The New York Times

Monday, January 31, 2000

A Peace Strategy for Congo

Congo's civil war is a key link in the chain of interconnected conflicts that are ravaging a vast swath of Africa from the Horn of Africa to Namibia. No fewer than six countries and three rebel factions have been drawn into Congo's struggle, which also includes militias, proxies and profiteers more interested in diamonds and copper than national liberation. Thousands of civilians have been killed, and many more are dying from disease and hunger. Nearly a million Congolese have been displaced from their homes.

Now a small glimmer of hope has emerged from last week's intensive, American-led focus on the conflict in the United Nations Security Council. After a week of discussions that included all six heads of state currently involved in the conflict, the Clinton administration announced that it will back Secretary General Kofi Annan's proposal for a peacekeeping operation that would include about 5,000 troops in support of 500 cease-fire monitors. No American troops would be involved. The force would be made up mostly of Africans, paid for by U.N. members. It is expected to cost $280 million for the current fiscal year, and the United States would be asked to contribute roughly one-fourth.

There is reason to be wary of another potentially dangerous U.N. peacekeeping operation in one of the world's most intractable war zones. But this proposal reflects a growing consensus by the combatants themselves that it is in their own interest to abide by a peace agreement they signed last July. If an environment safe enough for peacekeepers can be established, the plan deserves support.

As it stands now, Congo is split roughly in two. The government of Laurent Kabila, the erratic warlord who toppled the longtime dictator Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997, controls the south and west. He is backed by the armed forces of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Most of eastern Congo is controlled by three fractious rebel groups backed by Rwanda and Uganda. These groups have minimal popular support. Indeed, some of the worst fighting today is occurring not between state armies and rebel forces, but between indigenous ethnic militias and the rebel factions that they regard as occupying armies serving outside predators. Hit-and-run ambushes, retaliatory massacres, scorched-earth raids on villages and widespread rape are taking place in remote regions of eastern Congo.

The peace accord signed by all the key actors in Lusaka, Zambia, last July was intended to lead to an immediate cease-fire and a "national dialogue" among both armed and unarmed groups on the country's future. All sides continue to violate the accord, but large parts of Congo -- a country the size of the United States east of the Mississippi -- are substantially at peace. The proposed U.N. force would not -- and should not -- interpose itself between active combatants. Rather, it would provide security in relatively stable zones, which would

allow monitors to document violations of the accord there. The aim is to reduce security fears on all sides and build confidence that will enable the parties themselves to expand peaceful areas and address the more intractable issues.

Chief among them is the problem of how to neutralize the ethnic Hutu militias that found sanctuary in eastern Congo after participating in Rwanda's genocide in 1994 and have since staged murderous raids into Rwanda and Uganda. The Lusaka accord calls for disarming these groups, but it still is not clear how this will be accomplished. The proposed U.N. force will have a mandate to protect its own troops and civilians, but not to coercively disarm combatants.

The experiences of Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia have shown the disastrous potential of poorly conceived, ill-defined operations that lack the military or financial means to do the job. But there have been successful U.N. operations in Africa. The U.N. presided over Namibia's transition to independence and monitored elections that brought an end to a terrible war in Mozambique. If a modest commitment of African troops to shore up a shaky cease-fire in Congo reinforces the political will of the contending parties to move forward with their own peace agreement, something positive may be achieved, not just for Congo but for all of Africa.