The New York Times

Wednesday, July 7, 1999

America's War, Germany's Peace

By MICHAEL MANDELBAUM

WASHINGTON -- The apparent settlement of the dispute between Moscow and NATO over where Russian troops will be deployed in Kosovo clears the way for addressing a more important question: Will there continue to be American troops there? There need not be; Kosovo may finally allow Europeans to assume primary responsibility for a political and military problem in Europe.

The United States has an incentive to remove its troops from Kosovo. They may well be needed elsewhere -- on the Korean Peninsula, for example, or in the Persian Gulf. Western Europe, on the other hand, has no other significant military missions, and it has an interest in the Balkans that the United States lacks: preventing an outpouring of refugees from the region, who would head straight for Paris, Berlin and Vienna.

To keep the people of the Balkans at home, NATO's European members have agreed to pay the lion's share of the costs of reconstruction. In return, they will naturally expect to be the dominant outside influence in the region. This expectation has already been recognized; Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, has appointed a European, Bernard Kouchner, the French Health Minister, to direct the civilian administration of Kosovo.

In fact, the Europeans took the lead in Kosovo even before the war ended.

Led by the Germans, they decided that a negotiated settlement was needed; they devised the strategy of forging a common position with Russia and having the United Nations ratify it, and they sent Martti Ahtisaari, the Finnish President, to Belgrade along with Viktor Chernomyrdin, the former Russian Prime Minister, to secure Serbian acceptance of their terms.

This may have been Bill Clinton's and Madeleine Albright's war, but it is Gerhard Schr der's peace.

The balance of influence between Americans and Europeans will affect the future of the Balkans. In comparison with the United States, the Europeans are likely to be more firmly opposed to independence for Kosovo, more willing to provide economic assistance to Serbia and more interested in holding an international conference to negotiate a permanent political settlement for the entire region, including Kosovo and Bosnia.

The Europeans may also accept a wider political role for Russia in Kosovo, which would soothe Moscow's resentment at being denied a separate peacekeeping zone.

Because Kosovo is of no real importance to either NATO or Russia, the argument over who will control what is purely symbolic, but worrisome nonetheless.

A leading European role in postwar Kosovo would be a salutary development for both the North American and the European members of the Atlantic alliance. Indeed, American dominance of European security affairs is unhealthy for both sides -- something that would have been obvious to Americans had there been a ground war in Kosovo. The American armed forces would have suffered casualties fighting on behalf of European allies some of which would not even have put troops in the field.

Under these circumstances, public support for NATO in the United States would have plummeted.

For their part, the Europeans are acutely aware of, and indeed are embarrassed by, the imbalance in the alliance. Led by Britain and France, they have announced plans for an all-European military force within NATO. These plans, however, are likely to come to nothing.

Fielding such a force would be expensive, and no European government will raise taxes or cut social programs to pay for it. The countries of Western Europe will not equip themselves to wage another major war. F ortunately, in this case, Western Europe has no fighting to do. The tasks at hand in Kosovo are different. They include pacifying a small, poor, strife-torn province, establishing a working government there, laying the basis for economic reconstruction, deciding the province's relations with its neighbors, and then leaving.

These are tasks appropriate to a different role from Europe's past: that of an imperial power. To these tasks the Europeans bring a wealth of relevant experience, and they do not need American help to put it to good use in the Balkans.

Michael Mandelbaum, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of "The Dawn of Peace in Europe."