The Washington Post
Tuesday, March 7, 2000
U.S. Tepid On European Defense Plan
By William Drozdiak
BRUSSELS -- When leaders of the 15-nation European Union decided in December to develop an independent military force within three years, the project was hailed as a long-overdue bid by the continent's most stable and affluent democracies to assume greater responsibility for their own security.
But three months after the historic decision, U.S. and some NATO officials believe the European plan may be a riskier proposition than it seemed at the time. Whether it succeeds or fails, there are concerns that the European Security and Defense Initiative could erode the continent's American defense guarantees and leave it dangerously exposed to new threats of instability.
American officials have objected that the effort could waste precious European military assets, alienate NATO members outside the EU and create rival military structures that might make it difficult for the United States and Europe to respond coherently to future crises.
Nearly a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO is entering perhaps the most delicate stage of its transition to a new post-Cold War security order in Europe. There is broad agreement that Europeans should become more self-sufficient militarily but there is reluctance in Europe to take steps that could undermine NATO and encourage the United States to call its forces home.
This shift is occurring as the commercial rivalry between the United States and Europe is reaching new heights. At the same time, there is a widening gap in perceptions about security threats: As Europe frets about regional ethnic conflicts, the United States seeks to develop a missile defense system to thwart weapons of mass destruction from countries such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq.
At a summit in Helsinki in December, EU leaders vowed to develop by 2003 the ability to deploy up to 60,000 soldiers within 60 days and sustain that force for up to a year.
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright has summed up U.S. concerns about the plan with what she calls the "three D's": The European defense initiative must not "decouple" the United States from Europe; it must not "duplicate" NATO structures and capabilities; and it must not "discriminate" against NATO members that do not belong to the EU.
This lukewarm response in Washington has stupefied Europeans. After clamoring for Europe to take control of its own security, the United States suddenly seems fearful that the Helsinki plan could jeopardize NATO and U.S. leadership of the alliance.
"We seem to be damned if we do and damned if we don't by our American friends, so this time we have decided to bear the criticism for going ahead," Javier Solana, the EU commissioner in charge of common foreign and security policy, said in an interview. "I've been working on initiatives to build European unity for many years now, and I've never seen so much will and determination as over the defense project."
Solana, who previously served as NATO's secretary general, said the EU defense force cannot be built overnight and "won't happen in a way that will destroy NATO. It's true that the United States may lose some leverage as Europe gets stronger, but that is inevitable and by no means an unhealthy thing, because a strong Europe can relieve some of the burdens carried by the world's only superpower."
Former British defense minister George Robertson, who succeeded Solana at NATO, also expressed exasperation at U.S. criticism. The European project was motivated largely by shame over the allies' weak performance in last year's air campaign against Yugoslavia, in which U.S. aircraft flew over 70 percent of the missions.
"The United States suffers from a sort of schizophrenia," Robertson said. "On one hand, the Americans say, 'You Europeans have got to carry more of the burden.' And then when Europeans say 'Okay, we will carry more of the burden,' the Americans say, 'Well, wait a minute, are you trying to tell us to go home?' "
But Robertson argues that Europe's strategic independence is not feasible because the allies will need U.S. military support for years to come. He says it would be "self-defeating" to think of the transatlantic defense link as a zero-sum game in which one side's gain is the other side's loss. "It's not about Europe going it alone, but about Europe doing more," he said.
"The litmus test for whether European defense is going to be real is ultimately going to be whether the capabilities are there on the military side to back it up," said Alexander Vershbow, the U.S. ambassador to NATO. He said that if the Europeans fail to spend sufficient money to reach the Helsinki goals, it will create a major internal crisis for the alliance.
"It could lead to a two-tier alliance," Vershbow said, "in which the Europeans only focus on low-intensity situations such as peacekeeping, while leaving NATO to do the dirty work at the high end of the spectrum. That would not be healthy for the transatlantic relationship."
The EU's declared goal of being able to deploy 60,000 soldiers--the kind of force that could serve as peacekeepers in hot spots like Bosnia and Kosovo--will require up to 200,000 soldiers because of rotation needs. Yet the European allies, with 2 million soldiers on paper, had trouble fielding 40,000 for peacekeeping in the Balkans. And the allies lack the huge transport planes required to project military power beyond their borders.
Meanwhile, defense budgets have been falling across much of Europe. Germany plans to reduce military spending by $10 billion over the next four years and already devotes only 1.4 percent of its gross national product to defense, a lower percentage than any NATO country except Luxembourg. According to NATO figures, the United States spends about 3.2 percent of GNP on defense, with Britain and France spending 2.8 and 2.6 percent, respectively.
But the rush to cash in the peace dividend is best reflected in the paltry sums European countries devote to military research and development. The United States spends about $35 billion annually on defense RD; the rest of NATO, only $9 billion. While the European members of NATO together spend about 60 percent of what the United States devotes to its military budget, duplication means they do not come close to generating 60 percent of U.S. capability.
The United States is also worried that NATO's role as Europe's primary security organization may be weakened by the nascent EU force, which like NATO will be governed by distinct political and military committees. The Clinton administration wants NATO to have a "right of first refusal" in dealing with crises before handing off responsibility to the EU force.
But France insists the EU must have exclusive powers to decide when and how it will intervene in any continental crisis. The French reject any formal consultative link between the EU and NATO, fearing that the United States would smother any effort by the Europeans to become more independent.
The French attitude exasperates some U.S. officials. "It's as if the United States were some kind of computer virus that, once let in the door, would cause a complete meltdown of the EU's ability to take decisions," Vershbow said.
The United States is also concerned that the EU force may jeopardize the security interests of six NATO members in Europe who are not members of the EU--Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. They fear being drawn into conflicts without any say over decisions.
There is skepticism in Congress among isolationists and NATO supporters alike about the European project. Those who want to pull the 100,000 U.S. troops out of Europe doubt the EU countries will boost their military budgets, while those who want to preserve the transatlantic connection fear a failure of the European defense initiative will ruin alliance solidarity.
Some in both groups question why Europe feels the need for a defense institution outside NATO.
"The good news is that Kosovo seems to have awakened Europe to the need to address its military shortcomings," said Rep. Doug Bereuter (R-Neb.), who is closely involved in the debate about European defense. "The bad news is that, although Europe is taking concrete steps toward assuming more responsibility for foreign and security affairs, it has done so only by taking relatively easy organizational steps."
Bereuter said he has trouble getting answers to key questions: Will the Europeans develop their own nuclear doctrine, based on the French and British nuclear deterrent forces? Will the Europeans insist on acting only with a U.N. mandate, something that did not deter NATO from launching the Kosovo air war?
"The worst of all outcomes," Bereuter said, "would be to enter the 21st century with a European foreign and security policy that competes with NATO and with allies whose military contribution to NATO continues to decline."