Note: Place names rendered primarily in Serbian spelling"For the Kosovar Albanians, I'd like to say that this is a chance, not just
to stop your people from getting killed, but to take control of your
destiny, where your rights, your faith and your culture are respected, and
you have the autonomy you have been promised by law. For the Serbs, this
is a chance to prove Kosovo can remain part of your country while regaining
its autonomy and peace. For the people of both communities, this is a
chance to stop wasting your energies and your lives on a useless war and to
start conserving them for building a more open and prosperous future for
your children."
President Bill Clinton
February 4, 1999 - Washington
"The Europeans are acting in the wake of what they see as an American failure."
Dr. Dominique Moisi, French Institute for International Relations
Quoted by Christian Science Monitor, February 4, 1999 - Paris
"It would be wrong to exaggerate the role of the US in these talks. The
Americans are not going to be so present on the ground in the event of a
deal, which gives us a bigger role in the negotiations."
Unnamed French diplomat
Quoted by Reuters, February 5, 1999
"There has been a lot of criticism...that NATO was not able to act much
sooner in dealing with the humanitarian crisis that was looming last fall
when we came up and testified. We had roughly three or four hundred
thousand people who were up in the hills in Kosovo about to either freeze
or starve to death. And there was a lot of criticism, saying, 'Well, why
hasn't NATO taken any action?' And it took the leadership of the United
States to persuade the other members of NATO that NATO could act on its
own, without the need to seek a U.N. Security Council resolution."
US Secretary of Defense William Cohen, US Senate Armed Services Committee
hearing
February 3, 1999 - Washington
"So if you get a smaller force and the [possible NATO implementation force
to go into Kosovo] came out to be 20,000, our numbers could be very low,
down maybe possibly as low as 2000 to 4000. And I would see that being the
maximum number that we would be asked to contribute, even if they decided
to go in with 30,000."
General Henry Shelton, Chairman, Joint Chiefs US Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing
February 3, 1999 - Washington
"The draft plan would...reduce the number of Serbian troops in [Kosovo] to
4,000 or 5,000."
New York Times, February 3, 1999
"The more Yugoslav troops in Kosovo, the more NATO soldiers there will have
to be."
Unnamed diplomatic source
Quoted by The Times (London), February 5, 1999 - London
"I think that to a great extent the Kosovo problem is a drain on
[Milosevic], and he knows also that he is rapidly losing any support in the
international community. And he wants to at some stage reenter the
international community. He has to weigh what is more important to him,
whether going forward with an endless struggle... or whether making an
agreement that provides an interim period of peace, and allows him to at
least think about in some way coming back into some kind of better
reputation with the international community. He has to see that it is a
practical it is an outcome for him that is useful."
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
Interviewed on Lehrer News Hour, February 4, 1999 - Washington
". . . if you don't oppose the violence, it just gets worse and worse and
worse until finally you do oppose it at a much higher price, under more
dangerous conditions."
President Bill Clinton
February 4, 1999 - Washington
I. DISPLACED PERSONS/KILLINGS/ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS/POPULATION CENTERS UNDER
SIEGE
Reuters reported yesterday that "three ethnic Albanians were killed in
three separate incidents overnight in Kosovo... KVM [OSCE Kosovo
Verification Mission] said the three were male civilians found dead in a
white car."
Independent news service ARTA (Pristina) Wednesday cited local sources
saying "The 'Yugoslav' army (VJ), threatened that 'the second Re ak' would
occur in the Gjakov municipal village of Goden, which lies close to the
Albanian border... According to these sources, VJ forces raided all houses
in the village, asking the local people to 'hand in terrorists,' and taking
50 men out of their houses by force. Those Albanian men were taken to the
center of the village, where they were provoked and threatened with the
'Re ak scenario,' local sources claim. This incident was repeated twice, on
28 and 29 January. The men were kept for six hours on both occasions,
[according to independent Pristina daily Koha Ditore]. There are also
claims that four concentration camps are built in four different parts of
this village. Due to the deteriorated security situation, locals close
themselves in their homes after 4:00 PM." ARTA also noted February 4 that
"in Kline municipality, Albanians...have to report to the armed Serbs,
whenever they expect visits, otherwise their guests, especially males
between 16-60 years old, will be arrested and accused of being KLA [Kosovo
Liberation Army] members."
The Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) reported yesterday "the
Stimlje MTS [Mother Theresa Society humanitarian organization] clinic
reports that it is very low on medicines, blankets, and clothing for the
estimated 5,000 IDPs [internally displaced persons] in the region. The
clinic treats up to 120 patients (70% children) each day." KDOM reported
Wednesday that "NGOs are very active in the Podujevo and Racak areas with
efforts to help the hundreds of IDPs created by recent fighting there. As
snow and cold continue, MTS reports a serious shortfall of supplies for
these IDPs. Medicines, snow boots, and clothing are in most urgent need.
The MTS also is appealing for more doctors and medicines for wartrauma
victims (both adults and children)."
The Daily Telegraph (London) reported today that "Western diplomats said
there had undoubtedly been summary killings in Rogovo [where 24 Albanians
were killed by Serbian police January 29]. The direct head shots and blood
stains were irrefutable evidence of close-quarter executions... In a
meeting house behind [the scene of most of the killings] there are clear
signs of a summary execution, with bullet holes in a wall and human tissue
on the floor. British verifiers have locked the room in the hope it can be
examined by international experts."
II. FIGHTING/FORCE DEPLOYMENTS
KDOM reported yesterday that "Podujevo also remains quiet despite
indications that the VJ [Yugoslav National Army] is preparing to move into
the Majance Valley to retrieve a bulldozer which fell into KLA hands
several days ago... KLA troops in the southern Drenica village of Mlecane
complained to KDOM of daily harassment fire from Serb police positions 500
meters south of the village. The fire, the KLA says, is directed against
civilian villagers, one of whom was shot in the arm. A KDOM patrol in the
village heard automatic weapons fire from undetermined positions."
ARTA reported February 2 that "large police and military forces are
reported have taken up eight positions in the north-eastern part of
Suhareke," and noted reports that passers by were stopped at police
checkpoints.
