonist, but will aim at him particulary. He [Milosevic] can prolong his
existence and somehow return into the game by sacrificing, for instance
Seselj, which would be positively received [by international community].
The question is if that would be enough, but Vuk Draskovic counts on it and
claims that he is the only democratic opposition in Serbia, while in the
same time, he protects Milosevic. He recommends himself as a support to
Americans and to him [Milosevic] , but I think that all of them see him as
a willow's wedge.
I believe that Milosevic has crossed the final border for tactical
withdrawal and concessions; therefore it seems like he is going to burst.
His relationship with Seselj is not as pragmatic as Draskovic hopes. That
relationship is natural and is a deep reflection of the developed orbit of
that regime, which had reached Seselj thanks to the force of gravity. That
is why Seselj talks in the name of the whole regime and looks more
authentic than Milosevic and his wife together. He is their foster child
and no one has the right to ask them to get rid of him. If they can not
continue together with him, it does not mean that they could cope without him.
So, if Seselj stays, that would mean that the regime will use any tools to
attack those who America would like to help. All political activity and all
brutality will be aimed at the opposition, independent media,
non-governmental organizations and students. Washington's promise of
support could have worse consequences than the NATO threat. In this case,
it would have been better if no one from Washington had promised anything
publicly, because if the hunt for 'American' agents starts, any sort of
help will be delayed.
No one should hope that America can remove this regime just in two days.
Especially not the opposition, which should not wait for America to install
them. That is not the way it happens, although here people believe that
outer powers always solve inner problems. And because people believe in
those powers, they [the people] turn against everything that comes from
outside, thinking that it does not matter anyway, that it will not cost
them anything and will not change anything, either. That means that the
opposition has to be rather cautious and careful, so that the American
support will not 'cost' them more than the support of Serbian citizens.
