.A) News Summary (Part I, in previous e-mail -- Compiled from news and wire
reports): Political and economic developments in Serbia; Serbia vs. Montenegro;
Vojvodina and Sandzak; media; universities; regional issues; international
scene; Belgrade vs. Tribunal
REPORTS FROM REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA (Part II)
B) Politics in Belgrade
1. POLITICAL SCENE IN SERBIA
2. TESTIMONY OF OPPOSITION LEADER NEBOJSA COVIC BEFORE THE CONGRESSIONAL
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
C) Serbia and Montenegro
3.SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO - BELGRADE AS THE THREAT
D) US Policy on Serbia viewed
4. AMERICA HAS TURNED ITS BACK ON MILOSEVIC
5. SHEER COERCION
E)International Criminal Tribunal
6. PRESS CONFERENCE BY HAROLD KOH, US ASSISTANT OF STATE FOR DEMOCRACY,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN SERBIA
B) Politics in Belgrade
1. POLITICAL SCENE IN SERBIA
Independent news service BETA (Belgrade) -- December 10, 1998 (excerpts)
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic has not yet embarked on purges in
the Yugoslav Army, as was expected following his midNovember dismissal of the
chief of staff, General Momcilo Perisic...
Sources close to Perisic say that...General Perisic will continue to
oppose Milosevic and is also showing political ambitions. Allegedly, Perisic
could go public with such ambitions as early as the beginning of January, but
he seems unwilling to join any opposition political party, convinced that he
would be successful by acting alone. Sources close to Perisic said that further
purges of numerous officers close to Perisic had been delayed because the
outcome of such action is not certain to be successful.
One of the candidates for the position of deputy chief of staff is the
commander of the Yugoslav Army Pristina Corps, General Nebojsa Pavkovic. "A
possible appointment of Pavkovic to this position would be a clear sign that
the new chief of staff should fully submit himself to Milosevic's will," said
BETA's source. He added that General Pavkovic is quite close to the ruling
political bloc and that, starting last August, he had succumbed to political
pressure and agreed to engage the army in the operations in Kosovo. The source
added that General Pavkovic had allowed himself to be ordered by the Yugoslav
Deputy Prime Minister and envoy of the Yugoslav President for Kosovo, Nikola
Sainovic, to use the army in "purely police actions." The commander of the
Pristina Corps has twice been specially promoted, and at the end of summer he
and his corps were publicly commended by the Yugoslav president.
The source in the General Staff also said that top military circles
close to Perisic believe that "the affair is not yet concluded," and that there
is still room to fend off Milosevic's intent to continue with the purge in the
army, similar to the one in the security service that had followed the
dismissal of its head, Jovica Stanisic, last October. In less than a month,
all more prominent Stanisic's associates have been removed from the service.
According to the source, Perisic's supporters will not abandon attempts to
prevent similar developments in the army...
"We have evidence that the decision to dismiss General Perisic was
accompanied by movement of police troops. This indicates that Milosevic was,
and remains, seriously concerned over possible consequences of this decision.
If the opposite was the case, the whole operation would have been carried out
publicly, and Perisic would have been invited to attend the council session.
Normally, the chief of staff is expected to attend all council's sessions," the
source said.
Military sources ascribe Perisic's dismissal to old rows between the
army and police. Namely, for years now Milosevic has been rather successful in
marginalizing the army, while at the same time he has been strengthening and
equipping the police forces completely loyal to him. It is believed that the
decision to dismiss Perisic was a direct consequence of the chief of staff's
strong opposition to the proposal that from the 1999 budget only 11 billion
dinars should be set aside for the army...
As opposed to the army in which the situation is not yet fully
resolved,
the state security service has already been completely subordinated to
Milosevic and the interests of the radically disposed circles within the
Socialist Party of Serbia and the Yugoslav Left. The newlyappointed head of
the service, Rade Markovic, has been promoted to the rank of police general,
the highest police rank.
Markovic is close to the Yugoslav Left and is possibly even its
member.
Appointments of new department heads in the state security are under way and in
them, according to sources close to the service, the crucial role is played by
the Yugoslav Left Director Mirjana Markovic, the wife of Yugoslav President
Slobodan Milosevic.
