From: Buchung K. Tsering, International Campaign for Tibet

1994 and 1995 witnessed a significant surge in Chinese government efforts to restrict the growth of religion in Tibet. Official government pronouncements clearly state that more restrictions are being put into place, from halting further construction of monasteries, to limiting youth from joining monasteries, to increasing government oversight and management of monastic activity.

These and other measures are part of a shifting policy on religion in Tibet which aims to actively restrict and suppress the spread and growth of organized religious activity. This report comes five years after the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) released its ground-breaking religious freedom report "Forbidden Freedoms." During the intervening five years, ICT has found no substantial improvement in any area of religious freedom. ICT has monitored over 10 key areas of religious freedom in Tibet, and found that despite international scrutiny and constructive engagement with China, there has been no loosening of religious controls.

The report's findings include:

* Renovation and reconstruction of monasteries must be approved by relevant government departments. Unapproved rebuilding is prohibited but often occurs in some areas, particularly in remote parts of Tibet and with smaller monasteries and temples.

* As of 1994 the Chinese government has officially declared that a sufficient number of monasteries, monks and nuns now exist to "satisfy the daily religious needs of the masses," and that more rebuilding is not needed.

* The number of monks and nuns in each monastery is controlled by Chinese government regulation. Monasteries had been petitioning to increase the officially sanctioned number but policy statements in 1994/1995 indicate that increases will henceforth not be granted. Moreover, according to one pronouncement, "overstaffed monasteries must liquidate their excesses."

* Tibetans often must secure government approval to enter a monastery. Young Tibetans are admitted to monasteries through a number of procedures, ranging from the relatively traditional agreement between the candidate's parents and his or her teacher, to an extremely regulated and politicized process controlled by government and Communist Party officials. Chinese authorities often exert the most control over the admission process at monasteries located in or near large cities having a substantial Chinese population.

* In 1994 and 1995 renewed and more vigorous efforts were aimed at preventing Tibetan Communist Party members from showing any signs of religious belief. In the past, there existed varying amounts of leeway for Tibetan cadres to unofficially practice and believe in religion. Tibetan party members often kept their beliefs quiet, and officials looked the other way. This period is now coming to an end, at least for the time being, as Tibetan party members are coming under closer scrutiny, and are liable for punishments and demotions which they did not face in the past.

* In recent years China has stepped up efforts to reduce the amount of voluntary offerings made to monasteries by lay people, and criticizing monks who live off other people's work like "parasites." Legally, offerings to monasteries are permitted as long as they are "freely offered and small in quantity." Authorities in Chamdo Prefecture called the number and size of offerings "shocking" and decried the growth of religion there. The people's goal, prefecture authorities said, should be to "invest our money in commercial production instead of giving to monasteries."

* The overwhelming bulk of funding for monastic reconstruction and operating expenses comes from offerings from the Tibetan population. The Chinese government has provided some subsidies, particularly to monasteries with historic links to pre-Communist China or that have historical or tourist significance. Over half of all subsidies have gone to fewer than 10 sites. The two largest recipients by far are the Potala palace and the Tashilunpo monastery. While this money is touted as going to religion, the Tashilunpo is home to the Panchen Lama and the Potala Palace is now a historical site not a religious one and remains the site of the only major monastery (Namgyal) in the Lhasa area that has not been allowed to resume religious functions.

* Restrictions are placed on the substance of teachings, on who can give them, on who can receive them, on the size of the crowd receiving them and so forth. Often monasteries must receive official permission from local authorities before a certain type of teaching or ceremony is performed. A common calculation by the authorities is how many people would be drawn to such a ceremony, and whether it could take on anti-Chinese overtones. Monks and nuns are also restricted or forbidden from performing a variety of rituals in people's homes and in other places outside of the monastery.

* Over half of Tibetan prisoners of conscience are monks and nuns reflecting the leadership roles monks and nuns have taken in pro-independence demonstrations and other banned political activities.

* An overwhelming majority of detained monks and nuns are routinely and brutally beaten during the initial days and weeks of their confinement when their cases are being investigated. Torture includes electric shock, hanging by extremities, dunking and dousing with cold water, deprivation of sleep, exposure to intense cold, lacerations from sharp objects, internal injuries from blows to the head, abdomen and joints, electric shocks to the mouth and genitals, attacks by dogs, rape and sexual abuse.

* Numerous credible reports indicate that nuns have been forced to strip off their clothes when subjected to beatings and torture. Torture has involved the rape of women and nuns by inserting electric batons in their vaginas.

* A key element of China's campaign to control monks and nuns is expulsion from monasteries. Expulsion has sometimes been a routine process following arrest and imprisonment. Expulsions can also occur independent of an arrest or imprisonment on the recommendation of a work team and/or the Democratic Management Committee.

* By far the most explosive religious freedom issue this decade is the dispute over the discovery and recognition of the Panchen Lama. China has taken a hard-line stand by dominating the process, rejecting any role for the Dalai Lama and installing a boy identified through a trumped-up selection process. The result is that there is now a legitimate Panchen Lama - and a rival one with enormous financial and political backing from Beijing. China's motives as of 1995 are inextricably caught up in its current hard-line campaign to combat the influence of the Dalai Lama in Tibet, which in turn is part of its drive to securely maintain Tibet within the "motherland."

* A bellwether of China's Tibet policy are the descriptions of the Dalai Lama, which vary year by year. 1994/1995 has seen a sharp shift in terminology of the Dalai Lama, and for the first time, China is taking the position that he is no longer a religious leader.

* A two day visit to Lhasa in November, 1994 by Abdel Fattah Amor, the UN special rapporteur on religious intolerance did little to expand the dialogue on religious freedom between China and the UN. The Special Rapporteur's most recent report contained only a brief mention of China. His visit was marred by excessive efforts by the government to ensure he had no unsanctioned contact with Tibetans and, moreover, by outright misrepresentations regarding religious freedom issues.

* A range of Communist Party and government structures have been erected in Tibet to keep religious practice under limits acceptable to the Chinese leadership. In recent years the most intrusive role has been played by the "Democratic Management Committees," (DMC), set up in all monasteries and nunneries to implement government and Party policies and regulations. DMCs also frequently act as the eyes and ears of the government and the Party in monasteries.

* In 1994/1995 "work teams"=20were particularly active in monasteries, consisting of Party members and government workers who, in conjunction with the DMCs, conduct "educational" sessions with monks and nuns. The official role of these work teams, according to the Chinese Buddhist Association, is "organizing monks and nuns in the study of the opinions of the Tibetan regional party committee" and to "educate" them "to be patriotic" and "abide by the law." The unofficial role is also to test the political loyalty of monks and nuns and identify monks and nuns for surveillance, expulsion from the monastery or arrest.

* A questionnaire for district government officials in Tibet conducted in March 1994 provides an overview of many current government concerns:

- How many [monasteries in your district] have been renovated or newly constructed without government permission?

- Do they house the government allocated number of monks and nuns?

- Were they ever involved in the 1959 reactionary revolt or 1987 separatist activities?

- How many times were they involved and how many people participated?

- How many people were detained, sentenced or sent to the "Reform Through Labor" program?

- How many escaped or are under investigation?

- How many reincarnate Lamas have been appointed and do they come from the outside [India]?

- Are they followers of the separatist movement?

- Are these incarnate Lamas meddling in the administration, law and order and education of the community?

- How are the Communist Party and the People's Government struggling to restrict the activities of religion, according to the rules of law?

The International Campaign for Tibet

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Phone: +1 (202) 785-1515 Washington, D.C. 20006

Fax: +1 (202) 785-4343 Non-profit, Tibet advocacy group