Financial Times, 12 January 1999, page 12

Saving Kosovo from itself

PERSONAL VIEW OF CARL BILDT

Nato has a bigger stake than any other organisation in preventing war in Kosovo. It is there that it must prove that it can preserve peace in Europe.

If tensions in Kosovo continue to escalate, the province could be plunged into a full-blown war before winter gives way to spring. And Nato leaders, meeting in Washington in April for the organisation's 50th anniversary, could well be facing their first failure to deter war in a generation.

The last international attempt to mediate in the conflict between Albanian separatists and Serbian security forces was in October, when Richard Holbrooke, the US special envoy, put pressure on Slobodan Milosevic, the Yugoslav president, to agree to the deployment of civilian observers to monitor a reduction of Serbian troops in the region.

But this was never going to be more than a stop-gap measure, designed to buy time for political talks to get under way. It was hoped that an interim arrangement on autonomy for Kosovo would be ready by early November.

But the talks hardly got off the ground. Different US drafts have swung like a pendulum between the two sides, with neither of them showing any real interest in reaching a settlement.

In the meantime, the security situation continues to deteriorate. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has reeestablished control over large parts of the province after having been driven back by a Serb offensive last summer.

Armed incidents are proliferating. Civilians are being armed. There is a real threat of civil strife in areas where Serbs and Albanians still live close to each other. The conflict might soon react the cities.

Kosovo is now at a dangerous impasse. Stalemate on the political front has made it more difficult to control outbreaks of violence, while the escalation of conflict is blocking progress on political negotiations.

Without outside pressure there is virtually no prospect of the opponents coming to an agreement by themselves. They are both bent on conflict. Each side believes can prevail upon its adversary, no matter what the international community is saying.

There are limits to what outside forces can do in order to bring peace to Kosovo. But the international community must try to prevent the escalation of a conflict that threatens to destabilise the Balkans and visit even more human suffering on its people.

The presence of 1,500 unarmed verifiers will no doubt be useful, as will Nato air power in the region and the deterrent effect of a European "extraction" force in Macedonia, which is on standby in case verifiers get into difficulties.

But this is hardly enough. As long as military pressure is not exerted on all sides to the conflict, it will scarcely be possible to move the political process forward.

Nato has made it clear that it is ready to use its air power against Serbia. But it has little leverage over Kosovo's ethnic Albanian separatists. This seriously undermines the possibility of political progress.

In an earlier stage of the conflict, the Albanian government asked Nato to sta-

tion forces along its border with Kosovo. its immediate concern was to deter Serbian cross-border raids against KLA bases.

The reluctance of Nato to deploy forces in northern Albania has impaired efforts

to work towards a settlement. Clashes in the border region between Yugoslav forces and the KLA have become frequent and can be expected to intensify. But as a result of the cross-border incursions, it has also become more difficult to demand a reduction of Serbia's military presence in the province. Meanwhile, it has become virtually impossible to exert serious pressure on the KLA, which has been building its forces in northern Albania.

If, however, Nato were to seal the border between Albania and Yugoslavia, and if Nato and the United Nations reinforced their presence in Macedonia, the international community would have substantial more leverage over the two sides in the conflict. The longer Nato prevaricates, the more likely Kosovo will head for open war.

There is no doubt that a deployment of Nato ground forces in northern Albania would scale up international involvement in the region. But so far, governments have been reluctant to consider this option, hoping that what has been done so far should suffice.

This is manifestly not the case. And it will be impossible to avoid further commitment. An international peacekeeping force would be needed if the two sides agreed to an interim political pact. On the other hand, should the war escalate, sooner or later an even larger foreign intervention force would be required.

Nato's stake is bigger than any other international organisation in the success or failure of efforts to bring peace to Kosovo.

In the early stages of the conflict in Bosnia, it was easy to blame the European Union, and then the inadequacy of the UN's response. But in Kosovo, it is Nato that has taken on the issue of war and peace. It is there that Nato must prove whether it can preserve peace in Europe.

While the task of Nato is to prevent war, other players should also be prepared to work for peace. Europeans, Americans and Russians must begin to consider the long-term problems that afflict the Balkans.

Towards the end of the last century, instability in the Balkans was a constant threat to Europe. The situation may now be different, but nevertheless, we must not forget the lessons of history. If we cannot deter war in the Balkans, if we fail to give the region a more stable political structure, then we will not be able to say we have peace in Europe.

The author is a former Swedish prime minister and international peace envoy to Bosnia.