Japan has become a giant power. However, according to the author, Japan has not learned how to perform as a giant: the ludicrous performance of the Diet's "Non-war Declaration," the government's hypocritical treatments on the issues of "forced prostitution," "force labors," and the June Fourth Tiananmen Incident, showed that Japan politically is still an underdeveloped "infant" (p.6). Based on these facts, Asai tries to answer the following questions: what stance should Japan take to the international society, what role does the international society expect of Japan? Until then, this issue has been argued only from the conservative side, represented by Ozawa Ichiro's The Blueprint of Reforming Japan. Since the 1990 Gulf Crisis, they argued that Japan should make "military contributions" besides financial supports to the US led "international society." Their purpose is to push Japan to become a military giant power (pp.6-7).
Rather than academic studies, Asai drew his conclusions in this book through public speeches and dialogues. He appeals to Japanese people who were cheated by the government authorities or concealed from the truth by the mass media on some important issues. Asai wrote this book with a strong crisis consciousness from the current Japanese political situation: the forcible passing of the UN Peace Keeping Organization (PKO) bill in the Diet which makes sending armies abroad possible, the governmental implementations of sending the Self Defense Forces (SDF) abroad, the bureaucracy's maneuver to pursue a giant power status by becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the small district election system that will bring a totalitarian (taisei yokusan) political system (*1), the so-called "administrative and financial reforms" which will make implying power politics easily, the backward attacks on education and local autonomy, and last, the revision of the constitution (especially clause 9) which prohibi
ts war, military forces and military operations abroad. The conservative political forces, represented by the "reformist" Ozawa who is actually more conservative than the conservative LDP paramount leader Nakasone, believe in only power: power is justice and justice equals to power (p.80).
In the first chapter, Asai discusses the giant Japan's position in the international politics. He stresses that besides the meaning of opposing war, the constitution also teaches how Japan reached this conclusion, i.e., Japanese must remember their war history (as criminals), and the constitution is a general national determination of Japan toward the world not to pursue military power again. However, the biased US occupation policy caused the conservative Japanese politics (p.32), which has emphasized only the miserable war result of Japan as a victim (p.77). Ozawa labeled the general national feeling of refusing Japan's armament as the "pacifism for only one country" to stop any refutation (p.45). Asai points out that their international sense came from the old experience of how a giant power (the Chinese empire) treated small dependent kingdoms (Korea, Ryokyu); they just want to push Japan to replace the declined Chinese empire. Asai even suggests that Japan should learn more from China (and European pow
ers) whose "five peaceful co-living principles"foreign policy, which is derived from the miserable modern history, is much more equal and progressive (p.48-49). As the former China Section chief of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, Asai's observation is unique as well as excellent, though there exist obvious failures of China's foreign policy.
Chapter 2 discusses Japan's international contribution under the current situation of international disputes. Asai points out that the Japanese postwar ruling conservative forces are the same figures in the war period, except their sharply changing attitude toward the U.S., which had no experience as a global giant when it suddenly became a superpower after WW II (p.53-54). Even until recently, the U.S. violated the judgment of the International Court of Justice and invaded Nicaragua in 1986. The worst is that the Japanese government can only follow the U.S.: it continuously changed the definition of the "military forces" which is prohibited by the constitution and eventually reached the "limitation" (!) of the constitution. For example, how to declaim that sending the SDF abroad is not prohibited by the constitution? The Japanese government offered a criterion: "not for the purpose of war" (the government official statement on October 28, 1980). Which country in the history claimed its aggression (includ
ing the "Great East Asian War") for the purpose of war?
The constitution prohibits the use of military ways, including the so-called "collective self-defense right," to solve international disputes. However, the PKO bill allows the SDF to bring weapons "for self-defense." Moreover, in the "basic agreements" (April 22, 1994), the allied parties of the Hata Cabinet (including the Socialist Party) absurdly declaimed that "the Japanese constitution is based on the concept of the UN common security." They further falsely illustrated the concept of the UN common security to an "international collective self-defense right," to promise the U.S. that Japan would fight with the U.S. against North Korea even with the concept of the UN common security, instead of the UN decision, rather than to prevent such a crisis (pp.192-193) (*2). Asia concludes, "Whether our Japanese people stand up against such a false self-defense right by the conservative forces, will determine Japan's future" (p.194).
Chapter 3 argues what relationship should the giant Japan have with the UN and should Japan not become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Asai was surprised at the statement of the Japanese government toward people that Japan would make contributions to the world armament reduction and control once Japan becomes a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The Japanese government certainly knew that there were several reasons for the UN Security Council not to deal with this issue, the U.S. and other powers are against it too. Such situations will not change for the reason of Japan's becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council (p.239). For the Japanese government and the conservative forces, it is not easy to find superficial reasons to appeal for the people because they had to conceal their real intention, which was shown early by Nakasone's speech "The Post-Cold War World" at Stanford University on February 18, 1992 (pp.266-267).
