The New York Times

Tuesday, June 22, 1999

Give the Russians a Chance

By WILLIAM L. NASH

WASHINGTON -- N ear the end of the first year of NATO's mission in Bosnia, the Russian brigade working with, and for, the American division was faced with a particularly difficult problem. Some Bosnian Muslims who had moved into the Bosnian Serb republic were behaving provocatively, and the Serbs were responding with threats of violence.

As with any such situation, it was my responsibility, as division commander, to support my subordinate, in this case a Russian, with additional resources. We decided to demonstrate the cohesion of our combined forces by using soldiers from as many nations as possible. Turkish, Swedish, Danish and American troops joined Russian soldiers, under Russian command, to search for hidden weapons in a volatile village.

While either my American deputy or I remained in the vicinity, the Russians commanded the operation without incident. They were evenhanded in their approach, treated all parties with dignity and respect, and were firm in pursuit of their assigned mission.

This is the kind of positive cooperation with Russia that NATO should expect in Kosovo. Yet for the last two weeks there have been many questions about Russia's participation. Although Defense Secretary William Cohen and the Russian Defense Minister, Igor Sergeyev, agreed on Friday that 3,600 Russian troops would be integrated into the peacekeeping force, many questions and suspicions remain. Will Russian troops do their job? Or will they side with the Serbs -- even supporting the partition of Kosovo?

From my Bosnian experience, these worries are vastly overblown. There is no reason to expect less from the Russians this time around. In fact, it was NATO's failure to show respect and consideration for the Russians throughout the air campaign that in part led to their takeover of the Pristina airport on June 11.

In Bosnia, I never saw Russian forces favor the Serbs or discriminate against the Bosnian Muslims. There was never any evidence that the Russians had secret orders from Moscow to subvert NATO operations or break the unified effort.

If anything, the Russian military's paramount concern was to show that its army was still a great professional force. The troops were disciplined and competent, and their commanders so professional that they did not appear to mind our American penchant for hashing out differences openly and publicly. They even put up with our seemingly endless briefing slides. They wanted to be in the inner circle with their dignity intact.

For our part, we worked hard to make sure that Russia was in the inner circle. In fall 1995, Defense Secretary William Perry and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev conceived of a way to achieve a clear chain of command while keeping the Russian military's identity within the larger force. The Russians were given their own sector within the American area of responsibility.

The achievements of Mr. Perry and Mr. Grachev did not come easily -- they were the product of months of discussions between the two men and within NATO. That itself was possible because the two officials had spent years in regular communication.

It is unfortunate that this same level of commitment and communication didn't take place before troops were sent into Kosovo. In dealing with the Russians, American officials should listen as much as they talk, consider Russian views seriously and build, rather than demand, consensus. There was no reason to have alienated Russia; its participation will only help in Kosovo, encouraging the Serbians there to stay, and not flee as they have in recent days. Indeed, while it is fine for Russian forces to be integrated into the French, German and American operations, the reverse would also work. Yes, put American units under Russian command.

Why not? Kosovo remains under overall NATO command. The United States would not lose its prerogatives, stature or standards. On the contrary, this action might begin to calm the real Russian fears about NATO's long-term intentions. And our long-term relations are more important that the specifics of a Kosovo peacekeeping force.

As it is, Russian and American soldiers know a great deal about each other. The professional nature of both armies transcends geography, language and political outlook. In Bosnia, we learned that 50 years of studying each other as enemies made it much easier to work together as allies. And in Bosnia we created a cadre of military leaders from both nations who can accomplish any mission with which our politicians present them. Now that the politicians have finished their negotiations, it's time to trust the soldiers.

William L. Nash, a retired major general, commanded United States Army forces in Bosnia from December 1995 to November 1996.