Radio 21 reported February 2 that the villages Ratisht and Dashinoc in
Decan municipality were "attacked by Serb forces. Also several villages in
Podujevo municipality were attacked as well."
KDOM also noted yesterday that villagers in the Stimlje/Racak area "remain
concerned for their safety as police continue harassment. Stimlje residents
report an increase in police presence in their village and some Racak
villagers who returned to feed their animals expressed anxiety over
remaining in their homes without a KDOM presence in the village...
Villagers note...that when the KVM personnel leave in the late afternoons
the Serb police 'come out in force.' They hope KVM can extend its hours in
the town."
KDOM reported February 3 that "KVM and USAID report[ed] seeing a
companysized VJ element, including T55 tanks, moving between Komorane and
Kosovo Polje yesterday.... in Podujevo and the Majance Valley some small
arms fire was heard yesterday. Serb police and VJ units remain in their
positions in the area, despite VJ assurances to KVM 4 days ago that the
battle group would return to barracks."
KDOM reported February 3 a "police report today that on February 2 its
personnel were attacked with riflepropelled grenades in the village of
Supkovac along the PristinaMitrovica road. The police suffered no
casualties and did not return fire according to the report. Another attack
was reported on police near Malisevo. Serb police reported yesterday that
on the previous evening police and workers at a mine in Belacevac were
attacked by individuals having automatic weapons and sniper rifles. One
vehicle was badly damaged but no casualties were reported. Police were
reportedly fired upon also in Rznic and Glogane (near Decane) on the same
night."
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director George Tenet said at a February
2 Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing: "We are on the verge of a
dramatic deterioration of the Kosovo crisis as the limitations of winter
weather pass. The ceasefire negotiated last October is near collapse. The
number of attacks by both sides is increasing as are the casualties. Both
sides are now preparing for much heavier fighting in the spring. The KLA
has used the ceasefire to improve its training and command and control, as
well as well as to acquire more and better weapons. As a result the KLA is
a more formidable force than the Serbs faced last summer. We estimate that
there are several thousand KLA regulars augmented by thousands more
irregulars, or home guards. Moreover, funds pouring into KLA coffers from
the Albanian diaspora have increased sharply following the massacre at
Racak. We assess that if fighting escalates in the spring as we expect
it will be bloodier than last year's. Belgrade will seek to crush the KLA
once and for all, while the insurgents will have the capability to inflict
heavier casualties on Serb forces. Both sides likely will step up attacks
on civilians. There is already evidence that the KLA may be retaliating for
the slaying of Albanian civilians at the hands of Serb security forces by
attacking Serb civilians. The recent attacks against Serb bars and
restaurants in Pristina and Pec could be the beginning of a pattern of
titfortat retaliation that will grow more severe as fighting intensifies.
Heavier fighting also will result in another humanitarian crisis, possibly
greater in scale than last year's, which created 250,000 refugees and
internally displaced persons along with hundreds of destroyed buildings and
homes."
President Clinton said Thursday: "Certainly, if this conflict continues,
we'll see another massive humanitarian crisis: there'll be more atrocities,
more refugees crossing borders, more people crying out for justice and more
people seeking revenge."
III. ARRESTS/DETENTIONS/REPRESSION
Independent Radio 21 (Pristina) February 4 reported the "arrests of three
Albanians in Dobrash village, and reported that the County Court sentenced
one Albanian for five years prison while two Albanians who spent seven
months in detention were released." Radio 21 reported February 3 the
arrests of one Albanian in Ferizaj and one in Hasi area, and noted that
"arrests have also continued in Malisheva area, where two Albanian youths
were arrested." Radio 21 reported February 2 that the trial of two
Albanians from Gllogoc municipality started in Military Court in Nis.
County Court sentenced two Albanians for two years in prison in Peja and
one in Mitrovica.
Reuters reported yesterday that Serbian authorities continued to hold the
bodies of the victims of the massacre at Racak, "explaining that 12 of them
were still unidentified and needed further examination... The remarks
contradicted the advice that monitors with the KVM had received Thursday
morning, which was that all 40 bodies would be deposited in the village
mosque for identification and collection... Ethnic Albanian political and
religious leaders in the town of Stimlje...told Reuters the delay was due
to political pressure from local police to have the bodies buried
separately in a number of different cemeteries in the locality. The ethnic
Albanians...are insisting that since the victims were all from the same
village they be laid together in the same place, a prospect that clearly
concerns the authorities who see it as a potential magnet for anti-Serb
feelings."
The Reuters report continued: "The Muslim imam in Stimlje, Mahmut Mahmuti,
told Reuters he had been called to the police station twice in the last
three days and pressed to persuade the relatives to agree to separate
ceremonies without religious ritual. An official of the local LDK
[Democratic League of Kosovo], who declined to be named, said he had also
been hauled in by the police and pressed to agree to separate burials."
IV. CONTACT GROUP INTERIM AGREEMENT FOR KOSOVO [Excerpt of 1/28/99 Draft]
ANNEX 2 -- POLICE and SECURITY
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
B. The KVM shall monitor the enforcement of this Annex and related
provisions of the Agreement, and supervise their implementation. The
Parties agree to cooperate fully with the KVM and to comply with its
directives.
C. In addition to other responsibilities specified in this Annex and the
Agreement, the KVM shall have the authority to
1. Monitor, observe, and inspect law enforcement activities, personnel,
and facilities, including associated judicial organizations, structures,
and proceedings;
2. Advise law enforcement personnel and forces and, when necessary to
bring them into compliance with this Agreement and Annex, issue appropriate
binding directives;
3. Participate in and guide the training of law enforcement personnel;
4. Assess threats to public order and advise on the capability of law
enforcement agencies to deal with such threats;
5. Advise and provide guidance to governmental authorities on the
organization of effective civilian law enforcement agencies; and
6. Accompany the Parties' law enforcement personnel as they carry out
their responsibilities, as the KVM deems appropriate.
D. All Kosovo, Republic and Federal law enforcement and military
authorities shall be obligated, in their respective areas of authority, to
ensure freedom of movement and safe passage for all persons, vehicles and
goods. This obligation includes a duty to permit the unobstructed passage
into Kosovo of police equipment which has been approved by the KVM for use
by Kosovo police.