The same sources say that in changes of the personnel structure in the
state security in general, the Yugoslav Left also has the last word and that
this "causes unease and discontent of the personnel" loyal to the Socialist
Party. The arrival of a number of Yugoslav Left adherents in this sensitive
area has provoked discontent of prominent members of the Socialist Party who
asked from Milosevic to appoint "their man" to one of the more important
positions in the service. Milosevic complied by naming as Markovic's deputy
for political issues the former party official Uros Suvakovic... The
appointment of incompetent but fully obedient apparatchiks, such as Suvakovic,
only confirms that the Serbian and Yugoslav political leadership is becoming
increasingly upset and nervous with the escalation of the Kosovo crisis and the
growing pressure of the international community.
Belgrade has responded rather nervously to an announcement by
Washington
that it will alter its course towards Milosevic and extend support to the
democratic opposition in Serbia. This shows that Milosevic is seriously
worried that even such a weak opposition might oust him if given more
substantial foreign support.
...Analysts in Belgrade have different views regarding the
organization's prospects for success. A prominent political analyst, Ognjen
Pribicevic believes that the West has seriously reconsidered its policy towards
Milosevic and that, for the time being, its most serious partner in Serbia is
the Alliance for Change. On the other hand, a sociologist and the leading
Yugoslav political polls expert Srbobran Brankovic, says the latest research
has shown that the opposition rating is rather low, and that in fact the
opposition leaders are "politically dead." In Brankovic's view, the
alternative lies in creating a government of independent experts that will
enjoy the support of opposition parties, which is a solution favored by certain
circles in the Serb diaspora as well...
2. TESTIMONY OF NEBOJSA COVIC, COORDINATOR OF OPPOSITION "ALLIANCE FOR
CHANGE," BEFORE THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN
EUROPE
Washington, DC -- December 10, 1998 (excerpt)
At this moment, Milosevic has absolute power in Serbia. The source of
that power is much more important than the fact that the power exists. There
are many misunderstandings about the source of power. It is not...the ability
of a ruler, it is not the support of the people... it is the unscrupulous,
ruthless manipulation with people and with their livesdestinies.
All analyses of the behavior of Slobodan Milosevic starting from the
prejudice that Milosevic has a political attitude, i. e. that it is determined,
are erroneous. He is pathologically linked to power. He adapts himself
perfectly to all changes, and channels all modalities of his behavior in order
to stay in power, regardless of the political card he has to use in such
endeavors.
Milosevic is not a communist, but he takes advantage of an important
part of the electoral body in Serbia. These are mainly people of middle age,
who grew in communism. The picture of communism became in the minds of those
people an emotion, which is consciously being transformed into a new myth about
the "happy days". To that aim, he uses skillfully the symbols and the
remembrances of communism. He uses constantly the terms: equality, social
justice, humanity, solidarity...He is constantly harboring the illusion of the
people that such a time will come again, and keeps the people in a kind of time
quarantine.
Milosevic is not a nationalist, either. He transformed nationalism
into
destructive xenophobia and chauvinism again in order to create insecurity,
dependence, fear the basic mechanisms for the crashing of every kind of
resistance and of every kind of free thinking as well. The concept of the
Greater Serbia, which lie marketed skillfully through the attitudes of others,
was only used for taking advantage of the awoken national charge.
Besides, the source of his power is the legitimacy given de facto
to him
by the International Community. He.. is elevated above the constitution, above
the parliament and above all state institutions,. but also above the will of
the majority of the citizens of this country. The sanctions of the
International Community, still in force, are the confirmation of the legitimacy
of Milosevic as the representative of the entire nation. In such a situation
the life of the people becomes increasingly difficult, and people blame for
that the International Community, while Milosevic and his entourage manipulate
the people in a much easier way, with less effort. Everything is reduced to
the statement: "The whole world hates us but we are here to save you."
Slobodan Milosevic bases his power on three basic levers: the
media; the
financial institutions and the big economic systems; and the secret police.
Using the state television RTS and other media of his, Milosevic
assures
absolutely controlled information in the entire territory of Serbia. Every
single event is resented in a way which is appropriate for Milosevic and his
ruling group. Every contact with the international community, regardless of
the results and the outcome of the talks, is presented as a new proof that the
international community can not avoid him, that his policy won.
