The New York Times - OP-ED

Monday, June 14, 1999

What Role for Russia?

By ANATOL LIEVEN

LONDON

Winston Churchill liked to tell the story of the man who tried to give the powder to the bear, and all the elaborate preparations he made to do so -- "but the bear blew first." Decayed and decrepit though it is, the Russian bear blew faster than NATO when it came to sending peacekeepers into Kosovo. It taught us a lesson about speed and surprise -- and if it is true that NATO's advance into Kosovo was delayed to prepare for photo opportunities, then it was a lesson we badly needed.

The Russian position on the ground is of course extremely weak. Unless Bulgaria gives permission for Russian overflights, it will be virtually impossible to reinforce the Russian forces in Kosovo, though they will doubtless be supplied by the Serbs. It is therefore in NATO's power to blockade the Russians and force them out.

But this would be a mistake. Even if NATO is forced to agree to a separate Russian zone, leading to de facto partition of Kosovo, it will not be a severe blow to NATO policy. It might even help long-term reconciliation in the Balkans -- which cannot be achieved without the Serbs.

It is still unclear how large the Russian presence will be. It is entirely possible that the Yeltsin Government will back down in the face of a mixture of bribes and pressure from the West and abandon its hopes for a separate zone in the Serb-inhabited areas of northern Kosovo.

If, however, the Russians do establish such a sector, with or without NATO agreement, then NATO governments will have to decide how to live with this. Quite frankly, I have always assumed that, whatever Western leaders are saying, a NATO occupation of the whole of Kosovo would sooner or later lead to the formal independence of the whole of Kosovo and the flight of its Serbian minority. With about 90 percent of Kosovo's population Albanian, and the vast majority of these people in favor of independence, democracy alone would dictate this.

Apart from anything else, NATO will sooner or later have to start devolving power to local elected representatives. It is simply implausible after everything that they have suffered that such Albanian leaders -- whether K.L.A. or other -- will agree to live permanently as part of a Serb-dominated federation.

The alternative to NATO's acceptance of independence would therefore be an indefinite NATO occupation in order to preserve an increasingly empty pretense of Yugoslav sovereignty and in order to prevent elected Albanian representatives from exercising real power.

Of course, any NATO withdrawal and acquiescence in Kosovo independence would be accompanied by assurances of protection and rights for the Kosovo Serbs -- which in the view of the Serbs would in the end be worth very little. That is why the Serbs of Pristina have fled by the thousands ahead of the NATO advance.

A separate Russian presence would, however, greatly complicate this otherwise rather smooth process. Russia will insist that NATO genuinely disarm the Kosovo Liberation Army, and the K.L.A. has no desire to disarm, whatever it says. It will insist that Kosovo remain legally part of Yugoslavia and will be able to call on support from both the United Nations Security Council and NATO's own repeated official statements.

From NATO's point of view, there are only two benefits from a Russian presence. It will strengthen the otherwise thin pretense that this is truly a U.N.-mandated operation; and especially if deployed along the Serbian border, it may discourage terrorist and partisan attacks (whether freelance or Belgrade-sponsored) on NATO troops. Such attacks could otherwise be a real possibility, especially in circumstances of deep poverty and political upheaval in Serbia.

On the other hand, Russian soldiers could themselves become targets of attack by the K.L.A., and might even participate themselves in attacks on Albanian civilians. It is hardly surprising that NATO governments and commanders view a separate Russian presence with such profound misgiving.

Sooner or later, if Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo proves untenable, Russia is likely to back a move from Belgrade for partition, leaving the Serb-inhabited areas and as many of the Serb historic sites as possible in Serbia and giving the bulk of Kosovo independence.

Western leaders have vehemently rejected this possibility, but partly at least because it has been seen as giving at least a partial victory to the evil Slobodan Milosevic. If, however, Mr. Milosevic can be removed from power -- and pray that he can -- then a compromise along these lines with a future, more civilized Serbian government might appear a great deal more acceptable. It would also mark a historic compromise with the Serbian nation, and indeed with Russia.

Such compromises, of course, will be unnecessary if NATO can simply control the situation in Kosovo indefinitely and dictate its own terms to all parties. But the alliance has received one lesson in recent days that it is a good deal less in control than it had thought, and it will probably receive many more such lessons in the weeks and months ahead.

(Anatol Lieven of the International Institute of Strategic Studies is the author, most recently, of ``Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry.'')