The New York Times

Friday, June 11, 1999

Peace and the K.L.A.

The quality of the peace that NATO can bring to Kosovo in the coming months will depend in large measure on the cooperation it receives from the commanders and fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The settlement terms fall short of the K.L.A.'s goal of an independent Kosovo. But more than 11 weeks of NATO bombing have won Kosovars a high degree of political autonomy and made it possible for more than a million displaced people to return safely to their homes. The K.L.A. should demobilize its guerrilla units, surrender its heavy weapons and trust NATO peacekeepers to provide physical security for all of Kosovo's people.

The Kosovo Liberation Army as it exists today is an amalgam of a few hundred veteran ideologues and thousands of less politicized recruits who joined after Serbian forces stepped up repression in Kosovo last year. Its ground offensive in the last days of the NATO bombing campaign helped draw Serbian forces into the open where allied pilots could hit them, probably speeding the end of the conflict.

The K.L.A.'s political leadership and military chain of command are fluid and unclear to outsiders. Its most visible leader is a relative moderate, Hashim Thaci, the organization's political director. Mr. Thaci accepted the compromise peace terms agreed to earlier this year in Rambouillet, which will be the basis for United Nations administration of the province. Those terms require the K.L.A. to disband its fighting units and hand over its heavy weapons. K.L.A. members are allowed to keep their personal weapons, a realistic concession in a province where most people have guns.

Mr. Thaci has assured NATO leaders in recent days that he will comply with the peace agreement. But his orders may be resisted by others out to settle scores with Serbian civilians and rival Albanian politicians. The K.L.A.'s chief competitors used to be the nonviolent democrats led by Ibrahim Rugova. But Mr. Rugova's talks with Slobodan Milosevic this spring while Serbian forces were expelling hundreds of thousands of Kosovars have discredited him and most of his followers. Kosovo's main political contest is now between the pragmatic and radical wings of the K.L.A.

In the days immediately ahead, the NATO-led peacekeepers must assume direct responsibility for security at all levels in Kosovo, including not just military tasks but many police duties as well. Once peace takes hold, local police forces will be organized and trained under international supervision. If the K.L.A. willingly demilitarizes, many of its current fighters should be able to move smoothly into new roles as police in Albanian Kosovar communities, helping to make the autonomy and security promised by the peace agreement a tangible reality. K.L.A. resistance to the agreement would only doom Kosovo to additional misery and bloodshed.