By controlling the money flow, Milosevic prevents the creation of the
economic basis of the forces which could endanger him, and makes it possible to
those obedient to him on. important places (in banks and big economic systems)
to become enormously rich. In that way, he assures himself from possible blows
coming from that side. No financial institution in Serbia is liquid in the
strict economic sense, and all of them are based on the goodwill of Milosevic
and on their links with the National Bank of Yugoslavia, which is also
controlled by Milosevic. He knows at every moment, thanks to the secret police,
what are the plans of the opposition, and takes moves accordingly.
The opposition became at one moment the victim of the general demagogy,
by treating the national question as THE QUESTION. However, the opposition was
not defeated by appeals to the national feelings. The opposition lost the
battle because the people were "conditioned", in panic of the "doomsday", when
their nation will be lost, will vanish from the planet. The highlight of the
manipulation is the opium in the form of "heavenly people." The opposition was
not ready to avoid that trap, to stay outside it.
The Alliance for Changes learned that lesson. This nation is not
endangered from outside, but from inside. The nation has been manipulated by
already seen, but extremely destructive methods. This nation needs help in
order to find a way from its hypnotic dream. The support of the International
Community may shorten the period of awakening, may mitigate the consequences of
the return to reality. The Alliance for Changes is dealing with the substance
of the situation, not with the consequences. By making the true diagnosis of
the situation in Serbia, the Alliance for Changes a strategy of a struggle
which does not comprise a frontal attack against the system, but, on the
contrary, unmasks that destructive and anticivilizational creation. The
Alliance for Changes struggles for all individuals, for their right to the
freedom of choice. The free thinking representatives of this nation shall
revive its creative power, shall acquire for it the place in the International
Community to which it is historically entitled.
C) Serbia and Montenegro
3.SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO - BELGRADE AS THE THREAT
Independent news service BETA (Belgrade) -- December 10, 1998
Montenegro is living in perpetual expectation of a new attack from
Belgrade on the reform oriented authorities in that republic personified in
President Milo Djukanovic. Among those authorities, the belief prevails that
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic will attempt to oust Djukanovic on
January 14. This is the date set by the opposition Socialist People's Party
for demonstrations in Podgorica. That party is headed by the Federal Prime
Minister Momir Bulatovic, Djukanovic's chief political rival and a close
associate of Milosevic.
For years Djukanovic and Bulatovic had been close associates, having
come to power thanks to the fact that they helped Milosevic oust the previous
political leaders of Montenegro, at the end of the eighties. They drifted
apart last year, when Djukanovic decided to turn a new leaf, implement certain
economic and political reforms, seek reproachment with the world, and turn his
back on his old mentor in Belgrade. Bulatovic failed to follow suit, instead
opting for less risk, that is to stay by Milosevic's side.
Bulatovic and Djukanovic who had until then been the closest of
friends,
became bitter political rivals, at the same time causing a rift among the small
number of voters in that republic, as they split between the two opposing
factions.
In the presidential elections held in Montenegro a year ago, Djukanovic
defeated Bulatovic. Bulatovic's supporters tried to prevent Djukanovic's
presidential inauguration on January 14 last year by organizing mass protests
in Podgorica. In the ensuing scuffle at least 40 policemen and three
demonstrators were injured. In any case the attempt to sabotage Djukanovic's
inauguration did not succeed, which meant that Belgrade had given up on the
idea of ousting him.
Considering the fact that the neoreformer Djukanovic received strong
international support it was not easy for Milosevic to realize that intention.
Many believe that the anniversary of the conflict will pose an opportunity to
now finish the job.
Podgorica does not recognize the federal government since Milosevic
appointed Bulatovic to be prime minister, claiming that he had been elected
irrespective of the will of the Montenegrin legislature. Sources in Podgorica
and Belgrade assess that there is practically no outlook for a deal to be
struck between Djukanovic and Milosevic, and that the Serbian authorities will
not relent from their intention to oust the current and install a regime that
would be loyal to them in Podgorica.
The Federation
Disagreements and conflicts are multiplying between Belgrade and
Podgorica in recent days. All of last week was marked by conflicts between the
Montenegrin and federal authorities. Montenegro refused last week to implement
a federal government decision to charge transit tax on all trucks transporting
goods from Slovenia via Yugoslavia. Since Montenegrin Premier Filip Vujanovic
had only days earlier visited Podgorica, where he had talks with Slovenian
officials regarding economic cooperation with Slovenia, the decision to
implement the transit tax on Slovenian goods was interpreted in Podgorica as an
act, the sole purpose of which was to make more difficult cooperation between
Montenegro and Slovenia.
