EMANUELE GAZZO.

Director of Europe Agency

ABSTRACT: Document on the European Union and federalism prepared for the 36th Congress of the Radical Party (Rome, Hotel Ergife, 30 April - 3 May)

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A fight is always a fight, even if its total impact or overall effect has some positive aspects. The difficulty is to identify and "purge" the negative aspects. Results may be the fruit of a "policy" aimed at establishing a new balance. While admitting that chaos is natural, even the essence of life, the search for a certain degree of organisation does not necessarily go against this: rather, it means that change is constant but prevents perpetual chaos from becoming a new form of inertia.

In recent years, the world has had an opportunity to "boil" without "exploding," which proves the existence of a system of safety valves which has managed to keep functioning. The dust stirred up by the fall of the Berlin Wall obscured some things for a while, but it also gave birth to new ideas. Some cautious souls took this as an incentive to move ahead on the path towards "globalisation." Hence, in light of events which were not necessarily a result of this fall, an idea was born (or reborn) and developed: one must "finally" (and the root "final" is significant) establish a new world order which is implicitly uni-directional.

Europeans - we use the conventional meaning of the word Europe: an entity having competencies and powers - quickly realised that it was probably Willy Brandt who took the first chink out of the Berlin Wall in 1970 with his "Ostpolitik" (the Treaty between Germany and the USSR signed in Berlin on 12 August and that between Germany and Poland signed in Warsaw on 7 December). If one keeps these things in perspective, one is struck by the fact that these events took place about the same time that de Gaulle fell from power, that Jean Monnet's Europe decided to open its doors to the British and the "Nordics" and to launch an "economic and monetary union" as well as to establish "political cooperation," the ultimate goal of which was a "common foreign policy." However, the unforgettable Ambassador Roberto Ducci, who represented Italy on the Davignon Committee, was not able to get these three words written into the text. This was (almost) accomplished by the Treaty signed at Maastricht in February.

At the time, "Ostpolitik" was seen by Germany's partners with suspicion; they feared the return of the Rapallo mentality (some have even alluded to this recently, 70 years after the fact). In the Community, and especially in France, one wonders if the former demon of hegemony might not come back to haunt the Germans: at the time, some even felt that the Community was becoming a suit that was "too tight for Germany." That was in 1971 and not 1992. In Ostpolitik, Brezhnev saw the objective confirmation of a doctrine which proved to the whole world that the path of détente did not go through Prague or Bucharest (which was a fashionable capital), but only through Moscow.

In any case, Ostpolitik did not bring Brandt good luck, and his term of office ended on a sad note, with the accusation that his government had harboured the spy Guillaume. In contrast, these events were at the origin of the so-called Helsinki process, where the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe" opened in July 1973. The initials CSCE have taken on a new meaning with the new climate in East-West relations. This process has also confirmed the material presence of the Soviet Union (including its Asian territory) and of North America on the European continent.

In the years that followed, the Community was active in its relations with the Eastern European, or Comecon countries. It consistently and tenaciously insisted on keeping two options open, by establishing relations that included "mutual information" between two fundamentally different organisations, the path being open to bilateral relations between the various Comecon countries and the Community as a single entity. Moscow's acceptance of this principle represented a remarkable "political" success, but its scope of application remained within the recognised scope of Community competencies, i.e., mainly trade relations and, indirectly, economic relations.

Then, when the earth began to shake, many within the Community realised that the "political" timing was right: but everyone was surprised by how quickly things moved. Mitterrand, who was the President of the European Council then, convened a dinner-summit at the Elysée on 18 November 1989, but it was not immediately clear that the problem of German reunification should be dealt with "under Community control." This was an event that each country had to deal with on its own, and this is still hard for some to accept. The Community was not, of course, inactive, but it seemed surprised and a bit frightened by its role as a "point of reference" to which the Central and Eastern European countries looked. The 1989 European Council approved a series of statements and decisions which "went with the flow," without trying to guide it or change it. These were mainly "intercontinental" initiatives. Perhaps this was unavoidable. But it was practically a year before any genuine "political position" was taken, alth

ough such positions were formulated in the framework for action which did not go beyond the Community competency in the strict sense of the word. However, it should be noted that during the European Council of December 1990 - particularly in light of the pressure exerted by the Commission - the Twelve adopted measures for economic aid, but with the specific aim of supporting Gorbachev's policies, because his political adversaries (the "conservatives") wanted him to fail and were "organising" poverty, especially in the big cities.