Japan began to pursue the global giant status from Nakasone's premiership in 1982-87 (he was the first postwar Premier to officially worship at the Yasukuni Shrine), while the UN Security Council did not function well due to the Cold War political structure. After the decline of the former Soviet Union, the U.S. could utilize the UN Security Council to pursue its international strategy. To support this strategy that is restricted by the financial limitation, the U.S. began to request its allies, especially Japan, to undertake more military subdivisions (p.270). "It is the U.S. interest to promote and help Japan to play a global leading role" (Mondale's statement to the Congress hearing for the appointment of Japan's Ambassador on July 28, 1993). "Japan's taking steps to participate in all UN peace keeping activities is the precondition for the U.S. to support Japan to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council" (A Senate unanimously adopted decision on July 14, 1994). In his first US-Japan Summi
t with Premier Miyazawa (himself a "conservative mainstream" against Japan's military enlargement) on April 16, 1993, President Clinton formally expressed that the U.S. supports Japan becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council. However, how to reply to this U.S. request puzzled the Japanese conservative forces: Japan can assist the U.S. if the U.S. acts in the name of the UN (the Gulf War, Kampuchea, Somalia, Haiti), otherwise Japan will "lose trust of the international society and cause great damage to the US-Japan relationship" due to the "limitation' of the constitution (Saito Kunihiko, the deputy Minister of the Foreign Affairs, on March 23, 1994 Nikkei Daily).
Asai argues that it will be easy for the Japanese government to fool the Japanese people to participate in various military operations under the name of the UN by misrepresenting the UN decisions, as it has done to the constitution, once Japan becomes a permanent member of the UN Security Council. He showed us a reference: for the purpose of sending the SDF to Zaire, the Japanese government utilized an excuse that the UNHCR requested Japan to rescue refugees there. However, by the convention, "the UNHCR cannot request governments for assistance without the decision of the UN General Conference." The Rwanda issue was dealt by the UN Security Council, not the UN General Conference. Apparently, Ms. Ogata abused her power to help Japan's pursuing a military power status (p.279). In the meantime, the Japanese government refused advice from the UNHCR to protect Asian refugees within its own sovereignty. Actually, the Japanese government cooperated with the Chinese government to expel Chinese democratic activists o
ut of Japan since the June Fourth Incident. The MOFA bureaucracy concealed to Premier Murayama the U.S. advice of not sending the SDF there because of military dangers; they also redesigned the field research report (p.284).
The last chapter reviews the fiftieth anniversary of the end of WW II and argues Japan's future. Japan is deeply involved in the discrepancy: while democracy has been rooted in the Japanese society, the conservative ruling forces become strengthened and harsher toward Japanese people. Asai considers Japan's discrepancy due to the sudden ending of the Cold War and the international discrepancy, "the giant elephant of the U.S. has lost its way" (p.338). Both the allied ruling LDP + SDPJ + Sakigake and the "opposition" Shinshinto are pushing Japan in the military, backward direction. Their difference is to what extent to subdue to the U.S. meanwhile to oppress Japanese people. Asai concludes, to what extent will the U.S. press Japan's conservative forces and how will the Japanese people response to the backward reactions, will determine Japan's future.
I can seldom add comments besides introduction, simply because I agree with the author's arguments. It is a pleasure to read such clear judgments from a Japanese researcher as well as a veteran diplomat. The only dissatisfaction is that this book is for the audience of Japanese people (and the oral Japanese expressions seem redundant for reading), he uses many pages to illustrate the international issues in detail while cannot develop further discussions on Japan's domestic political affairs. Non-Japanese readers may feel Asai's arguments on Japan's political affairs too condensed or too simplified. I cannot get a certain conclusion whether Japan can fulfill its international obligations, or perform as a giant from this book. For further reading, Asai refers his other works, such as The International Common Knowledge and the Domestic Common Knowledge (Kashiwa Shobo, 1994), which discuss Japan's domestic affairs more directly.
As pointed out in the beginning, the issue of Japan's international role has been only argued by the conservative side, I expect more works of Professor Asai and others be introduced to the wider international world.
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1. In the October 20, 1996 Lower House election which was the first time under the small district election system, the LDP took 239 (48%) seats, the Shinshinto 156 (31%), the newly established Democratic Party 52 (10%). This result makes them to have much more than 2/3 seats to revise the constitution.
They dare not to promote revisionism right now only because they know that they cannot get the support from more than half of the people. By an Asahi Daily consciousness research (January 1, 1995), 25% answered the constitution, 24% answered the war experience, while only 17% answered the US-Japan Security Treaty, as the reason for Japan's postwar peaceful prosperity
