New York Times

December 10, 1999

[for personal use only]

A U.S. Role in Chechnya

By THOMAS GRAHAM (tgraham@ceip.org)

Thomas Graham, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace, was the chief political analyst at the United States Embassy in Moscow

from 1994 to 1997.

WASHINGTON -- Russia issued an ultimatum on Monday to the citizens of

Chechnya's capital -- leave before Saturday or die. True, after stern words

from the United States and the rest of the world, Russia backed off one day

later. But yesterday President Boris Yeltsin was rattling his saber again,

this time issuing an ominous reminder to President Clinton that Russia "has a

full arsenal of nuclear weapons."

Such bluster deserves a quick and firm response. But the Clinton

administration, in typical fashion, is waffling. Although the president

himself warned earlier this week that Russia would pay "a heavy price" for

its conduct in Chechnya -- the warning that apparently ignited Mr. Yeltsin's

outburst -- Mr. Clinton has been unwilling to put the teeth in that rhetoric.

Why? The United States, senior administration officials claim, has few levers

to push. And they say that if we use the levers we have, like suspending

financial aid to Russia, we will undermine our larger national interest in

helping Russia build a democratic, free-market society and safeguarding its

nuclear materials.

This stance is wrong. The war in Chechnya is itself a grave threat to

democracy in Russia. It is fueling ethnic hatred among Russians, and

siphoning financial support to an unreformed military and military-industrial

complex. It provides cover for the successors to the K.G.B. who are

emboldened to harass Russian citizens.

Most important, by soaking up Russia's scarce resources, the war weakens the

response to the nation's socioeconomic crisis, which is a much graver threat

to long-term security than anything that has happened in or around Chechnya

in the past few years.

If the United States backs up its oratory with action, will the Russians

listen? There are several reasons to think they will.

The most important is that Russians respect strength. Prime Minister Vladimir

Putin has become phenomenally popular largely because he has demonstrated

toughness with the Chechen rebels. Likewise, we need to demonstrate resolve

in defending our values and principles if we ever hope to persuade Moscow to

negotiate with Chechnya.

Also, for all their anti-Western talk, Russians fear isolation from the West.

Most members of the elite have their savings and investments in Western

institutions. Capital flight remains unabated. Russian elites need to

understand that by continuing the war in Chechnya they are isolating

themselves from the West and jeopardizing their investments.

Moreover, support for the war is not as great as many in the West have been

led to believe. One-third of Russians are opposed to Russia's involvement,

according to recent public opinion polls. Some critics are looking to the

West for support.

I spoke to a number of these people, including leading businessmen, when I

was in Moscow last month. They wanted the United States to take a tough,

principled stand on Chechnya. The pressure, they thought, would have impact

over time and encourage more Russians to speak out.

In addition, the majority that supports the war is beginning to waver. A

recent poll by the Russian Center for Public Opinion suggests that close to

half of all Russians would support negotiations with the Chechen leadership.

The polls also show that getting tough with Russia would not, as the Clinton

administration fears, help the Communist and ultranationalist parties in the

parliamentary elections nine days from now.

Virtually every major political party in Russia already supports the war,

even the reformist Union of Right-Wing Forces.

The only parties to register a rise in the polls as a result of the war are

the reformers and the pro-government bloc of regional governors.

Support for the Communists has not budged over the past few weeks;

ultranationalists are faring poorly. Nothing the United States says or does

is likely to change the situation.

How do we get tough with Moscow?

Suspend all loans from the International Monetary Fund and the Export-Import

Bank, and explicitly link the suspension to the war in Chechnya. In no way

should these loans even indirectly finance the military operation.

Along with our allies, review all technical assistance to Russia. Suspend any

aid provided directly to the Russian government except those programs dealing

with nuclear weapons and material. Continue the assistance that directly

benefits regional governments, private business and individuals, thereby

encouraging democratic and market reforms.

Warn that continuing the Chechen war will jeopardize Russia's invitation to

the meetings of the seven most industrialized countries.

Step up our support for Georgia, the Caucasus nation that has come under

increasing pressure from Moscow for its alleged support of Chechen rebels.

Granted, none of these actions will persuade Moscow to move immediately

toward a political solution in Chechnya. But over time, the pressure, along

with inevitable battle fatigue among Russians, will nudge Moscow toward a

negotiated settlement.

Resolving this dispute peacefully is the best thing the Clinton

administration can do, if, of course, it still believes democracy has a

chance in Russia.