E. The Parties undertake to provide one another mutual assistance in the
extradition of those accused of committing criminal acts within a party's
jurisdiction, and in the investigation and prosecution of cross-border
offenses. The Parties shall develop agreed procedures and mechanisms for
responding to these requests. The head of the KVM or his designee shall
resolve disputes on these matters.
IV. POLICE OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO
A. The communal police established by this Agreement shall have exclusive
law enforcement authority and jurisdiction and shall be the only police or
security presence in Kosovo, with the exceptions set forth in this Article
and Article V of this Annex [for Article V see below].
1. The Republic of Serbia shall immediately withdraw its security forces
in Kosovo (hereinafter referred to as "MUP") to 2,500 officers, and in no
event exceed that level of deployment with the exception of separate
provisions for border police in Article V. A of this Annex. All
anti-terror forces, special forces, special police, armored
vehicles-including PAC's, self-propelled Air Defense Artillery (ADA), and
armored reconnaissance vehicles weighing more than six tons - and all
weapon systems of 12.7 millimeters and above shall be withdrawn from Kosovo
immediately.
2. The remaining MUP shall carry out only normal policing duties at the
direction of the head of the KVM, and shall withdraw according to a
progressive schedule to be determined by the KVM head. As communal police
are trained and become available for deployment, law enforcement
responsibility shall be transferred to the local police. It is expected
that this transfer will occur in phases. The head of the KVM may specify
particular regions or localities for withdrawal of all MUP and early
transfer to local policing during this transitional period.
3. During the period of phased withdrawal, MUP in Kosovo shall serve under
the supervision and direction of the head of the KVM. The head of KVM
shall have the authority to order individual MUP officers or units to leave
Kosovo at any time, and to take, or refrain from taking, any action he
deems necessary to effect the implementation of this Agreement.
4. Notwithstanding paragraph 2, all MUP shall be withdrawn no later than 12
months after the entry into force of this Agreement with the exception of
Border Police as specified in Article V. A. The head of KVM shall have the
discretion to extend this deadline for up to an additional 12 months if
necessary to meet operational needs.
V. SECURITY ON THE INTERNATIONAL BORDERS
The Government of the FRY will maintain official border crossings on its
international borders (Albania and FYROM). Personnel from the
organizations listed below may be present along Kosovo's international
borders and at international border crossings, and may not act outside the
scope of the authorities specified in this Annex.
A. Republic Border Police
1. The Border Police shall continue to exercise authority at Kosovo's
international border crossings and in connection with the enforcement of
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia immigration laws. The total number of
border police shall be limited to 75. All border police in excess of this
figure shall immediately leave Kosovo.
2. Membership. While maintaining the personnel threshold specified in
paragraph one, the ranks of the existing Border Police units operating in
Kosovo shall be supplemented by new recruits so that they are
representative of the Kosovo population.
3. Training. All Border Police stationed in Kosovo must attend police
training at the Kosovo police academy.
B. The Federal Army (VJ)
1. VJ garrisons shall be limited to pre-February 1998 Border Guard
Battalions located in Djakovica, Prizren, and Urosevac and subordinate
facilities within 5 km of the FRY-Albania and FRY-FYROM border (specified
on the attached map). There shall be no more than 1,500 members of the VJ
present at any time in Kosovo. Border Guard units at the above locations
shall be limited to weapons of 82 millimeters and below. Border Guard
units shall not maintain armored vehicles above six tons - including APC's,
BOV's, and BRDM's - or Air Defense Artillery weapons in Kosovo. The VJ
shall immediately withdraw from Kosovo all forces and equipment above this
level. VJ units shall not deploy mines.
2. VJ units shall be permitted to patrol in Kosovo only within 5 km of the
international border, and solely for the purposes of defending the borders
against external attack and maintaining their integrity.
3. The VJ may travel through the territory of Kosovo to reach its duty
stations and garrisons only along routes that have been agreed upon between
the VJ and communal police commanders. In the event that they are unable
to agree, the head of the KVM shall have binding authority to resolve
disputes. VJ forces transiting and deployed in Kosovo shall be permitted
to act only in response to direct threat to life or property, pursuant to
rules of engagement agreed with the head of the KVM.
C. Customs Officers
1. The FRY Customs Service will continue to exercise customs jurisdiction
at Kosovo's official international border crossings and in such customs
warehouses as may be necessary within Kosovo. The total number of customs
personnel shall be limited to 50. All customs personnel in excess of this
figure shall immediately leave Kosovo.
2. While maintaining the personnel threshold specified in paragraph 1, the
FRY Customs Service shall recruit persons of Kosovar Albanian ethnicity to
work as officers within the Customs Service. Within eight months of the
effective date of this agreement, each unit of Customs officers working at
an international border or elsewhere within Kosovo shall include at lease
one officer of Kosovo Albanian ethnicity.
3. Kosovar Albanian officers of the Customs Service shall be trained and
compensated by the FRY. The FRY shall receive all customs duties collected
at Kosovo's international borders.
VI. OTHER SECURITY ISSUES
1. No Party shall deploy mines anywhere in Kosovo. The Parties shall
provide the KVM with all information in their possession as to the location
of existing minefields to facilitate humanitarian demining efforts.
2. Within three months of the conclusion of this Agreement, all existing
paramilitary and irregular forces in Kosovo shall disband in accordance
with the timetable and rules to be promulgated by the KVM director. The
KVM will arrange for the destruction of these weapons. No new paramilitary
and irregular forces will be permitted while this Agreement is in force.
VII. ARREST AND DETENTION
A. Except as noted in Article IV of this Annex and in the following
paragraphs, only officers of the communal police shall have authority to
arrest and detain individuals in the territory of Kosovo. Officers may use
reasonable and necessary force proportionate to the circumstances for these
purposes. Immediately upon making such arrests, communal police
authorities shall notify the detention, and the location of the detainee,
to the appropriate communal security commission.