The upper chamber of the Yugoslav parliament met in Belgrade on
December
3, without the participation of MPs from Montenegro. Both of Yugoslavia's
republics have twenty members each in the house. Instead the old members of
the chamber, those who had served before the election of Djukanovic, and who
are loyal to Bulatovic were invited to attend the session. Montenegro made it
clear that it would not honor the laws adopted at the session. MPs of the upper
house adopted a declaration condemning the US over its sharp criticism of
Milosevic, which in Montenegro caused a negative effect, even evoking ridicule.
Continuing the practice of ignoring the authorities in Montenegro, the
regime in Belgrade last week made a new move to strengthen ties with
Bulatovic's political option. Representatives of his Socialist People's Party
and of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia met to set a joint strategy for the
"preservation" of Yugoslavia. Podgorica saw the meeting as an attempt by
Belgrade to tighten the reign on Djukanovic and pave the way for his ouster.
Tactics
Montenegrin authorities continue to abide by the tactic which is
limited
to maintaining the acquired degree of autonomy, without showing any intention
of taking radical steps against Belgrade. In keeping with the tactic of
"passive resistance," the ruling coalition in Montenegro only last week
announced that it had started to prepare new resistance measures to be
implemented should Milosevic decided to attack Podgorica or incite turmoil.
Advocates of a more radical stand towards Belgrade among the
Montenegrin
authorities believe that the preparations for the "defense of Montenegro" are
running late and they have criticized Djukanovic over that. Political analysts
in Podgorica, however, believe that the Montenegrin President has room to be
somewhat complacent, since he enjoys international support, while the situation
at home is relatively stable. Also, the authorities in Montenegro believe they
are much better prepared to face Milosevic now than they were a year ago.
Djukanovic enjoys the following of "a critical mass" of the population,
guaranteeing him an advantage over forces close to Belgrade in that republic.
The pivotal role in the matter was played by Montenegro's state and independent
media which give full coverage of each step against Montenegro taken by
Milosevic, letting renowned politicians and experts from Belgrade and Podgorica
interpret and criticize those steps. Thanks to this, the majority of the
population has a negative view of moves taken by the Serbian authorities.
"The conflict with Milosevic will escalate, and we are expecting it,
because crisis are the life line of his regime," said to BETA a source close to
Djukanovic's office. Emphasizing that it is very important to avoid bloodshed,
Montenegrin officials share the unanimous opinion it is important not to allow
the announced gathering of the supporters of the Socialist People's Party in
Podgorica to turn into strife. The only factor not allowing peace of mind to
Montenegrin officials at the moment is how, should there be any conflicts, the
Yugoslav army will react. During the demonstrations in Podgorica last January,
the then army Chief of Staff General Momcilo Perisic reject Milosevic's demand
to engage the army in support of Bulatovic. In October Perisic was replaced as
the Yugoslav Army Chief of Staff and it remains uncertain how his successor,
the new chief of staff, General Dragoljub Ojdanic will react.
Montenegrin officials for now express the hope that General Ojdanic
will
continue "to perform his duties professionally." They have even announced that
they will continue to set aside funds for the military budget and emphasize
that they will support the Yugoslav Army as long as it performs its
constitutional functions. However, reports printed in the Monitor independent
weekly that the commander of the Second Army which covers Montenegro, General
Radoslav Martinovic, could be recalled to Belgrade, were quite disquieting.
Martinovic was not only a friend of the ousted Perisic, he also has quite "good
relations with the Montenegrin President Djukanovic," said to BETA sources
close to the Montenegrin President. While NATO was threatening Belgrade with
military intervention, Djukanovic had met with Martinovic and Admiral Milan
Zec, stationed in Montenegro, who gave their guarantees that the army units
deployed in Montenegro will not offer an excuse for that republic to become
involved in a conflict with the western alliance. The replacement of
Martinovic could be a signal of more offensive measures that could be taken by
Belgrade against Podgorica.
