The New York Times

Tuesday, June 8, 1999

Jousting With Belgrade

Slobodan Milosevic is a master at using delay, surprise and confusion to divide his opponents, and he is now using all three to undermine the peace agreement that he accepted in Belgrade last week. NATO will prevail in this diplomatic contest if it remains faithful to the peace deal, retains a reasonable degree of Russian cooperation and keeps military pressure on Serbian forces until Mr. Milosevic orders them removed from Kosovo.

The immediate obstacle to peace is Belgrade's refusal to accept a detailed NATO plan for the rapid withdrawal of Serbian forces and the arrival of international peacekeepers, most of them from the alliance. Serbian generals balked at the plan over the weekend, arguing that seven days was not enough time to exit Kosovo. They also maintained that as many as 15,000 Serbian troops could remain behind, though no such deal was made in Belgrade, and that peacekeeping units could not move into the province until the United Nations Security Council approves the operation. Mr. Milosevic is clearly playing for time, hoping that Russian and Chinese misgivings about the details, coupled with their veto power in the Security Council, will lead to more favorable peace terms for Belgrade.

The withdrawal timetable can easily be extended by a week if Serbian forces in Kosovo lack the fuel required for a speedy departure, and if roads and bridges hit by NATO bombs must first be repaired. But all Serbian forces have to leave, as agreed last week. A small number may return once Kosovo is pacified. NATO planes should not hesitate to continue bombing Serbian troops in Kosovo while Mr. Milosevic is obstructing peace.

The U.N. role in Kosovo is important, but need not be cause for diluting the peace terms that Mr. Milosevic approved. He knew that NATO would send in a force of 50,000 peacekeepers, including 7,000 Americans. Several thousand Russian soldiers may also participate. If possible, all the troops should be dispatched under a U.N. mandate to show the broadest possible support, and Kosovo should be temporarily placed under U.N. administration. There is no reason for Russia or China to oppose these measures. If anything, U.N. involvement would make the foreign presence more palatable for Belgrade.

But the Security Council can become a graveyard for good intentions. Washington needs to guard against that by insuring that a Kosovo resolution closely adheres to the peace plan. That means, among other things, that peacekeeping forces operate under a NATO chain of command rather than the muddled system the U.N. used in Bosnia before the Dayton peace agreement. Russian concern about the peacekeeping force and other issues slowed the drafting of a U.N. resolution yesterday by Washington and its allies. To encourage Russian and Chinese cooperation, NATO may need to cut back on bombing over Serbia itself for now. The endgame with Mr. Milosevic is always difficult, but unless he disowns the peace deal he endorsed, the mechanics for ending the war in an acceptable way can be worked out.