B. Border Police officers shall have authority within Kosovo to arrest and
detain individuals who have violated criminal provisions of the immigration
laws. Immediately upon arrest, Border Police officers shall notify the
detention, and the location of the detainee to the appropriate communal
security commission.
C. Officers of the Customs Service shall have authority within Kosovo to
arrest and detain individuals for criminal violations of the customs laws.
Immediately upon arrest, Customs Service officers shall notify the
detention, and the location of the detainee, to the appropriate communal
security commission.
*Views of draft agreement
When asked Wednesday why Yugoslav Army and Serbian police units would be
allowed to stay in Kosovo under the US-drafted interim agreement, Secretary
of State Albright said: "What we are working out now in the annex to the
draft principles here is a way to get the forces out in a sustained way, so
that what can happen during this interim period is that the OSCE mission
can continue to do its work, there would be the whole thing would be
internationally supervised, and that the local police, which is part of
what is supposed to be happening during this interim agreement, can begin
to take hold, so that ultimately this is an area that would be controlled
by the local police that would then be under the control of the new interim
selfgovernment. So these are part of the talks that are going to go on, not
to be determined by the parties, but by the exigencies of moving this
forward. I think that it's important to us to ultimately have them out."
In response to a similar question Wednesday, State Department spokesman
James Rubin said: "Well, I know some editorialists have made this point,
and it's easy to wave one's wand and say this is the way the world should
be; but the fact of the matter is that Kosovo is part of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a country,
Kosovo is not. Countries, quite normally and understandably, want to
protect their borders. And so it is easy to say the words and wave one's
wand and say one shouldn't have any Serb security forces of any kind
anywhere in Kosovo, but we have to remember there are some important
borders. Kosovo is bordering the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and
it also borders Albania, and I don't think anyone has suggested that any
country in the world doesn't have the right to defend its borders... Let's
remember that there are Serbs in Kosovo. And again, people might want to
wish away the existence of Serbs. But there are Serbs there. And there have
been provocations on both sides in Kosovo, including gross killings of Serb
citizens. And what we are trying to do here is to negotiate an agreement
that eliminates the capability of Serb forces to respond in dramatic and
overwhelming and horrible ways to the events in Kosovo. We are not trying
to eliminate the ability of the Serbs in Kosovo to have adequate
protection. And so we will have to weigh the various costs and benefits of
different security arrangements."
A Washington Post editorial Wednesday argued that "as long as Mr.
Milosevic's troops are in Kosovo, NATO troops won't be safe and Kosovars
won't be able to rebuild their country, nor establish the democratic
institutions NATO is demanding. Zero Serbian soldiers: that's the key
number for a lasting peace."
The Times (London) reported Wednesday that "in the latest draft of the
Hill plan, there are also elements that are unlikely to find favor with Mr.
Milosevic. According to the draft, the head of the Kosovo verification
team, the American envoy William Walker, would have authority over both
Belgrade and the ethnic Albanian leaders in ensuring the proper
implementation of all elements in the peace settlement. Sources at the
OSCE...said it was envisaged that the head of the OSCE team in the province
would have similar powers to those of Carlos Westendorp, the High
Representative in Bosnia, who is responsible for implementing the civilian
aspects of the Dayton peace mission. Under the draft plan, Mr. Walker would
be able to overrule Belgrade if there were a dispute over implementing any
peace settlement, effectively removing Mr. Milosevic's authority over the
province."
Reuters reported that under the agreement, "Serbian institutions would
continue to exist in the interim but could be shut down by the head of the
monitoring mission if they are deemed to run counter to the spirit of the
agreement."
Secretary of State Albright said yesterday: "The people of Kosovo must be
able to govern themselves democratically without interference from Belgrade
while the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and
sovereignty are maintained. And they must possess all the institutions a
democratic government requires, from a legislature and an independent
judiciary to a locally controlled police force. All the ethnic groups of
Kosovo, of which there are several in addition to the Albanians and Serbs,
must be treated fairly. They must be able to control without government
interference their identities and cultural life. And the rights of
individuals of all ethnicities must be fully protected. The right to
nourish and promote culture and identity is at the heart of many of the
problems of the Balkans. Finally, to ensure that these principles take
effect, authority should devolve as much as possible to local communities
so that they have the authority to resolve problems themselves. We do not
expect to resolve all the longstanding and deeply held grievances of both
sides. Rather, we seek to build a climate in which the people of Kosovo
receive the rights and security they have been denied and in which Belgrade
has a chance to show that Kosovo can prosper within its borders over a
threeyear interim period."
V. INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY
*Run-up to Rambouillet conference
Citing senior Western diplomats, the New York Times reported yesterday that
US and European Union envoys Christopher Hill and Wolfgang Petrisch "have
already sketched out the first two days of the talks, in which the Serbs
and their fractious ethnic Albanian delegation will meet in plenary session
to state their positions. Afterward, however, as the hosts try to impose a
news blackout on the participants, the negotiators will be flexible in
their approach, using direct talks as well as isolating each side and
shuttling between them... But after a relatively short time, another senior
official said, 'a compromise accord is likely to be presented to the
parties and basically imposed upon them, with credible threats directed
toward both sides."
Reuters reported yesterday that Hill "said he wanted the talks over as
quickly as possible, declaring: 'We have in mind a week, not two weeks.'
His main worries were for the start and the end of the talks. 'I think the
maximum strain in the process will be in the take-off days, then, you know,
the landing, as we come through the clouds, will probably be very bumpy.' "
Agence France Presse yesterday quoted Russia's envoy to the Rambouillet
conference, Ambassador Boris Mayorsky, described January 16 by Belgrade
state press agency Tanjug as Russian Foreign Minister Yvgeny Primakov's
"special envoy": "We are convinced that there can be no military solution.
The only path that can yield results is negotiation."
The Financial Times reported yesterday that "diplomats also admit there is
a strong likelihood that the Contact Group peace plan on offer will be
rejected by both sides."
