The New York Times - OP-ED

Wednesday, May 12, 1999

In War, Mistakes Happen

By ROBERT M. GATES

One result of the tragically mistaken bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade last week is the ritual search in Washington for human sacrifice, someone to blame. Before the tumbrels roll, however, three things should be taken into account.

First, within the Central Intelligence Agency and the military there was a system failure as well as mistakes by individuals. The source of all mapping information for United States military targeting is the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, a joint military and civilian intelligence organization. According to The New York Times, that agency was apparently the source of outdated maps. Then the C.I.A. analysts apparently misidentified the target. And finally, military databases in the United States and NATO used to check the accuracy of such information failed to catch the error.

The immediate causes of failure will be identified and responsibility fixed, but Americans also should understand that outdated maps and insufficient personnel are related to 12 years of budget cuts in both the military and intelligence -- mapping is considered one of those "lower priority" functions that often get the budget ax first. When satellite imagery resources are limited, use of precious orbit time for long-range database building -- like mapping -- often comes last.

When the mapping agency and the C.I.A. find themselves short of skilled map makers and analysts, and everyone is working prolonged hours because we are at war, mistakes will happen.

We had a rash of intelligence errors at the end of the 1970's and early 1980's after a budget drought lasting nearly a decade. The C.I.A. today is just three-quarters the size it was when I retired as director in 1993, and yet I believe the tasks assigned to the agency are both more complex and more numerous than during the cold war.

There is a very real correlation between resources and performance. Those in high dudgeon today over this most unfortunate targeting mistake would do well to keep that in mind, even as the authorities try to figure out precisely what went wrong.

Second, somehow some commentators seem shocked that mistakes like the embassy bombing can happen. In truth, with the thousands of munitions that have been used, it is extraordinary that so few have either gone astray, malfunctioned or been mistargeted. Whenever one does, and innocent bystanders are killed, it is tragic. But for all the obfuscation in Washington, we are at war with Serbia. And it is inevitable that there will be unintended and innocent victims.

Whether we should have begun this war at all must be debated when the fighting is over, but while the fighting continues, citizens of NATO countries -- and noncombatants in Serbia -- would do well to remember that a war is on, and that there never has been one in which civilians did not die accidentally. Therein is one of the tragedies of war and why it should not be undertaken lightly.

Third, China's outrage is justified and the United States has issued an official apology. But I also believe the bombing of the embassy has provided a pretext and opportunity for China to vent its broader outrage at NATO's intervention to right wrongs in a sovereign country -- a precedent that both Russia and China find most unsettling. I am certain that the Chinese Government is puzzled and angry at the United States for a number of reasons right now, and the bombing is a good chance to show it. We ought to have learned from Soviet history that Communist leaders in these huge empires -- Soviet and Chinese -- are isolated and paranoid and often attribute motives and scheming to the United States that we might find laughable.

One thing that doubtless mystifies leaders in both Beijing and Moscow is why we are willing to risk our relationship with them over Kosovo. As one sees the Administration alternately and unpredictably anger and appease both countries, Americans too might welcome some indication of a strategy or set of general principles for dealing with these two powers so as to protect future stability in Asia and in Europe, even while we deal with the multitude of real issues that are raised by their behavior -- and ours.

The bombing of the Chinese Embassy seems to be a tragic yet simple mistake. But it raises deeper questions about what has happened to our military and intelligence establishment, about our expectations in fighting an ugly war, and about American strategy. Some answers would be nice.

Robert M. Gates, a career intelligence officer, served on the National Security Council staff under four Presidents and was Director of Central Intelligence under President George Bush.