KOSOVO: EVIDENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONSABILITY OF PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC FOR WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY COMMITTED IN 1998.

PRESENTATION OF THE REPORT ON THE RESPONSABILITIES OF THE BELGRADE REGIME TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION FOR KOSOVO, MR. WOLFGANG PETRICH.

Press Summary

Rambouillet, 18 February 1999

The conclusion of the "No Peace Without Justice" report on the violations of international humanitarian law in Kosovo are very clear: the report establishes the individual criminal responsibility of President Slobodan Milosevic for the planning and conduct of the campaign by the Serb Ministry of Interior forces and the Federal Army and for the serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Kosovo during 1998.

The NPWJ team is primarily composed of former ICTY personnel with extensive experience working for the Tribunal on the same issues raised by this Report. They conducted field work in the former Yugoslavia, followed-up by extensive research in Brussels, Washington DC and New York.

The report demonstrates the existence of a campaign organised from within the State structure of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which involved the widespread commission of violations of international humanitarian law. It emphasises the necessity of establishing the individual criminal responsibility of those persons within the political and military hierarchy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia who have planned, ordered, instigated and executed a campaign of violence and terror within Kosovo, which has resulted in widespread suffering and destruction.

Any agreement reached in Rambouillet will not serve the purposes of peace and reconciliation without strong provisions concerning the access of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal to Kosovo and the obligation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to provide her with full co-operation. In addition, all States must fulfil their duty of assistance to the International Tribunal by providing the Prosecutor with information of any kind that she might require in order to conduct a full investigation in Kosovo and bring to trial those persons responsible for the atrocities which have been committed. If such persons are not now held accountable for their criminal actions, there can be no peace in Kosovo, both immediately and in the years to come.

While the Belgrade regime denied the ICTY Prosecutor access to FRY territory, including Kosovo, the No Peace Without Justice team was able to travel to Kosovo and other parts of FRY, as well as the neighbouring couries of Macedonia and Albania, in October and November 1998, in order to conduct the necessary field research for the preparation of this report.

In the field, they met and interviewed various individuals and organisations on the ground, including local journalists and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), members of the diplomatic community, representatives of international NGOs, as well as of international governmental agencies, and personnel from the various Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Missions.

The team analysed the events in Kosovo and related these directly to international humanitarian law as applied by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The team did not seek to document every violation of international humanitarian law committed in Kosovo during the conflict, but it concentrated on the offensive carried out from June to October 1998, in order to ascertain whether the crimes committed were part of a pattern of violation of the fundamental laws of war, reflecting a policy decision at the highest level in Belgrade.

The report establishes the full competence and jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia over the crimes committed in Kosovo and calls for unimpeded access to the investigators of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to Kosovo.

In establishing the ICTY's jurisdiction, the report establishes that there was an "armed conflict" at the time relevant to the events discussed, which is a necessary criterion for the application of the provisions of international humanitarian law within the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal. The report does not, however, seek to make a determination of when exactly this armed conflict commenced and, in an excess of caution, avoids an extensive discussion of events which took place in the first half of 1998, concentrating instead on the campaigns of July, August and September. The purpose of this limitation is merely to ensure that there can be no question as to the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal over the events which occurred in Kosovo in the period covered. The conflict in Kosovo clearly continued since October 1998 and recent events, including the massacre of numerous Kosovars in Racak and the continued shelling of towns and villages in that and other areas, show that the same policie

s continue to be carried out by the security forces.

By engaging in a systematic review of several incidents which took place in the chosen time period, in the context of the conflict as a whole, the report demonstrates that these events must be regarded as part of a wider policy on the part of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These authorities sought to crush the Kosovo Liberation Army through direct attacks on their bases and strongholds, as well as the targeting of their support network among the civilian population by instigating a campaign designed to terrorise the Kosovar population as a whole. This fundamental aim dictated all of the events which occurred in Kosovo and involved the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law by personnel acting under the authority of the leaders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The summary of events from March and April through to October 1998, contained in the report, reveals the stark reality of a sequence of attacks and operations conforming to a large degree to a pa

ttern, which could only have been directed by a central policy and source.

By the summer of 1998, military and police forces were thus being used to halt the activities of the Kosovo Liberation Army, which had garnered a large amount of support from the civilian population, by seeking to destroy their bases, remove their key personnel, prevent their acquisition of arms and equipment and ensure that the Kosovars as a whole were cowed into submission through fear, intimidation and the destruction of their property. This escalation into terrorisation of the civilian population came after several years of intimidation by the Serbian police forces in Kosovo and the widespread abuse of human rights in the province, and constitutes an unlawful method of operation during armed conflict.

The provisions of the Statute of the International Tribunal that are discussed in the report are contained in Articles 3 and 5, which relate to violations of the laws or customs of war and crimes against humanity. In particular, it is made evident that many of the attacks launched by the Serbian police and military forces in Kosovo involved the wanton destruction of towns and villages, as well as devastation not justified by military necessity, the bombardment of undefended dwellings, and the plunder of private property. Insofar as these attacks and incidents demonstrate a widespread or systematic nature, they are also considered as crimes against humanity, and constitute, among other things, the crime of persecution.

During the conflict in 1998, the persecution of the Kosovar population took the form of:

1. attacks on towns and villages inhabited by Kosovar civilians;

2. the killing and causing of serious injury or harm to Kosovar civilians, including women, children, the elderly and the infirm, both during and after such attacks;

3. the arbitrary selection, detention and imprisonment of male members of the Kosovar population during such attacks;

4. the coercion, intimidation and terrorisation the Kosovar population such that they abandoned their property and homes;

5. wanton and excessive destruction of civilian dwellings and other buildings;

6. wilful destruction of private property, including crops and livestock; and

7. the organised looting and plundering of civilian property.

The assembly and co-ordination of the various Serbian forces which were present on the ground in Kosovo, and were involved in the operations there, indicates a sophisticated level of planning and instruction for the campaign to be thus orchestrated. Consequently, a considerable degree of power within the State hierarchy would have been required. At this time, all power within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia emanates from one source, the President, Slobodan Milosevic, and it cannot be doubted that he has, since the beginning, been intimately connected with the entire course of the conflict.

Since 1989, President Milosevic has closely controlled all aspects of life within Serbia and has carefully organised the structure of the Republic, as well as of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in a manner which ensures his domination. As Chief of the Supreme Defence Council, Milosevic ordered the utilisation of the VJ in Kosovo, despite the objections of the Montenegrin premier. At the same time, he favoured the deployment of huge numbers of police forces, whom he was able to control through his national security adviser and head of Serbian State security, Jovica Stanisic, and through the head of the Serbian public security department, Vladimir Djordevic. There can be no question that he was and is in direct contact with the police and military commanders in the field - Stanisic and Djordevic on the one hand, and General Pavkovic of the Yugoslav Army on the other - and has directed their activities from Belgrade.

The Statute of the International Tribunal provides for two different forms of superior responsibility - under Article 7(1) and Article 7(3) - which are incurred by those persons who directed the Serbian campaign and controlled the forces involved in the commission of crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war. Such responsibility must be placed at the highest level in order to satisfy the mandate of the International Tribunal to contribute to the maintenance of peace and the achievement of reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia.

It would be wholly artificial to seek to address the crimes committed in the Kosovo conflict without recognising that the primary actor, involved at all levels in the planning, ordering, instigation and execution of these crimes, was indeed the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. President Milosevic carefully selected those forces that were to be used in Kosovo and directly communicated his instructions and expectations to their commanders in the field.

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