Prague Watchdog

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October 25, 2000

RUSSIAN POLITICAL FORCES ON THE WAR IN CHECHNYA

By Ilya Maksakov, correspondent of the daily "Nezavisimaya gazeta", Moscow

Special to Prague Watchdog

Much attention has been given to the differences between the first and second wars in Chechnya. One of them being the present absence of opposition to Moscow's actions in political circles; this could not be said of the 1994-96 campaign. Moreover, the positions of many political parties are literally concurring. Whilst there may be varying estimations as to the important events on the battle-front, there is no party or association which takes up the goals of the campaign, such as the neutralization of terrorism and preservation of the state's integrity.

We only have to look at the stance of the Russian Orthodox Church which must not be overlooked. The Patriarch of Moscow and Russia, Alexi II, expresses his opinion on the subject frequently and unequivocally. In particular he has announced his "spiritual support of the Russian army" as defender of Russias integrity. The Patriarch stated: "In the Northern Caucasus, our army opposes not only Chechen guerilla fighters but also the international terrorism which is trying to destroy stability and peace in our country." Also, at the beginning of this year the Russian Orthodox Church decorated commanders and officers who excelled in the Northern Caucasus for their services to Russia and the Church.

During the last year Russian political forces have had reason to express their positions and to act accordingly. Last autumn there was the commencement of military operations in the Northern Caucasus, followed by the explosions at residential houses in Russian cities, the potential crossing of the official Chechen border by Russian troops and then the dilemma of whether to advance into Chechnya to the south of the Terek river or to create a "sanitary cordon" north of the river. There was the expediency of the Grozny assault, the Andrei Babitsky case and the political conflict with PACE, the negotiations with Maskhadov, the enforcement of federal control in Chechnya and so on.

Besides the Narodny deputat [People's Deputy] alliance, the Yedinstvo [Unity] movement is the largest faction of the Duma, and for well-known reasons, supports the Kremlin in all matters. The more reticent position of the "bears" can be partly explained by the higher governing body's policy of consecutive problem-solving in Chechnya, which has in fact led to doubts and mistakes. Yedinstvo could neither afford to put pressure on authorities nor to advise on situations. Yet at the same time, the movement succeeded in establishing its branch in Chechnya [May 17, 2000] and, through this realization as an official structure, Yedinstvo is the only federal party to have its representatives in Chechnya. The leader of the Chechen branch, Lecha Magomadov, is an influential politician in the republic and his opinion has been considered by both sides since the first war. He was the most likely candidate for election as Chechen delegate to the State Duma, and would have gained the seat had it not been for the

sudden victory of Alsambek Aslakhanov.

The leader of the Yedinstvo faction, Boris Gryzlov, makes infrequent public appearances with unoriginal statements. For instance, he could not restrain himself from condemning the PACE decision to deprive the Russian delegation of their right of speech and the UN Commission's resolution for human rights, which he defined as an "outburst of anti-Russian hysteria". Nevertheless, as the party of power, Yedinstvo is obliged to follow a diplomatic role which is why Gryzlov has been simultaneously expressing his faith in the wise and reasonable position adopted by European politicians. He has said they are "...ready to seriously evaluate the efforts of the federal authorities to restore peace and order in the Northern Caucasus". In discussing pro-Kremlin political forces it should be mentioned that the leading figure in the dispute with European parliamentarians was Dimitry Rogozin, the Duma's Chairman for the Committee of Foreign Affairs and representative of Narodny deputat.

In terms of the expediency of negotiations with Aslan Maskhadov, Gryzlov has taken a cautious yet edifying approach. For example, when the chief of the independent public commission for the investigation of events in the Northern Caucasus, Pavel Krasheninnikov, was meeting Kazbek Machashev, a representative of the Chechen president, Gryzlov requested that representatives of the State Duma should coordinate their negotiations with Chechen leaders with federal bodies. In general, the Yedinstvo leader uses rhetoric which does not differ from the kind of statements which echo across the Kremlin and the White House: "...we do not fight against Chechens but for them, for their right to live in accordance with law, safety and prosperity ...Russia is ready to cooperate with international organizations to overcome human rights violations in Chechnya, but we are not going to yield to pressure and will not allow our victimization through the information war waged by Chechen leaders in the Western media [etc

...]".

Chechnya is almost the only issue on which Russian communists drop their opposition to the Kremlin. Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of the Russian communist party ,KPRF, voices an opinion which would be more typical of the most loyal supporters of Russia's governing body: "...all of us must be interested in the suppression of the bandit hot-spot in Chechnya, it engenders metastasis not only for Russia but for Europe too." Along with the majority of other Russian parliamentarians, Zyuganov vindicated Russia's actions in Chechnya concerning the dispute with PACE. In the communist leader's opinion, the decision made by PACE was "...hypocritical, unfair, shameful and humiliating". He believes the war in Chechnya to be a tragedy for the whole nation and does not view military action as a long term solution; yet despite supposedly being an adversary, he states that a positive, new period has begun in Russia : "...an epoch of creativity, smart diplomacy, restoration of lawfulness, respect for humanity and

responsible decisions", values which should also be sought for in Chechnya. Another communist leader and Speaker in the State Duma, Gennady Seleznev, has given his assurance of the high level of Russian public support for the tough treatment of criminal groups in Chechnya.