D)US Policy on Serbia viewed
4. AMERICA HAS TURNED ITS BACK ON MILOSEVIC
Independent daily Danas (Belgrade) -- December 15, 1998
After all those talks we had with congressional representatives and the
American Administration, it is clear that the Washington administration has
resolved to turn its back on Milosevic and the authorities in Serbia. They [the
USA] will turn to those who are fighting for democracy, for human rights in
Serbia and for prosperity in the economical sense. But, there is a little
problem there and that is that they [the USA] do not have a clear picture of
which forces or movements deserve their support - said Boris Karajicic, Senior
student of the Philological University and representative of "Otpor" during
yesterday's press conference, who presented this movement to the delegation of
the Human Rights Committee in the US Congress. Besides the representatives of
"Otpor", the delegation of the Union for Changes and some independent media
also visited the US and its authorities.
Karajicic emphasized that he presented "Otpor" as an student movement
and he reminded them [the USA] that the platform for further actions is much
wider, so that all those who fight against repression in society should stand
by slogan "Otpor".
Karajicic stated that "All forces/parties/movements in Serbia who think
that the cause of all causes is the democratization of Serbia, should agree
with unpolitical action. Some parties and political options have no chance to
impose on the people the power of change and that is why "Otpor" is speaking in
favor of the Polish model - a model which would unite people based on civilian
principles.
When asked if "Otpor" got only verbal support from the USA, Karajicic
stated that no material help was given this time, but that the American
administration is ready to help in that way, supporting projects that fight for
the autonomy of the University and for changes in Serbia.
Karajicic concluded: "Whether we are going to get that sort of help
depends on our project and seriousness."
Washington Post has sent 200 questions to the FRY president and out of
those 200, six of his answers were chosen and published on the hundredth and
something page in the Sunday edition. "About that interview published in
Politika, I do not know if it was copied, but I know that was not the way that
it was published in WP" said Karajicic, while answering a question about
Milosevic's interview as taken from the Washington Post, which was published on
more than couple of pages in Politika. He [Karajicic] noted that the Washington
Post wrote about the Belgrade delegation in the same issue on the third page.
5.SHEER COERCION
Official daily Vecernje Novosti (Belgrade) -- December 6, 1998
The US administration has abandoned the least bit of politeness in its
diplomatic relations with sovereign states and recently went beyond the limits
in orchestrating its pressure on Serbia and Yugoslavia. The day after State
Department Spokesman James Rubin took the stand and, with his contemptible
carnival diplomacy, voiced unacceptable statements about the President of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, thus exceeding the limit of interferance in a
sovereign state's internal affairs, Rubin's boss Madeleine Albright launched an
even fiercer assault on the President.
Under the veil of defending freedom of speech across the world, of
which
the United States is the selfproclaimed guardian, Mrs. Albright classified
Serbia among countries "such as North Korea, Cuba, Iraq, Burma, and Libya" on
this issue. Albright said the US administration "strongly opposed" the
clampdown on the independent media in Serbia and directly blamed the Yugoslav
President for its suppression.
Undoubtedly the new wave of US "underground diplomacy" is a direct
response to the harsh tone of the Federal Assembly declaration condemning the
flagrant interference of the world's superpower in the internal affairs of
Serbia and Yugoslavia, although the background to the uncontrollable coercion
against our country is certainly an effort by the US administration to strive
with all available means to weaken Belgrade's position in the negotiations that
should lead to a solution to the Kosovo crisis.
Mrs. Albright does not at all like to see Serbia and Yugoslavia's
determination to resist the secession of Kosovo and Metohija with all possible
means and to reject Hill's plan, that is, the US plan, for Kosmet [Kosovo and
Metohija] pointblank particularly if it exceeds by even an inch the framework
of autonomy for Serbia's southern province envisaged under the highest
international standards, but only within Serbia and Yugoslavia. Serbia's
position that Kosmet is an inalienable part of its territory glaringly
contradicts a heinous threat by the US Secretary of State, who said at one
point that "Kosmet will be in Serbia, but there will be no Serbia in Kosmet."
Bearing in mind the desire of the US diplomacy to arrange relations in
Kosmet and the Balkans to suit the new world order, of which Washington is the
inviolable executor, we should have no doubts that the US hawks, with Madeleine
Albright as their champion, will build up the pressure on our state as the time
approaches for the Kosmet knot to be unraveled. Only the naive can believe it
could be otherwise.
E)International criminal tribunal
6. PRESS CONFERENCE BY HAROLD KOH, US ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR
The Hague -- December 14, 1998 (excerpts)
Question: Are you going to Yugoslavia to monitor the investigation of the
Vukovar Three?