Reuters reported today that"Yugoslavia will send a 13-member delegation,
led by Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Radko Markovic, to Kosovo peace
talks... the official Tanjug news agency said on Friday. The team includes
two Yugoslav deputy prime ministers, the deputy speaker of the Yugoslav
parliament and the leader of the Kosovo branch of Yugoslav President
Milosevic's Socialist Party. Eight are representatives of small ethnic
minorities in Kosovo, including Turks, Moslems, Egyptians, Gorans,
Romanies, and two small, pro-government ethnic Albanian parties."
Reuters reported yesterday that "Serbia's parliament voted overwhelmingly
[by a count of 227-3] to send delegates to peace talks on Kosovo...
[parliamentary speaker Dragan Tomic said] 'We reaffirmed our unity and
determination to resolve the problems of Kosovo through dialogue,' adding
that there were two basic principles: that the problem be resolved
peacefully and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia and
Yugoslavia be preserved... Deputy Prime Minister Vojislav Seselj also
spelled out what he called two unconditional positions Belgrade would take
to the talks - no constitutional separation of Kosovo and no foreign
peacekeeping troops, [saying] 'We will use all means to prevent the arrival
of NATO troops in Kosovo.' "
When asked yesterday whether Belgrade was using the imposition of NATO
troops as a bargaining chip to have the "outer wall" of international
sanctions lifted, Secretary of State Albright said: "This is not the time
to be talking about bargaining chips. I think that they need to come to the
table. There will be a draft put forward. And I think that it's very
important, you know, a NATO Implementation Force is part of the deal. I
think that it's very important to be able to have a NATO force in there to
be able to implement this. And I think that I guess it's not unexpected
that the Serbs would be trying to make bargains like that. But the bottom
line here is that it is important for them to come to the table, to focus
on the fact that there is a viable interim agreement on the table, and to
be prepared to have a negotiation in good faith."
The Scotsman (Edinburgh) reported Wednesday that "one possible carrot for
Yugoslav cooperation with the peace process seemed to be the prospect of
Yugoslavia joining the OSCE and prompting the EU to consider lifting some
sanctions on Serbia."
Bishop Artimje of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo said in an
interview yesterday with independent daily Dnevni Telegraf (Belgrade) that
Serbs in Kosovo "are going to ask [the co-chairs] to participate in the
[Rambouillet] negotiations directly. Of course we are not allowed to be
members of the official delegation nor can our presence make any decisive
influence on the agreement which will be reached, but we think that there
has to be heard the voice of the Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija and
especially from the representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church which is
vitally interested in the results of the conference."
The Washington Post reported yesterday: "Under pressure from the West to
make the best of the negotiations and achieve a deal by February 19, the
ethnic Albanians have eased their infighting somewhat, but not ended it.
Today, for example, an aide to Rugova said that he expects to be named
delegation leader, but [independent editor Veton] Surroi said that everyone
but Rugova has already reached a consensus that he will not be the leader.
A third likely member of the team, Hedajit Hyseni, said that he and at
least seven others favor letting an official of the KLA chair the team, but
US officials said they oppose having anyone assume that role. 'It will
likely be two or three kinds of negotiations, between ourselves and with
the Serbs and the internationals,' said Fehmi Agani, an ally of Rugova who
is among those invited to attend. 'But the attitudes of those groups are
getting closer...and we all have one aim.' "
RFE/Newsline reported yesterday that the Kosovo Liberation Army general
staff "has named Rama Buja, Jakup Krasniqi, Hashim Thaci, Azem Syla, and
Xhavit Haliti to represent it at Rambouillet, [KLA spokesman Jakup]
Krasniqi told the [Voice of America] Albanian Service on 3 February. The
moderate shadow state will be represented by Ibrahim Rugova, Fehmi Agani,
Bujar Bukoshi, Idriz Aeti, and Edita Tahiri, Radio Free Europe's South
Slavic service reported. Mark Krasniqi, Veton Surroi, and Blerim Shala will
attend as independents." State Department spokesman Rubin said Wednesday:
"We welcome the fact that a broad crosssection, including key members of
the KLA, are going to participate in these talks. Ambassador Hill is now in
Belgrade where he is scheduled to meet with Serbian President Milutinovic."
Agence France Presse reported Wednesday that "in announcing its
negotiating team...the KLA reasserted its demand for independence -- not
the autonomy favored by the United States and its European allies. 'We
will present to the international community, but also to our enemy, our
clear demands for freedom, democracy and independence of Kosovo,' said [KLA
spokesman Jakup] Krasniqi. He added: 'We demand guarantees from the
international community that after, a three-year transitional phase, the
Albanian people will be able to have self-determination, through a people's
referendum, on the liberty and independence of Kosovo.' "
The New York Times reported Wednesday that "Hashim Thaci, a 30-year-old
former military commander and now leader of the political directorate...has
emerged as the main advocate of [the KLA] participating in the talks as the
beginning of a political process of independence. 'He is the upcoming
political figure and is making a deeper impression as the voice of reason
in the KLA,' "said independent Koha Ditore editor Dukagjin Gorani.
The Daily Telegraph (London) said Wednesday that "a diplomat familiar with
the KLA's general staff and politics, said: 'It will be an extremely
curious phenomenon to see a guerrilla organization which has never won a
battle sitting at the negotiating table with what was, until recently, the
fourth largest army in Europe.' "
Reuters said yesterday that "the KLA contingent, expected to number five,
would join about a dozen ethnic Albanian political leaders in negotiations
with Yugoslav federal and Serbian officials." The Washington Post reported
yesterday "a dispute between the Americans -- who invited 15 people to
participate on each side -- and the French, who...say they want to more
than 10 representatives each from the Serbian and Albanian sides. The KLA
"has said it plans to send five people, as does Rugova's Democratic League
of Kosovo. Another ethnic Albanian group, the United Democratic Movement
coalition, plans to send at least four people. Two independent
intellectuals, Veton Surroi and Bleri Shala, also have said they plan to
attend. Neither US or French officials have figured out how to decided
which of the 15 invited participants will go home if the French limit of 10
holds."
