by Sonja Biserko

La Stampa, Monday 26 April 1999

Milosevic and much of the Serbian establishment continue to believe that Serbia will manage to withstand the NATO attacks, and even that it will win and found a new Great Serbia. In Belgrade it is thought that the uncertainties and differences of opinion among the Western partners will lead to the convocation of an International Conference and to peace negotiations: this would be a great, historic result that would involve all the regional players, or so it is believed. And if the Serbian negotiators had a clear line, this would be the right moment to change the map of the Balkans. The most important result would be the division of Kosovo, the loss of a southern part of Yugoslavia in exchange for a piece of Bosnia. For Western strategists, it is essential to understand this background. Far from considering a withdrawal and despite the heavy economic and military losses, the Yugoslav regime believes it can obtain a historic victory over the most powerful military alliance and over the only remaining superpowe

r. Most Western observers believe Belgrade's attitude to be a bluff. But a clear knowledge of the Serbian power structures confirms that this line of argument has a logical foundation from a Serbian point of view. And it demonstrates that the West's countermove must be a wide-ranging plan to achieve lasting peace. The devastation caused by the NATO attacks will cost Serbia dearly. The efforts of generations to produce a network of infrastructures have been destroyed. But this devastation also destroys the premises of democratic institutions. Contrary to what NATO and many observers in the region hope, it is impossible for this very reason to imagine an uprising against Milosevic. Other developments are much more probable: the survival and continuing dictatorship of Milosevic; a military dictatorship; or a conflict between rival military groups, and consequently chaos. None of these outcomes would lead to the hoped-for political renewal in Belgrade. The strategy behind the Rambouillet negotiations was inadequ

ate. The insufficient and tardy efforts of the Western powers to reach dialogue provided Milosevic with enough time to put his repressive policies into practice. While the Europeans were opposing the leading role of the US in Kosovo, the war preparations in Belgrade proceeded apace. The negotiations tried to consider all the parties equal, but in this way the "strongest" party, Serbia, was favoured. The confusion over how to behave towards the KLA, the Albanian liberation movement, and the lack of a serious analysis gave the green light to the Serbs and to their attacks on Albanian villages, carried out on the pretext of "eliminating the terrorists". The possible loss of Kosovo was referred to for the first time in the notorious Memorandum of the Serbian Academy, which in 1986 drew up the project for a Great Serbia. Dobrica Cosic, national poet and former president, has predicted on several occasions that "the twentieth century will close for the Serbian people with the loss of Kosovo". When the regime comme

nced a real war against the Albanians in the region, it demonstrated its inability to understand the changes in the Western policy towards regional conflicts, especially in the Balkans. On the contrary, the aim was to create new "accomplished facts" in Kosovo. With success, so far. In Belgrade the beginning of the bombardments was considered a new diversionary manoeuvre by NATO, a bluff. Belgrade did not believe the reality of the attacks. Consequently the initial reaction of the regime and of the general public was resistance. The ethnic cleansing in Kosovo has demonstrated yet again the terrible cruelty of this war machine. But the concerts and other events have also shown that the population is incapable of rebelling against the atrocities committed in its name in Kosovo. Unfortunately these developments have proved that a democratic alternative does not exist. The mass media were the first victims of the bombs: all news was immediately placed under the control of the State. The state of emergency and the

introduction of the death penalty, martial law, the partial mobilisation, and the enrolment of volunteers have prevented any possible rebellion. Urged on by intense propaganda, Serbia finds itself on a path with no return. It is heading towards chaos, towards an inevitable moral collapse and a historic defeat. It refuses to acknowledge the policy carried out in the past, and refuses to recognise the crimes it commits day after day. In fact Milosevic, responsible for the disaster in Slovenia, in Croatia, in Bosnia and now in Kosovo, has only given expression to the collective conscience of the Serbian elite, above all of the security forces. For this reason Serbia can no longer hope to be integrated into the European institutions, without massive support from the international community. But this means that the presence of NATO in Kosovo will not be enough. Only a protectorate would ensure a safe return for the deportees. After a decade of political errors in the Balkans, it is absolutely necessary that the

United States and the European democracies work out an overall vision for the whole region: beginning with the de-Nazification of Serbia. A Marshall Plan for the Balkans is also necessary for economic reconstruction. And if peace and stability in the region are to last, we will also need a permanent security force. The West continues to debate the deployment of ground troops. It should realise, however, that from a long-term perspective an international force will also be necessary in Serbia.