The New York Times
Thursday, May 20, 1999
BEFORE WINTER ARRIVES IN KOSOVO
Summer is still a month away, but next winter is already starting to drive decisions about the war in Yugoslavia. The logic is inescapable: either hundreds of thousands of displaced ethnic Albanians need to be safely resettled in Kosovo before freezing temperatures return to the Balkans or the United States and its allies must winterize refugee encampments in Albania and Macedonia and help Montenegro do the same. If the combination of air power and diplomacy fail to make repatriation possible soon, NATO will quickly have to confront some hard decisions, including whether to retain the option of using ground troops later this year to evict Serbian troops from Kosovo.
The calendar is inflexible. Harsh weather in the region, especially in the mountains, comes as early as October or November. If refugee camps are to be made habitable for the winter, construction work must begin in June. If NATO wants to keep open the possibility of invading Kosovo before snow and ice make military operations extremely difficult, the alliance must start to assemble the soldiers, tanks and other weapons now. It will take two to three months to get an adequate land force in place.
That is why the pace of diplomacy is picking up and debate about the possible use of ground troops is intensifying, with Britain pressing for an invasion, Germany resisting and Washington wavering. Without strong American leadership, crucial decisions may be deferred or fumbled.
Clearly, it would be preferable to reach a political settlement that allows the safe return of the refugees and the presence of a well-armed international peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Despite the recent political turmoil in Moscow, Russian and American diplomats are refining a deal that can be brought to the United Nations Security Council. Viktor Chernomyrdin, the Russian envoy, discussed the proposals with Slobodan Milosevic yesterday.
We continue to believe that NATO bombing will eventually compel Mr. Milosevic to support a political settlement that is acceptable to NATO. If the parties can agree on the composition of a peacekeeping force and a timetable for the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo, other elements of an agreement will likely fall into place. But if the negotiations falter or fail, NATO should have other options available.
Unless Mr. Clinton and the nation have already concluded that ground forces should never be used in this war, which does not seem to be the case, preparations for an invasion should move ahead. The gathering of an invasion force in the region would itself brace Mr. Milosevic, and many of the NATO units could be used for peacekeeping if the war ends during the buildup. The presence of a robust ground force in the area does not mean it has to be used, but the absence of one makes the invasion threat meaningless.
Planning for winter housing for the refugees should also be advancing. Heated shelter for hundreds of thousands of people cannot be thrown up overnight. Moving ethnic Albanians to Western Europe and America can help, but will not solve the problem. It may not seem like it, but the time for making critical decisions is rapidly approaching.