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RIPENESS IS ALL

It is a venerable point of discussion among historians, what the relationship is between so-called "infra" - and "suprastructure" in society.As is well known, Marxists had a quasi-automatic concept: only the "productive forces" were real sources of progress. Ideologies, by constrast, were considered of secondary importance, since they would represent only a mirror-image of evolution.

Today, only few scientists would believe in such a mechanical scheme. Most of them conclude that ideas have a power of their own, although their impact on history remains limited if they do not ( not yet or no more) correspond to real needs. In other words, ideas do not just reflect reality: they can influence it, provided they arrive at the proper moment, in a period when they are "ripe".

The European federal concept

For instance, the European federal concept was advocated brilliantly before the XXth century, but the proposal remained a literary exercise, whereas the end of the nationalistic era provides a concrete response.

This philosophy (opposed to the one supported by Altiero Spinelli) inspired a minority of the European Union of Federalists in the 50-ies and 60-ies. It considered itself as gradualist and possibilist. Of course they realised that Jean Monnet was right in underlining that institutions are indispensible since they consolidate potential progress. But they considered it useless to propose perfectionated federal constitutions at a moment when they were untimely. It was better to stick to less perfect institutional reforms that were "ripe".

Such considerations may be realistic, even today.

What is realistic after Maastricht

In Maastricht, two main federalistic schemes were on the table: Monetary and Political Union. All too often, these were referred to as if connected, which was true only in part. Unfortunately, they were far from having reached the same level of feasabilty, or "ripeness".

Monetary Union had already been prepared by several years of the half-way European Monetary System. Surely, the leap towards a full-fledged common European currency remained a difficult one. Only two member states, Luxembourg and France, already fullfilled the conditions for admission: a reasonably balanced budget, inflation well under control and a limited national debt.

The other ten countries were given time until 1997 or even 1999, to prepare for the final aim. No doubt this meant a series of painful and unpopular measures. Nonetheless, those who signed the Maastricht-agreement knew that a deflationist policy was indispensible, and accepted its consequences, in order to make this union a success before the end of the century. This time, in contrast to the unsuccessful Werner-plan of the 1970-ies, a drastic reform could be put into practice. This time, it was "ripe".

Is Political Union Impossible?

As far as the other project ("Europe speaking and acting in common") was concerned, the situation, was quite different.

Concerning Political Union, each country has its own cherished culture in international affairs, so that it seems unrealistic to build on the hypothesis that such deep-rooted traditions could be rapidly eliminated or even harmonized. Recent events demonstrated how fundamental the contrasts are.

The tension in the Middle-East gave the first example. Whereas the Netherlands have a strong leaning towards Israel (which does not exclude occasional criticism vis-à-vis the government), de Gaulle could play the Arab card without meeting sizeble opposition. For the moment, the gap could not possibly be bridged.

The second example, connected with previous one, is the Gulf-war, in which Britain lined up unconditionally with the U.S., whereas the Federal republic stood apart, and Mitterand rationalized the French position with arguments that had nothing to do with London's.

Finally: the Yugoslav drama. From the beginning, Germany advocated a rapid recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. In Bonn's view, the pseudo-federal state under Serbian hegemony had no future any more. The Dutch for their part, came to Belgrade with the friendly but conservative illusion that conciliation was still an issue. Consequently, the European Community, in the name of which they acted, lost precious time, while an atrocious civil war went on.

We do not conclude that such obvious divergencies make diplomatic union unpracticable henceforth. On the contrary, systematic efforts have to be made in order to produce a rapprochement. But, contrary to monetary union, a common diplomacy is unthinkable for the time being. Here we have to act with conviction, but carefully, playing for time. Effective integration in this field is not yet ripe.

The Europe of Regions

In order not to conclude on a seemingly "pessimistic" note, we are convinced that in two other realms, the situation is ripe.

First, the Community can rapidly consider granting co-operation in the decision-making process, to the regions. In fact, Europe is richer in diversities than the simple flags of our nation-states seem to indicate.

It is a fact of life that the interests and aspirations between, say, Bavaria and Schleswig-Holstein do not necessarily co-incide. The same is true between the mezzogiorno and the industrial triangle Milan-Turin-Genova.

Secondly, there is Community-help to and co-operation with our fellow-Europeans beyond what was the Iron Curtain. In Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary (fortunately, these three might form a kind of Middle-European "Benelux"!), the situation is worsening. We could not possibly be too generous or too fraternal. Here, civil society and the Community authorities have to work together systematically and .... fast. Here at least an inspiring, overall action is more-than-ripe!

Prof. Dr. Hendrik Brugmans

Europae Collegii Rector Emeritus