The New York Times OP-ED

Sunday, September 12, 1999

East Timor Isn't Kosovo

By Ronald Steel

WASHINGTON - "Because we bombed in Kosovo doesn't mean

we should bomb Dill," said Samuel Berger, the national

security adviser, about the atrocities in East Timor,

which seem to have been committed by militias, supported by elements of the Indonesian military. Well, why not?

The case for intervention in Dill is stronger than it was in Kosovo. Kosovo, after all, was a province of Serbia

and had been for centuries. East Timor was never a part of Indonesia until it was seized by the Jakarta Government in 1975. Its people over-whelmingly voted for independence in a recent United Nations-monitored election that the Indonesian Government promised to honor. Yet, after days of violence and hundreds of deaths, the West has only asked, albeit forcefully, that Indonesia allow international peacekeeping troops into

East Timor.

If the United States intervened for humanitarian reasons to support the Kosovars, even to the point of bombing Serbia, why shouldn't it do the same against Indonesia?

One reason is that - all the rhetoric aside - we did not intervene in Kosovo primarily for humanitarian purposes. The plight of the Kosovar refugees is what tugged at the public's heartstrings. But if American foreign policy were driven mainly by such concerns, we would have sent a few thousand troops to Rwanda to stop the genocide of the Tutsis by the Hutus.

Wnat tipped the balance in the case of Kosovo, as in the case of Bosnia, were two concerns: that the conflict

would spread to other areas of the Balkans and beyond, and that American leadership of NATO - and even the alliance itself - would be thrown into question. The Kosovo operation was in part meant to prove that NATO

was still relevant in a post-Soviet Europe.

None of this applies to conflicts out- side Europe. Witness, for example, the West's nonresponse to, and even lack of interest in, the Russian repression in Chechnya. Unless Indonesia changes its mind and allows in troops,

the East Timorese will most likely be left to fend largely for themselves. This will happen not only because

East Timor is tar from the North Atlantic world, but also because of the size and importance of Indonesia.

It is the world's fourth most populous nation, rich in natural resources and a prime trading partner for

American corporations. It is a logical counter to any potential Chinese expansion. Furthermore, unlike puny

Serbia, it is a serious military power.

Moreover, we have good reason to avoid weakening the Indonesian Government. This is because the civilian officials do not appear to be in control of the military units carrying out repression in East Timor. Punishing the fledgling democratic Government by military action could defeat our own purposes.

So where does that leave the noble principle of humanitarian intervention, so triumphantly affirmed in Kosovo? About where it began: as the exception rather than the rule.

Intervention will occur where it can be done relatively cheaply, against a weak nation, in an area both accessible and strategic, where the public's emotions are aroused, and where it does not get in the way of other political, economic or military needs.

However realistic this may be, it is deeply regrettable on moral grounds. The special tragedy of this case is that the "international community" monitored an election whose predictable results - an overwhelming vote for

independence - it had no intention of guaranteeing.

But in the end, the quest for self-determination - which is what led to the current murderous repression - is relative, not absolute. People have the right to seek their own independent state. But others will come to their defense only where they believe their own self-interest is involved. That is where the line is being drawn today in East Timor.

Ronald Steel teaches international relations at the University of Southern California and is author of "Temptations of a Superpower."