An Ominous Moderation

By Arb?n Xhaferi

January 21, 2001

Various analysts had been recently speculating in the public that the 'democratic' changes in Serbia would eliminate the Kosova cause, that the Albanian idea would loose own relevance and that Serbs would once again take the leadership in solving the Balkans 'Gordian knot'. As an inclusive part of such na?ve or be they truly analytic reflections, Serbs are painted as cleansed of own responsibility, freed of the heavy burden of own consciousness, as serious and with a high level of statehood, with interesting projects for the Balkans, as unavoidable factors, great fighters for democracy, unreservedly pro-westerner etc. etc. Such Copernican-styled change of discourse, of opinion and assessment has been too exaggerated, eve effective counter-response.

First of all, one must understand that as far as Serbs and some of their allies are concerned, especially Russians, oblivion is not a psychological category, not even a moral one - it is simply a political category. By forgetting, they aim to achieve two goals:

* - to avoid the deserved punishment that, as an example, Germans are forced to pay even today, and

* - to restore their policy of hegemony and expansionism, carefully covered up with a layer of alleged moderation.

Kostunica, Gjingjic, Covic and others, hiding behind a fancy mask of moderation, followed by the exhausting, ascetic appearance of the derates and take the responsibility of facing the consequences of Milosevic's policy, to bend on his knees as Chancellor Willy Brandt did in asking for forgiveness, or at least act as Vatzlav Havel did; or to continue with the expansionist, colonialist policy of Milosevic. It cannot work to be both moderate and share Milosevic's aspirations at the same time. If they were moderates, they would have proven this during the Presheva valley crisis. Instead of presenting a political offer, they demand permission from UN to take military action 'for liquidate the terrorist bandits," i.e. to cleans again another territory, but this time with an approval of the world. This image of moderates is an ominous one, just as well as aggressive and possessive, to the same extend as the despot-styled image of Milosevic.

In addition to this hegemonic argument the source of which is the positive image of the new Belgrade power-holders, other arguments are used against the independence of Kosova, arguments that are supposed to achieve what tanks failed to achieve earlier.

One dangerous argument that had been often used and imposed lately is directly related to Macedonia. It is a well-orchestrated claim that independent Kosova would directly destabilize Macedonia. Such thesis reflects one tragic friendship, as on behalf of the well being of one nation, insists on the tragedy of another nation.

This is probably the most preferred thesis that had found place in the reflections of many politicians. Nevertheless, it is a fragile and a rather contradictory argument:

* - the future of Kosova and the Kosovar people depends on the mercy of neighboring states. If such methods had been used in other cases, many of the (presently) independent states would have not existed at all (today). Or, why Kosova and the Albanian people do not raise the issue fragmentized Albanian territories caused by the independence of Macedonia;

* - why should one state, Macedonia, be destabilized when, according to democratic standards, this state should be also of the Albanians;

* - when and where such segregating argument had been used before?

With such rhetorical argument that raises verbal, non-political dilemmas, which would include persistent demand of guarantees that would prevent such possibility, essentially aims to hide the opposing possibility: dependence, reintegration of Kosova within the so called Yugoslavia would directly destabilize Macedonia. WHY?

The first scenario

The international factor, convinced by Serbian arguments, decides to support the reintegration of Kosova within Yugoslavia. Such act would require that the Kosovar leadership and people would be previously convinced, which is out of any question. Then the international factor would threaten with two alternatives: first, by pulling their forces out of Kosova, i.e. allowing the open confrontation between TMK and FRY Army, which cannot be justified politically; second, by threatening to cooperate with FRY Army to pacify Kosova. The second possibility would automatically transform KFOR into an occupying force or at least one wing of the Yugoslav Army, which is out of any logic or interest. In both cases, Kosova people would continue their struggle. As a result, Albanians would show their solidarity, especially the Albanians in Macedonia, which means that the war would be slowly transferred to Macedonia, gradually destabilizing this country. Macedonian authorities would attempt to prevent the implication of own c

itizens in the Kosovar developments, which could lead to confrontation with own or foreign citizens.

The first alternative could also provoke some more global distortion. Left without any support from western factors, Kosovars begin to suffer fragmentize. Groups that would seek support in pro-Islamic orientation appear on the scene. Such ideological and structural fragmentation is predictable even if the international factor would convince the Albanian political leadership. Small groups are out of control; and they act on all territories inhabited by Albanians.

The second scenario

The international community manages somehow to convince the Albanians to agree with the imperative of a time-factor and not refuse the integration of Kosova within Yugoslavia. The process as such is carried out without significant disturbances in Kosova, but over here in Macedonia one could witness other developments. By having a political pretext and realizing own national interest of staying with Kosovars again (as they were during the last eighty years), the ethnic Albanians of Macedonia would join the other pro-Yugoslav forces in Macedonia in an attempt to rejoin Macedonia within the, now hypothetical, Yugoslavia. The idea as most natural: why should Albanians spliot isolated.

The argument that independent Kosova would destabilize Macedonia is essentially nothing but a curtain, used to hide the lack of essential arguments, previously used to justify the occupation of Kosova.

Arguments used against the independence of Montenegro are of the same nature: don't demand own independence, as you would provoke independence of Kosova! These are false, rhetorical and hypothetical arguments that aim to hide the complete failure of the project of Serbian hegemony in the Balkans.

The problem is not in Kosova, Macedonia or Montenegro. The problem is with the Serbian expansionism. The problem lies with the political schizophrenia of Kostunica, his team and their anachronous, hegemonic and colonialist projects.

The problem lies in the fact that Kostunica is a nationalist, but attempts to presents himself as being moderated. The problem lies in the fact that they, Kostunica and his team, aim to achieve by using moderated means what Milosevic failed to achieve by using arms. The problem lies in the fact that the new Serbian political class thinks that NATO made a mistake, the USA has an anti-European policy, that ICTY is a political body, that Serbians are not to be blame.

Soon enough we will understand that Kostunica has no offer and that he and his moderated appearance is even more dangerous for the peace in the region. At least Milosevic was clear and easily to decode.

Kostunica dangerously hides the truth. For how long?