It was then wondered whether the support given Gorbachev was an error of assessment of the true situation in the then "Soviet Union". But Member States unanimously conceded that there was nothing to do but adopt a minimalist approach, because it was impossible to anticipate whether the "earthquake" would have any consequences, where they would be and of what intensity. No one has emerged right or wrong from the events. Lech Walesa said he was profoundly disappointed in the slow pace with which Europe has acted and continues to act. He believes that the West does not understand that there has been a revolution and therefore reasons according to traditional lines of thought. That is why it supported Gorbachev when he was already destined to fail. But Walesa himself deplores the fact that the Poles moved too hastily in their attempt to "meet the West" and to adopt the most advanced forms of capitalism. The result is that they now find themselves in considerable trouble and are forced to back track.

It goes without saying, moreover, that the Community can only act in a global framework, trying to favour its own initiatives which it believes to be the most useful for Central and East European countries but also more coherent with its own development. All this must be judged in the context of a future architecture of Europe and its protagonists, i.e. tenants of the future "European House". At the moment, there is a mushrooming of economic-financial, political, political-polycentric, military, administrative bodies. This proliferation goes hand in hand with the swelling of contents and responsibilities of existing organizations where committees, sub-committees and groups are created and vie with one another for priorities. All this is perhaps inevitable but also very lamentable. This is especially true, because while it only constitutes one of many nuisances in normal times, what would occur in case of a real crisis is not known. The fact is that there is an attempt to organize the "transition", but

nobody is really sure of the direction it should take.

The Commission has a few ideas on the subject. This is natural as it knows that one of the ideas cherished by those who are hoping for the end of the Community is to see it extend from Vancouver to Vladivostock. The Commission is studying various ideas still to be clarified. A "break" is needed to consolidate what was decided in Maastricht, towards reinforcement. If it were possible on a voluntarist basis, the Community could encourage "natural" grouping to meet choices which, to a certain extent, have already been put into application. These groupings could be formed on bases that are similar if not identical to those chosen by the Community for its own formation. Thus, it would become not only an example, but a "model". It would be possible to evolve as far as "personal unions" by organising the presence of observers in decision making bodies on a mutual basis. This would result in a sort of natural "osmosis" to make "gentle" change possible. It would also, at a given time, make "globalisation" almost aut

omatic. This would not necessarily be merger into a "mega-Community" but rather the "Community of Communities" to fulfil the need for coherence and ineluctable differentiation between the major elements making up the European identity.

The Commission has not only considered things for the medium and long term. From the very beginning it has acted by trying to go beyond the limits of its competencies in order to stimulate, rally, and coordinate - giving necessary emphasis to constituting "emergency aid" in the food, technological and management domains. It has wisely avoided setting itself up as the "teacher" of democracy, preferring to set an example through action. This has, admitted Vice President Andriessen, sometimes forced it to "start right back at the beginning again". It has, however, managed to get the message across where it could be heard.

It is true, nevertheless, that, at the present time, the three countries with which it has signed association agreements including political consultation - namely Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary - have learnt the lesson and signed a triangular free trade agreement between them which will develop to transform itself into a true "common market" by the end of the decade. This automatically implies "stopping for a break" in the wild race towards accession, the generator of so many misunderstandings.

As far as the CIS republics are concerned, one is faced with a political prerequisite. One has still to understand whether the CIS claims to be evolving - and will really evolve - towards a "liquidator" body charged with managing role - and resource - sharing, or whether, on the other hand, it is the embryo intended to give new vitality - we do not know in what form - to an entity with dimensions similar to the former USSR. It is only when it knows the reply that the Community - and with it the West as a whole - will be able to decide whether to aid the different republics - so making division final - or whether to encourage unification (as did the Marshall Plan and its instruments which resulted in the OECE and the Community).

This does not mean that the Community, in its relations with Central and Eastern European countries, is giving up "defining and implementing common foreign and security policy" (as written in Article J-1 of the Maastricht Treaty), that is, in practice, to also have an Ostpolitik. But let us be realistic: for the moment the Community is only, as far as foreign policy is concerned, in its earliest infancy. The proof of this is that the ministers who are to meet in the conclave in Portugal should begin by trying to understand what "major common interests" are and how to imagine the hypothetical "common actions". We are at the methodology stage of a gradual approach towards "possible" common foreign policy. A reminder is in order: this was the point of departure of the proposals to relaunch political Union with which Mr. Saragti tried to break the ice after failure of the Fouchet Plan, a plan that de Gaulle had hoped to impose upon the Europe of Six. But this was back in October 1964.