Newsweek International

December 20, 1999

[for personal use only]

THE NEW RUSSIAN ISOLATIONISM

A wave of anti-Western bitterness and anger is building, and self-serving

politicians are seeking to exploit it for all it's worth

By Igor Malashenko

Malashenko is a political strategist with Media Most, which publishes the

weekly magazine Itogi in cooperation with NEWSWEEK.

After 10 years of experimentation with political democracy and market

economics, the Russian public and the Russian elite are disillusioned with

both. Today many Russians equate democracy with crime and disorder, and the

market economy with corruption and poverty. Who do they blame for that? Boris

Yeltsin, of course, and his reformersó?"and their supporters in the West.

Distrust of the West skyrocketed during the NATO operation in Kosovo, which

was portrayed by key Kremlin leaders as an assault on Russian national

interests. After

the war, public opinion slowly returned to pre-Kosovo attitudes. But a

visceral perception of the West as an alien and hostile force remains. It has

been stoked recently by the criticism, from Bill Clinton and various European

leaders, of Russia's brutal assault on Chechnya. As a result, a broke and

belligerent Russia seems to be turning ever more inward, encouraged by

leaders who deliberately encourage and exploit nationalistic and xenophobic

sentiments for their own advantage.

Moscow is waging the war in Chechnya not as a military but as a political

campaign. Its declared goal is to destroy all the terrorists and guerrillas

on Chechen territory. But this cannot be achieved by the indiscriminate use

of force; that strategy leads to a disproportionately high number of civilian

casualties and a relatively low level of losses among Chechen guerrillas. The

real goal of the war in Chechnya is power in Moscow itself, and its top prize

is the presidency. Think of it as a war of succession. The Kremlin has

officially anointed Prime Minister Vladimir Putin the official successor to

Boris Yeltsin, and the war in Chechnya should ensure his victory in the

presidential election in June 2000. The war is still widely supported by the

Russian public; so is Putin.

That's fine for now. Kremlin strategists realize, however, that enthusiasm

for Putin and the war could evaporate if the military operation in Chechnya

fails to produce a quick and decisive victory or the official body count of

Russian troops grows too high. To avert this threat, the Kremlin is trying to

undermine and silence its political opponents, and to manipulate and censor

TV stations and newspapers under its control. Putin and his supporters are

willing to put relations with the West at risk to remain completely

unrestrained domestically, to use any amount of force in Chechnya and to rig

elections or shut down TV stations and newspapers that criticize the

government line. Moreover, some of Putin's strategists have apparently

advised him to take the initiative and respond to Western criticism with

extremely tough rhetoric of his own. Yeltsin seems to agree with this tactic;

witness his harsh anti-Clinton performance in China. As long as world oil

prices remain relatively high, Kremlin strategists believe, a showdown with

the West is not only desirable but also affordable. This misperception is

reinforced by the traditional Russian belief in the country's inexhaustible

natural riches.

An expanding political coalition supports this new isolationism. It is an

unlikely combination of discredited reformers who blame the West for their

failures, die-hard proponents of a centralized economy, a growing number of

political leaders with KGB backgrounds and nearly bankrupt "oligarchs," such

as Boris Berezovsky and others. All of them share a common interest in

fencing Russia off from the West's annoying and intrusive influence.

A Russia increasingly isolated from the West will need new political allies.

It is on the prowl for them. Last week Boris Yeltsin and Belarus leader

Aleksandr Lukashenkoó?"famous for his aggressive anti-Westernismó?"signed a

new

Union treaty. There is also a real danger that Russia will cooperate with

regimes in Iran and Iraq in such areas as arms sales and technology transfer.

The Western response to such initiatives is quite predictableó?"and would

cost

Russia dearly. Left out of the "modern" world, Russia would lag farther and

farther behind industrialized countries, and even some in the Third World.

Is a period of Russian isolationism inevitable? That's unclear; though it is

on the rise, there still is no overwhelming anti-Western consensus. In fact,

a substantial segment of the public still supports improved relations with

the West and is mostly immune to xenophobia. Many members of the elite

understand quite well that isolation from the West is a dead end. However, it

is not certain that they are strong enough to fend off the isolationist

surge. Even if they are not, there is little doubt that sooner or later

Russia would have to admit once again that isolation solves nothing. But by

then it may be too late to restore itself as a viable and competitive nation.