Answer: That's not the only reason but that's at least part of the objective.
We'll be arriving tomorrow night and we'll be meeting with NGO leaders. And on
Wednesday morning we'll be meeting with a number of members of the cabinet of
the FRY, and then at noon we have a scheduled meeting with Milosevic. It's not
a coincidence that the Vukovar Three are scheduled to be presented for a
military hearing on Thursday. So we're hoping to have a frank and full
conversation on that subject.
I think our basic message is that there have been a whole series of
obstructions and examples of gross noncompliance with the tribunal and its
activities. They include barring the access of investigators to Kosovo; the
failure over a number of years to implement commitments, to implement into
domestic law an obligation to cooperate with the work of the tribunal; the
failure to produce General Mladic, who is widely believed to be in the FRY; and
now the latest: a fairly blatant indication that they do not respect the
primacy of the tribunal on issues over which the tribunal plainly has
jurisdiction.
The tribunal has now as of Friday issued an opinion, making it clear
that they believe that deferral to the tribunal's jurisdiction is appropriate,
and I think that's going to come to a head on Thursday.
I think the main message from our point of view is that this is not
just
one incident, or a series of isolated incidents, which could be defended on a
variety of technical legal grounds by Milosevic, but that it is part of a
pattern and practice of systematic noncompliance with the tribunal, to which he
is committed by prior agreement to comply. And it again confirms the view that
was expressed strongly by our (the State) Department over the past few weeks
that it's clear that Milosevic is the problem. He's not just part of the
problem, but he is the problem. Until steps are taken to address these issues,
there will continue to be instability in the region.
Q: What measures are the U.S. or the U.N. ready to take? Because there has been
talk about this for months.
A: I think these measures (are) under discussion and certainly I am not free
to discuss any internal negotiations but it is clear that with regard to
flouting of Security Council resolutions there will be a resort back to a full
discussion within the Security Council as to how to respond. I think one of the
complicating factors for the ICTY is that the ultimate enforcement mechanism is
the Security Council itself.
As you know, the Security Council has a set of particular procedures
that have to be negotiated. Last week, our government strongly condemned
Belgrade for failing to cooperate with the ICTY, and has clearly expressed its
desire to take that matter back before the Security Council. And to enforce
previous resolutions, particularly Resolution 1207.
Q: Do you know what form eventual actions by the UN Security Council would
take?
A: It could take the form of sanctions, increased sanctions. This is under
discussion, and certainly additional resolutions ought to be considered. I
think certainly direct conversations with Milosevic should be held, making
clear the United States' and the Security Council's dissatisfaction with these
matters.
As you know, President McDonald sent a letter to the Security Council.
And I am not completely appraised of all the different responses. The view that
there has been a flouting of the Security Council is widely shared by the
members who have been polled.
Q: But this has been going on for years since '96. The tribunal may well in
FRY be viewed as a sham; what more can we do to get Milosevic to comply?
A: Part of it is a clear identification of Milosevic as someone who is the
problem, and that, although because of his control he has been someone also to
be dealt with. The U.S. has very strongly signaled this last week its
conviction that it cannot expect profitable dealings with Milosevic, unless
three conditions obtain: some degree of respect for autonomy and selfgovernment
in Kosovo; full cooperation with the tribunal; and democracy in Serbia itself.
All three of these goals are being very severely compromised by his
current activities. And the reason that I am going, frankly, is to investigate
and report on this to the secretary (of state). I think that there is a very
high degree of concern on this issue by the United States government, and a
question whether a further response is now appropriate in light of what appears
to be a concerted effort to defy the tribunal.
Q: What about the stand of the Russians in the UNSC?
A: Well I think that this is a subject for negotiation. It does seem that if
the Russians are committed to a tribunal that can play the role that we want it
to play, they will have to understand just exactly what it is, namely a
rejection of what the tribunal is all about: an effort to create an
international system which can promote accountability in the former Yugoslavia
by rendering justice.
Concealing war criminals from the jurisdiction of the tribunal; refusing to
allow investigators access into the scene of atrocities; having proceedings
that are designed to avoid the jurisdiction of the tribunal are all signs of a
direct, not just indifference to, but rejection of the goals of the tribunal
that the Security Council, including the Russians, took great pains to
establish.