The New York Times reported yesterday that "while the negotiators expect
the Serbian delegation to be difficult, they expressed the most frustration
with the divided Albanian delegation, where the increasingly popular
fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army are trying to diminish the power of
the [Kosovo "President"] Ibrahim Rugova... The KLA is also resisting
efforts by the prime minister of the Kosovo Albanian government-in-exile,
Bujar Bukoshi, to put more former members of the Yugoslav army on the
rural-based guerrilla force in an effort to professionalize it. The KLA
also wants Bukoshi to relinquish control of money raised from Albanian
exiles abroad. 'People are slowly realizing that the Albanians can be as
much a problem as the Serbs,' one official said. 'Some of them think they
can get independence through fighting. Others mistrust the international
community. Others simply want to promote themselves. If they ran a state
like this, it would be a disaster.' "
The Wall Street Journal reported today that the US "and its European
allies plan to use both a carrot and a stick with the Kosovars. The carrot
will be the promise that an international aid conference will be organized
as soon as a cease-fire is reached. But they will also threaten that
international support - perhaps the Kosovars biggest advantage over the
Serbs - will shrivel if they prove uncooperative."
*Debate and planning on NATO Kosovo implementation force
The Chicago Tribune reported yesterday that "in Brussels, NATO military
planners are refining options for a peacekeeping force drawn up last
September, an alliance official [said]. He said its scope, size and rules
of engagement would depend on the nature of the task set by a peace deal...
The important thing was that there should be no vacuum between the
conclusion of a deal and the deployment of a NATO-led peace force to
implement it, he said. 'We have to be ready at short notice,' the alliance
official said. NATO military planners were expected to provide the allies
with their options for an enabling force, or advance party in the next few
days."
The Baltimore Sun reported yesterday that "if an agreement was reached,
NATO would quickly place the peacekeeping force on the ground. 'Things
could happen fast,' said a NATO diplomat."
The Times (London) reported today that "NATO is planning to send five
brigades, three of them armored, into Kosovo, with a 5,000-man reserve
force in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia... The total size of the
force, including the strategic reserve, will be about 35,000... NATO hopes
that the force envisaged for Kosovo will have the same powers it enjoys in
Bosnia, where the Implementation Force [IFOR] of 30,000 troops has almost
viceregal authority, with the ability to go anywhere, search any building,
demand to see any file and also control the airspace... Six NATO countries
have said they will contribute to the Kosovo force, which will probably be
called KFOR. NATO diplomatic sources said that the force would consist of
five brigades, three 'heavy' and two light, made up of 15 battalions."
Agence France Presse reported yesterday that "France and Britain are
thrashing out a plan for a mainly European peace force to Kosovo that could
number between 25,000 and 35,000 troops, French Defense Minister Alain
Richard said Thursday." In a separate report yesterday, Agence France
Presse said that "NATO military experts believe the policing and
implementation of a peace accord would require up to 36,000 men. The figure
is considered politically sensitive by NATO diplomats who have asked their
military colleagues to find ways of revising it downwards."
The Baltimore Sun reported yesterday that "the military plans are being
drawn up by British General Sir Rupert Smith, the deputy supreme allied
commander of NATO, and are expected to be completed by this weekend. Smith
is 'struggling' with what is called a 'troop-to-task analysis,' said one
military official. Plans call for various levels of troops that would be
needed to enforce a peace settlement or to force one, said one NATO source,
with a high end at about 35,000."
The Baltimore Sun report also noted that retired army General George
Joulwan, NATO's former supreme allied commander, "is worried about the lack
of focus for military intervention... 'Do you have to seal the Albanian
borders? Do you have to evacuate humanitarian organizations? Do you have to
disarm both sides?...We don't have a strategy, it's reactive rather than
pro-active.' "
Reuters reported Wednesday that an unnamed alliance official said "the
size of the mission would ultimately be determined by conditions. Key
factors were whether Yugoslav Army and Serb special police would be
withdrawn wholly or partially, whether their weapons would be placed in
cantonment and the posture of the KLA guerrillas."
Reuters reported that France's Defense Minister Richard "said
Thursday...France was ready to contribute 5,000 ground troops plus 40
aircraft and ships. The ships would patrol coasts to prevent delivery of
arms, presumably to ethnic Albanian guerrillas... The existing NATO
Extraction Force based in Macedonia and currently held to rescue Kosovo
peace monitors...would be the first element of the international force to
enter Kosovo, he said... The French element of the extraction force, about
900 paratroopers and combat helicopter crews, would serve as the core of
the French brigade for Kosovo." Agence France Presse noted that Richard
"said French officers would be part of the command structure."
Agence France Presse reported yesterday that "Britain is considering
sending some 6,000 troops to Kosovo as part of an international force if
the warring sides in [Kosovo] reach a peace deal, British sources said
Thursday... If this scenario is confirmed, Britain would have one of the
biggest contingents in the force and could take command of it on the
ground, the sources said."
Reuters reported Greece's Prime Minister Costas Simitis said yesterday
that Greece "would join in a proposed implementation force if one emerged
from peace talks in France set for this weekend... Simitis repeated
Greece's concerns that using NATO force against Serbia if peace talks fail
would not work... Simitis also said that if military force was to be used
it should come with the backing of the United Nations."
The Baltimore Sun reported Thursday: "The exact size and the tasks of the
peacekeeping force are expected to be worked out in the course of the talks
at Rambouillet.... Though most of the NATO troops' tasks are unclear, they
are likely to try to stem the arms flow to the ethnic Albanian rebels.
NATO is working with neighboring Albania on a plan to deploy troops along
its border with Kosovo to prevent small arms - from AK-47's to
rocket-propelled grenades - from being smuggled over the rugged hills. Up
to 2,400 NATO troops could be used for such supply duty in the hills, which
have been compared to the supply line of the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail
during the Vietnam War." The Wall Street Journal said today "a NATO planner
noted that the Kosovars already have told NATO officials that placing
troops along the border would be regarded as a hostile act."
The Journal also noted that "in Kosovo, the peacekeeping tasks will be
twofold. One is to protect Kosovars...from Serb forces. The other is to
protect Kosovars from other Kosovars... The task of keeping the peace among
Kosovars worries NATO planners enormously."