The Yabloko faction can perhaps be counted as the most consistent critic of the Russian government during the Chechnya campaign. Although no large political force would dare to be an absolute opponent to the Kremlin's actions [especially considering the public's strong support for anti-terrorist measures], before last year's State Duma elections Grigory Yavlinsky proposed an alternative view of the situation in the Northern Caucasus. He suggested that massive bombardments in Chechen territory should stop and that there should be a suspension of large-scale land offensives; he also called for negotiations with Maskhadov on matters concerning the extradition of terrorists held by Russian authorities. The storm of criticism which followed this statement made Yavlinsky and his union claim that their leader had been misunderstood. They explained that Yabloko was in favour of the liquidation of terrorists but with minimal casualties and did indeed support actions taken by the Russian armed forces in Che

chnya.

A number of prominent Russian political scientists have linked the failures of Yabloko and Yavlinsky in parliamentary and presidential elections with their attitude towards Chechnya. Despite this, Yabloko supporters are maintaining their standpoint. Delegates of the State Duma which belong to this faction did not boycott PACE sessions. In February, Javlinsky personally gave Putin [at the time still acting President] a plan for the resolution of the Chechen situation which stipulated the commencement of negotiations. Yavlinsky still insists on this, believing that talks must be conducted with those "...who kill us and whom we kill". However, the possibility of this occurring is seriously reduced by Yavlinsky's precondition; Moscow will only negotiate with those Chechen leaders who recognize Russian laws and whose hands are not stained with blood. He also accused the West of applying double standards to Russia.

As concerning Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, LDPR, there is a saying about him that "what the Kremlin has on its mind, Zhirinovsky has on his tongue". This is partly true, many of his statements seem to be testing public opinion on various initiatives. When the proposal of enforcing direct presidential control in Chechnya from Moscow was widely discussed, Zhirinovsky claimed that this question had already been decided and that the only possible answer was the implementation of Russian rule. He also stood by the official point of view on the impossibility of negotiations with Maskhadov. During January's PACE session Zhirinovsky was the most active defender of Moscow's position, and at a time when the President of Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev, was under private [but well-known] pressure from the Kremlin, Zhirinovsky made the harshest statements of his address. Still, the leader of the LDPR has shown occasional signs of independence, especially with matters w

hich he has never been indifferent to. One of them being his evidently anti-caucasian stance, which became wholly apparent after the terrorist act at Pushkinskaya square in Moscow. Immediately following the explosion, Zhirinovsky organized a meeting and demanded the "...severe punishment of terrorists in the Northern Caucasus".

Similarly to the communists, the union Otechestvo-Vsya Rossiya [Motherland - one whole Russia] is opposed to the Kremlin [though moderately so] and does not call to question anti-terrorist operations. One of the leaders of the OVR and mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, has repeatedly expressed his wish to see the military action in Chechnya continue right through to the end, even though at the beginning of the second campaign [along with another OVR leader, Yevgeny Primakov] he had objected to a large-scale operation, and backed only the creation of a sanitary zone. Nevertheless, Luzhkov has supported Putin's position concerning the direct presidential control of Chechnya and his refusal to begin peace talks. The Moscow mayor has a reputation of being an anti-Chechen politician; like Zhirinovsky, he also connected the explosion at Pushkinskaya square with the "Chechen trail". His prejudice becomes manifest even in the provision of economic aid to Chechnya. For instance, he was prepared to participate

in the reconstruction of the republic's economy but wanted to direct the funds from Moscow's municipal authorities to Cossack settlements on the left side of the Terek river.

Compared to Luzhkov, Primakov does hold a more flexible position . He does not disregard the factor of separatist leaders, he believes that the future situation in Chechnya will depend largely on the behaviour of guerilla fighters and does not exclude the possibility of negotiations with those who reject terrorism and are capable of "...really controlling the situation". In his opinion a denial of separatism is unnecessary as Chechnya's status could be discussed in the course of negotiations.

Finally, the most diverse position belongs to the Union of Right Forces, SPS, which in general is not opposed to the Kremlin but often tries to forward its own opinion to the Russian governing body. The leader of SPS, Boris Nemtsov, initially supported the idea of direct presidential control but then proposed another scheme which would appoint a "governor-general" who would be given a very wide latitude. SPS's flexibility was revealed by Nemtsov's statement that "...there cannot be a military solution to the Chechen problem but there can be a military-political solution." Another SPS member, Pavel Krasheninnikov, has attempted to establish contacts with Maskhadov's people, thus seeming to contradict the Kremlin's official position; however his heading of an independent commission on the founding of Chechnya was supported by Putin. Another example of the ambiguity of SPS's members was when Sergei Kovalyov, the faction's delegate from the State Duma, declared his support of the PACE decision concerni

ng Chechnya. He refused to boycott sessions in Strasbourg whilst the majority of the faction upheld the State Duma's official line.