The New York Times

September 15, 1999

Fatal Trust in Timor

By JOHN ROOSA

JAKARTA, Indonesia -- Fleeing Dili before it was burned to the ground, I did not have the chance to say goodbye to friends. I have little idea what became of most of them. I heard from the few who escaped East Timor that Manuel climbed into the hills, Fernanda was missing after her house was looted and burned, and Olandina was killed. Every day I wonder who is dead, who is confined in a refugee camp in West Timor and who is eating roots and leaves on some hillside.

I was lucky to make it out alive. On Sept. 5, the day after the results of the referendum on East Timor's independence were announced, a pro-Indonesia militia fired into the office building where I was staying. With nearly 40 Indonesians and East Timorese, I lay silent on the floor as the bullets whizzed overhead and the windows crashed down. We expected the militia to enter at any moment, but after an hour of heavy shooting, the militia passed on to other targets. We heaved a sigh of relief and then a sigh of desperation; we knew the sacking of Dili had begun.

It was no secret that militias connected to the Indonesian military were planning to wreak vengeance on the East Timorese if they voted for independence in the Aug. 30 referendum. Before the vote, pro-Indonesia forces had openly and repeatedly threatened a bloodbath. Indonesia's officials in the East Timorese government warned that there could be a repeat of the terror of 1975, when the Indonesian military first invaded and annexed East Timor.

The East Timorese hoped the presence of the United Nations, foreign journalists and international observers like myself would deter an Indonesian reprisal. They put all their trust in the international community.

Given that the pogrom was so predictable, it was easily preventable. The United States could have insured that some sort of international force was prepared to go into East Timor immediately after the vote if Indonesia, as everyone expected, failed to provide security.

But in the weeks before the ballot, the Clinton Administration refused to discuss with Australia and other countries the formation of such a force. Even after the violence erupted, the Administration dithered for days, insisting that Indonesia stop the militias.

While President Clinton's steps to force Indonesia to accept international troops were welcome, they could have been taken earlier. When East Timor does become independent, I will return to find my friends, help those who survived and try to explain to them how it was that the United States betrayed their country.

John Roosa, a historian of Indonesia, spent two months as an official observer of the vote on East Timor's political status.