Reuters noted that when asked about Belgrade's position on foreign troops
in Kosovo, "[US envoy] Hill said he had not discussed the issue in talks
with the government. 'I suspect they are managing to contain their
enthusiasm for ideas like that... At the same time I do find them committed
to finding a workable settlement on Kosovo.' "
Reuters reported that retired British General Sir Michael Rose, commander
of the UNPROFOR deployment in Bosnia before the 1995 NATO intervention,
Wednesday "warned [during a hearing before Britain's House of Commons'
Select Defense Committee] against sending NATO troops into Kosovo...'The
next step, if war breaks out again is the deployment of NATO forces in a
preventative role along the border between Kosovo and Albania.' Rose...said
this would send a clear message to Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic
that he should abide by any political agreement hammered out between the
parties... [and that] NATO could also indicate that it was prepared to
start a 'train and equip programme for the KLA, the same way we did in
Croatia.' Rose said if those options failed, air strikes should also be
used before ground forces were deployed. 'I would not stick them in
straight away. They would be a hostage to fortune. Peacekeepers always get
shot at from both sides,' he said."
The New York Times today quoted Richard Holbrooke: "The key to the whole
thing is a permitted entry into Yugoslavia by NATO ground troops and the
allies will be there if we're there."
The Times (London) reported Wednesday: "The OSCE verification team has
1,070 members operating in Kosovo. That will rise to 1,600 and will reach
the originally proposed 2,000 level once a peace settlement is approved.
The final 400 verifiers will be legal experts and police officers."
*U.S. slow-motion on ground forces
President Clinton said yesterday that "...the time to stop this conflict
in Kosovo is now, before it spreads and when it can be contained at an
acceptable cost. We have agreed with our allies on a strategy that, we
believe, can bring peace and to back that strategy with the threat of force
by NATO. If a settlement and this is a big "if" if a settlement is
reached, a NATO presence on the ground in Kosovo could prove essential in
giving both sides the confidence they need to pull back from their fights.
If that happens, we are seriously considering the possibility of our
participation in such a force. We are discussing it now with Congress and
our allies. No decision has been reached."
Clinton continued: "Our willingness to contribute troops will depend upon
a number of things, and I'd like to outline them: number one, a strong and
effective peace agreement. If both parties haven't committed to stop
killing each other, there is no point in our sending Americans and other
NATO forces, and other allied forces, into a situation where we can't
succeed. Number two, the parties must demonstrate a commitment to
implementing the agreement and to cooperating with NATO and any other
people who go in with us. Number three, we have to have a permissive
security environment with the withdrawal of enough Serbian security forces
and an agreement restricting the weapons of the Kosovar paramilitaries. And
finally, we have to have a welldefined NATO mission with a clear exit
strategy. Our European allies and partners will have to contribute a
substantial majority of the troops. But NATO is a partnership, and they
have a right to expect the United States, which has been the leader of NATO
for 50 years now, to be a part of that. For now, we don't have to reach
that question because the peace talks will begin on Saturday in France."
The New York Times reported Wednesday that Albright and Administration
national security officials met with key House leaders Tuesday to ask for
'acquiescence in the least' that US ground troops take part in any
peacekeeping force in Kosovo, Clinton administration and congressional
officials said... In the last weeks of negotiations, according to
administration officials, the Kosovo Albanians made it clear that they
would not trust a peacekeeping force that did not include Americans.
'That's one of the pots of gold they are looking for,' one official said.
Another administration point is that there will be more violence in the
spring if peace talks fail, and that a US refusal to send troops could
block any agreement. 'What if the United States abdicates its
responsibility,' one official asked, 'and then there are additional
massacres?' " The New York Times reported today that "the Administration's
present approach to sending ground troops appears to have been shaped by
conditions laid down by Senator Joseph R. Biden, the ranking Democrat on
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Biden, who had been cited by an
Administration official as giving only qualified support to ground troops
in Kosovo, told the White House that he backed the plan as long as it was a
NATO operation and the Americans were the smallest contingent, the
Senator's press secretary...said Thursday night."
The Wall Street Journal reported today that "the ultimate size likely will
depend on whether the US agrees to take one of the 'sectors' laid out in a
peacekeeping plan under discussion by NATO. Occupying one of those sectors
likely would require at least 3,000 combat troops. The mission is expected
to last at least three years and perhaps as long as five, Pentagon
officials said."
The Times (London) reported today that "NATO diplomatic sources said that
it would be crucial for the US contingent to have a high-profile role and
not just be in support because of the impact the presence of US forces
would have on Belgrade." The New York Times reported yesterday that
diplomats and Administration officials "foresee American troops serving a s
the smaller part of a contingent that would include about 8,000 British
soldiers and as many as 5,000 French soldiers. Germany, Italy and other
nations are also expected to commit troops, according to Administration
officials and diplomats.' "
The Baltimore Sun reported yesterday "a NATO source suggesting US
mechanized infantry and armored troops would likely be deployed as part of
the force."
The New York Times also noted "Administration officials emphasized that
the President has not made a final decision on committing troops. American
representatives to the peace talks expect to leverage that fact to extract
the best agreement possible from both parties, American officials said...
Officials said the president must see any final agreement. He is then
expected to consult Congress again before he would send ground troops."
The New York Times noted Thursday that "the President's national security
advisers returned to Congress today for consultation with key Senators. The
Administration officials, including [Secretary of Defense William] Cohen,
General Shelton, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and the National
Security Adviser, Samuel Berger, appeared at two confidential briefings.
They described the stakes the United States has in preserving peace in the
Balkans and the consequences if the United States did not take part in
preserving an accord. Several participants said they were left with the
'clear impression' that the United States intended to make available 2,000
to 4,000 troops for the effort."
Secretary of Defense Cohen said Wednesday during a hearing of the US
Senate Armed Services Committee: "I cannot imagine and would not support
any notion of NATO trying to make an intrusive invasion as such into Kosovo
to establish a peace or make a peace. That would be unwise in my judgment,
and I would hope the judgment of...other members of NATO. There would have
to be a real agreement, and not something that is illusory, something that
has the appearance of being an agreement but would simply allow our we
have people on the ground to be subject to be caught in a crossfire
between the warring and ethnic factions."
Cohen further remarked: "We haven't got an agreement yet. We can't really
size the force until you have an agreement. And so all of that has to take
place in a fairly short period of time. But the short answer is we're not
there yet, and that's the reason we're starting this process now, to make
sure that we properly consult and then satisfy the law with the answers to
all of those questions."
Secretary of State Albright said yesterday: "Our willingness to
participate [in a post-agreement implementation force] will depend on
achieving a strong and effective agreement to which the parties show that
they are genuinely committed. The force must be able to operate in a
permissive environment, including the withdrawal of a sufficient number of
Serb security forces and an agreement restricting paramilitary weapons and
operations... There has to be a permissive environment. And if for some
reason...or for any reason, if there is a complete breakdown in all of
this, and the agreement is not being carried out, the forces would leave.
And I think that it has to be very clear that this is an implementation
force that has to that its mandate is one to operate within a permissive
environment and not one where a struggle, a fighting struggle is going on.
We must agree with our NATO allies on a clearly defined and achievable
mission, one where our contribution would be no more than several thousand
troops, while our European allies provide the lion's share. At the same
time, we must recognize that some U.S. participation is desired and
expected by our allies and may be essential to securing the confidence of
the parties. I am pleased to say that Europe has already shown willingness
to take on a great deal of the burden in Kosovo. Britain, France and other
allies have already pledged to provide the bulk of a postsettlement force.
Thirtyseven countries have sent verifiers to the OSCE mission. Russia has
pledged its partnership in ending the war and securing the peace and is
providing, as I said, a senior negotiator for the talks at Rambouillet...
And certainly, we would welcome any decision by Russia to participate in a
Kosovo Peace Implementation Force."
US Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson, asked Wednesday about a possible
deployment of US ground troops to Kosovo, responded: "Certainly I support a
NATO effort in Kosovo. I do not at this time support ground troops in
Kosovo because I do not know what the game plan is, I do not know what the
exit strategy is, and I don't know how many of our forces would be
involved.... I think it is a very tough decision for me to say that we
should have more unending missions in the Balkans when we have not really
had an exit strategy in Bosnia yet and don't seem to have one in the near
future."
During Wednesday's Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Jeff Sessions
said: "Like the cost of this comes close if it's 5000 or 6000 troops for
this long a period, it would be close to the entire cost of a ballistic
missile defense system for this country. So we've got to make some hard
choices. Kosovo and the Balkans have been referred to as the back door to
Europe. It's certainly their backyard... And from my conversations with
other senators, I don't believe this Congress is going to be very receptive
to any major longterm commitment of troops in Kosovo, because it threatens
our ability to maintain a strong national defense and the unique role the
United States ought to be playing in the world."
*NATO members still reviewing enforcement options
Reuters reported today that NATO General Klaus Naumann, head of NATO's
military committee, "told German television [today] military planning had
been completed and air strike targets selected to avoid hitting the
civilian population. 'We are ready to act militarily,' Naumann told the ARD
network...We could keep it going for a long time if necessary... The
targets are exclusively military and they were picked in a way that would
limit damage to the civilian population."
Agence France Presse reported yesterday that "NATO has marshaled a fleet
of around 200 warplanes, mostly US fighters and bombers based in Italy, to
hit possible targets in Serbia... Diplomats say the order to attack is most
likely to be issued in the event of a new massacre of civilians by Serb
forces or Belgrade being held responsible for the peace talks in France
breaking down... At the time of the last Kosovo crisis in October 1998,
NATO had around 430 warplanes ready for possible intervention."
Agence France Presse continued: "By contrast, the Yugoslav air force has
79 Russian-built MiG warplanes as well as a broad air-defense network with
surface-to-air missiles, according to the International Institute for
Strategic Studies in London... Their SAM 6 [surface-to-air missile system]
has been upgraded recently and Belgrade is believed to have linked its
air-defense network with a similar one in ethnic Serb-ruled areas of Bosnia
to detect any NATO air raids as early as possible."
Secretary of State Albright said yesterday that "if President Milosevic
refuses to accept the Contact Group proposals or has allowed repression in
Kosovo to continue, he can expect NATO air strikes. If the Kosovo Albanians
obstruct progress at Rambouillet or on the ground, they cannot expect NATO
and the international community to bail them out. Decisions on air strikes
and international support will be affected, and we will find additional
ways of bringing pressure to bear.... There should be no doubt on either
side that the consequences of failure to reach agreement or to show
restraint on the ground will be swift and severe."
The Washington Post reported yesterday: "The threat to the Kosovo
Liberation Army, should it violate a cease-fire or refuse to compromise,
can also be real, the officials insisted. American and NATO officials are
already working to reduce the flow of arms to the guerrillas from Albania
and are using sophisticated surveillance techniques along the mountainous
border. While no one believes that border can be sealed, the officials have
talked with the government of Albania about a more intensive international
effort to scrutinize the Tirana airport and the Albanian ports of Vlora and
Durres to prevent the smuggling of arms and money to the ethnic Albanian
forces in Kosovo. KLA bank accounts can be closed, the officials said, and
communications and logistics disrupted. The ethnic Albanians have also been
told that the current international support and sympathy for them and their
fight for self-rule could quickly disappear."
VI. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Agence France Presse reported that Carlos Westendorp, international High
Representative in Bosnia, said Wednesday "the Bosnian peace process could
be seriously affected if the conflict in Kosovo worsens... 'Serious
economic consequences and a new wave of refugees would only be part of the
problem,' Westendorp was quoted as saying [to state-run Zagreb daily
Vecernji List]. He cited a toughening of the Bosnian Serb position as
potentially the worst political fallout from a worsening of the situation
in Kosovo."
Agence France Presse reported that Montenegro's Prime Minister Milo
Djukanovic "said Tuesday [that] since the [Kosovo] problem was one for
Serbs and Kosovo Albanians to resolve, 'Montenegro will not accept an
eventual call to join the so-called federal government in the peace talks,'
he said... [But] if there are any changes 'which would harm Montenegro,'
the republic will reserve the right to 'protect its interests,' Djukanovic
said."
